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His vessels were short of ammunition:--
As the ammunition gave out the vessels retired from action. . . .
I have ordered the largest vessels to proceed to Beaufort to fill up with ammunition. . . .
In one hour and fifteen minutes after the first shot was fired not a shot came from the fort . . . . Finding that the batteries were silenced completely, I directed the ships to keep up a moderate fire in hopes of attracting the attention of the transports bringing them in.
In his letter of Jan. 9, 1865, to the
Secretary of the Navy, attacking me for not making preparation for a more lengthy stay at
Fort Fisher because I relied upon the powder-boat, he has the effrontery to say:--
I thought a good deal would be done by the explosion, but still I laid in a double allowance of shell and shot, and did not depend on a doubtful experiment.
Yet after a few hours of not rapid firing upon the fort by his vessels some had to withdraw from the attack, being short of ammunition, and he sent the larger vessels the next day to
Beaufort to replenish their supply, the fleet having expended no more shot and shell than he would use in a “month's target practice.”
1
How do these facts comport with his reckless statement that he put in a double allowance of ammunition?
What was
Fort Fisher and its condition at the time of the two several attacks upon it?
We have shown what
Porter thought of the capabilities of
Fort Fisher as a fortification.
Now this fort had been constructed at great labor by the
Confederacy, and by its ablest and most experienced engineers.
It was built to hold one of its most important points, which had become its chief depot for supplies from abroad of arms, clothing, and ammunition.
But he says of it, “There never was a fort that invited soldiers to walk in and take possession more plainly than
Fort Fisher.”
2 This was his opinion after the first attack, and upon it he based all his abuse of me for not accepting the “invitation.”
