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Admiral Porter had been seen, and was told that he had not. I consulted a few minutes with the officer in charge, and then stood twenty-five miles out to sea, and found the Minnesota and some of the large vessels out there.
I spoke them and inquired if they knew where Admiral Porter was. They said they did not, but supposed he was at Beaufort; that they could not get in the harbor of Beaufort, and therefore had come along.
Expecting him momentarily, I did not come to anchor, but steamed under what steamboat men call “one bell,” --steamed slowly around all that night.
On the evening of the 16th, not seeing Admiral Porter, I stood in towards land with the blockading fleet, my transport fleet still remaining at Masonboroa Inlet, with the exception of my own vessel and a little boat for a tender.
I waited that day, which was very fine, and waited also the next day. The sea was so smooth that I lowered my gig and took a row for pleasure.
There was not wind enough to fill the sail of a yawl boat that was let down.
I sent General Weitzel and Colonel Comstock on the Chamberlain to make a reconnoissance of the fort, and they ran in so as to draw the fire.
We waited there Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.
On Sunday morning (the 18th) I received a letter from Admiral Porter dated the 16th of December, in which he said that he expected to leave for the rendezvous on the 17th, and that if the weather permitted he expected to blow up the powder vessel on the night of the 18th.
He also informed me that it had been suggested to him by some of the naval engineers that even at twenty-five miles the explosion might affect the boilers of the steamers and make them explode if heavy steam was carried, and advised that before the explosion took place the fires be drawn and the steam allowed to run down as low as possible.1
We waited until Sunday night before Admiral Porter made his appearance.
I ran out to meet him and was informed by him that the powder vessel Louisiana, which he said was “as complete as human ingenuity could make her,” 2 having on board two hundred and thirty-five tons of powder,3 all he could get, had gone to attempt the explosion, and that he proposed to stand in the
1 See Appendix No. 117.
2 See Appendix No. 118.
3 The testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War shows that only two hundred and fifteen tons were ever got on board. The navy got one hundred and fifty tons of that from the army, and supplied only sixty-five tons instead of one hundred and fifty tons as agreed.
A. M. Thayer and Co. 1892.
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