Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 8.
Frank Moore, Ed.

[41] thousand and nine thousand men altogether. That includes this division of Buford's that operated up here. I have somewhere among my papers a list of all his brigades. I know nearly all of them. I have run against nearly all of them. He had five of the oldest regiments in the confederate service detailed expressly for this purpose as a nucleus of his organization. These were troops that had seen a great deal of service along the line below Memphis — Chalmers's brigade, Ely's brigade, Bell's brigade, and McCullough's. I cannot estimate Forrest's force at less than between eight thousand and nine thousand men. The cause of this raid, unquestionably, was the fact that so large an amount of troops which had been holding this region of country had been removed — a portion of them up the Tennessee River to Decatur, and a portion up the Red River — also the fact that he knew perfectly well, from his spies at Memphis, the condition of our cavalry. Memphis, from the nature of the ground there, is a place that requires not less than five thousand men to garrison the outer line. It is the worst place to cover that I ever saw. We have a fort there that was built that would take seven thousand men as a reasonable amount to line the parapets. We have immense stores there, for from Memphis not only the Sixteenth and Seventeenth army corps are supplied, but General Steele's army at Little Rock are supplied from there also. We have large hospitals there, scattered all over the city. We have an unsteady and unreliable population; and the daily interior guard duty, for the city proper, requires over three hundred men. I considered then, and I consider now, that the removal of any force competent to make any serious impression upon Forrest would have imperilled Memphis; and I believe that was what General Forrest wanted done.

Question. How large a force did you retain there for the safety of that place?

Answer. I retained the infantry--four thousand men. I kept the cavalry out all the time as far as they could go.

Question. How came you to reoccupy Fort Pillow? Had it been abandoned?

Answer. No, sir. When I moved to Meridian, the Fifty-second Indiana regiment, which had been there, was withdrawn, and made a part of the expedition, and the Thirteenth Tennessee cavalry, which was recruiting, was moved down there as a recruiting point. I afterward reenforced it by sending up Major Booth with four companies of colored heavy artillery and six guns, and a section of light artillery, making in all about six hundred men.

Question. Do I understand you to say that the post had never been entirely abandoned?

Answer. No, sir. When the Fifty-second Indiana was taken away it was temporarily abandoned until the Thirteenth Tennessee came down to hold it as a recruiting point. I considered Fort Pillow as a place which ought to be held with a small garrison, and I think so yet, and any navy officer or river man will tell you that the situation of the channel there requires it.

Question. I am not questioning that at all. I merely inquired as to the fact.

Answer. I sent Major Booth there because I had great confidence in him as a soldier. He was an old soldier who had served in the regular army, and I considered him the best man I had for that purpose. I received a report from him “that he could hold that post against any force for forty-eight hours,” which was all I expected him to do, and if he had not been killed I think he would have held it. I have no doubt that his death was the immediate cause of the capture of the place.

Question. Just in this connection, please to state why you deemed it important to keep up a garrison at that place?

Answer. The steamboat channel at Fort Pillow runs right under the bluff, and brings every boat as it passes within musket-shot of the shore, and a couple of guns mounted up above there would stop most effectually the navigation of the river, and drive away any of the tin-clad gunboats we have, for a plunging fire would go right through them, and they could not get elevation enough to strike. The whole life of the army below, especially while these large movements were going on, depended upon an uninterrupted communication by the river, and the stopping that communication for two or three days might deprive us of necessary supplies just at the moment that they were required. These were my reasons for holding the place.

Question. What information have you in regard to the attack upon Fort Pillow; its capture, and the barbarities practised there?

Answer. I am not positive about dates, but my recollection is that Fort Pillow was attacked on the twelfth of April. Just about dusk of the twelfth a boat came down to Memphis from Fort Pillow, bringing information that the place was attacked, but that Major Booth was perfectly confident of being able to hold out until he could be reenforced. I immediately ordered a regiment to be got ready, with four days rations and an extra supply of ammunition; took the steamer Glendale, dropped her down to Fort Pickering, and the regiment was in the very act of going on board when another boat came down with the information that the Fort was captured. The order to move up the regiment was countermanded, for there was no use in sending it then. There were at Fort Pillow two ten-pound Parrotts, two six-pounder field guns, and two twelve-pounder howitzers, and about six hundred men. I cannot tell precisely the number of the Thirteenth Tennessee cavalry, for it was a recruiting regiment, and filling off and on. If the men had been left in the position in which they had been placed by Major Booth, and from which position he had already repelled an assault of the enemy, I think they would have been able to have held the Fort until reenforced. I believe that the ground there is so strong that six hundred men