[856] Previous to ordering any troops from Butler, I sent my chief engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me, and reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the latter with great security; but that General Butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that the general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox Rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck ; and it was therefore as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty sketch which General Barnard1 had drawn; and in making my subsequent report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention — as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler, and, I know, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of General Badeau's
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1 It will be remembered that Barnard was the engineer sent down by Halleck on the 21st of May, 1864, to examine my defences and report whether I could move my army for offensive operations. He reported to Grant on the 24th of May recommending that “for offensive operations” twenty thousand of my troops be sent out of the bottle to reinforce and rescue Grant at Cold Harbor, which was done. And it also appears that Barnard in attempting to describe my fortifications by a picture, used this phrase, which Grant remembered and put in a report to Halleck.
It is a just criticism to say, how could the engineer officer, seeing more than twenty miles of smooth rivers to be crossed by pontoon bridges everywhere, protected by the navy, a fine harbor with quays and landings for the embarkation of troops at City Point and Bermuda Hundred, report to his general that my army was corked up as if in a bottle so that it could not be moved at all for offensive operations? Here is another instance of an engineer picture-drawer who did me great harm, and it is the only act of his done during the campaign of 1864 that has any chance of going down in history.
A. M. Thayer and Co. 1892.
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