29. αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν—ἀνδρεία: and if αἰσχρόν, not ἀρετή
(which it is), since all ἀρετή is καλόν (349E. Cf. Lach. 182C ἡ δέ
γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλὸν εἶναι and with the general sentiment
Meno, 88B οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ᾽ οἶον
θάππος τι: οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαππῇ ἄνθπωρος, βλάρτεται, ὅταν δὲ
σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;
30. λέγεις: the present is idiomatically used in referring to an
earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on ὅπερ λέγω in
Apol. 21A. With λέγεις followed by an accusative in this sense
compare Symp. 199E πειρῶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν: ὁ Ἔρως
ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;
31. οὐχὶτοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι. This Protagoras did not say,
but only that οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι: see 349E For this reason
Sauppe and others reject τούς before θαρραλέους, and in favour
of this urge the reply of Protagoras (καὶ νῦν γε): but inasmuch as
(1) οὐκοῦν οὗτοι—μαινόμενοι φαίνονται seems to be intended to be
incompatible with τοὺς ἀνδρείους οὐχὶ—εἷναι, (2) θαρραλεώτατοι
δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι in l. 35 clearly implies that θαρραλέοι are
conceived of as ἀνδρεῖοι (no less than ἀνδρεῖοι as θαρραλέοι), we
must, if we regard the argument as a whole, retain the MSS.
reading. Protagoras' καὶ νῦν γε is an unwary admission: he does not
at first catch the difference between οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν οἱ θαρραλέοι
and οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι θαρραλέοι, and Socrates avails himself of his
opponent's slip to hasten to his conclusion—which but for this
misrepresentation could only be expressed as ἀνδρεῖοι are σοφοί
( = ἐπιστήμονες), not σοφοί are ἀνδρεῖοι: see on 349Eand 350D
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