Benjamnin F. Butler, Butler's Book: Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Major-General Benjamin Butler

[no. 63. see page 671.]

As I informed General Halleck in my despatch of 8.30 of May 26, I had already got my best troops into a movable column for the purpose of offensive operations. My defensive line is in such position as to be safe to leave it with the dismounted cavalry, the invalids, and a few good troops. I found that the rebels had uncovered Petersburg, and its importance as a depot to them cannot be overrated. I had proposed to attack the place to-morrow morning, with every prospect of success, but the imperative orders transmitted through General Halleck, and the arrival of the transportation, although not sufficient, in my judgment, but yet sufficient to begin with, rendered necessary a change of order. General Smith embarks to-night. I have now left here one division and two regiments of infantry, invalids, dismounted cavalry, and artillery. Much of the light artillery I shall send away as soon as my transports return. I regret exceedingly the loss of this opportunity upon Petersburg.

[no. 65. see page 687.]

As I reported in my despatch of 10 A. M., Warren was ordered to attack a column of the rebel infantry which was passing toward Cold Harbor, but instead of falling upon it in force he opened with artillery, and at 3 P. M., reported that the intrenchments of the enemy were exceedingly strong, and that his own lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to attack with. It seems that Wright blundered in the execution of his order to march to Cold Harbor. Instead of having his advance there at 9 A. M., as was General Grant's and Meade's design that his whole corps should be on the ground at daylight, when a rapid attack in mass would certainly have routed the rebel force which a little later assaulted Sheridan, and an advantage might easily have been gained which, followed up by