Benjamnin F. Butler, Butler's Book: Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major-General Benjamin Butler

The plan of operation against New Orleans had been agreed upon in a consultation between Flag-Officer Farragut, Captain Bailey of the navy, who afterwards led one of the divisions by the forts in the Cayuga, Major Strong, my chief of staff, Lieutenant Weitzel, and myself, Captain Porter not being present. The plan then adopted was substantially the one carried out, which resulted in the capture of the city:--

I. Captain Porter, with his fleet of twenty-one bomb-schooners, should anchor below the two forts, Jackson and St. Philip, and continue to fire upon them until they were reduced, or until his ammunition was nearly exhausted. During the bombardment, Captain Farragut's fleet should remain out of fire, as a reserve, just below the bomb-vessels. The army, or so much of it as transportation could be found for, should remain at the mouth of the river, awaiting the issue of the bombardment. If Captain Porter succeeded in reducing the forts, the army would ascend the river and garrison them. It would then be apparent, probably, what the next movement would be.

II. If the bombardment did not reduce or silence the forts, then Captain Farragut, with his fleet of steamers, would attempt to run by them. If he succeeded, he proposed to clear the river of the enemy's fleet, cut off the forts from supplies, and push on at least far enough to reconnoitre the next obstruction.

III. Captain Farragut having passed the forts, General Butler would at once take the troops round to the rear of Fort St. Philip, land them in the swamps there, and attempt to carry the fort by assault. The enemy had made no preparations to resist an attack from that quarter, supposing the swamps impassable. But Lieutenant Weitzel, while constructing the fort, had been for two years in the habit of duck shooting all over those swamps, and knew every bay and bayou of them. He assured General Butler that the landing of troops there would be difficult, but not impossible; and hence this part of the scheme.

Both in the formation of the plan and in its execution, the local knowledge and pre-eminent skill of Lieutenant Weitzel were of the utmost value. Few men contributed more to the reduction of the city than he. There were few more valuable officers in the service than General Weitzel, as the country well knows.