Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 32.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

In each battle Jackson's opponent had double the force he commanded. The design of the Union generals was to concentrate their forces and crush Jackson by their overwhelming numbers, but Jackson's superior strategy of keeping them separated, retreating and advancing at will, and attacking them in detail at places which he desired, proved that he was a great master of the art of war. His men were inspired by the motive of self-defence and self-preservation—the first laws of nature.

After Jackson had driven the Federal forces from the Shenandoah Valley he joined General Lee at Richmond, and fell upon the right wing of General McClellan's army. Victory after victory crowned the Confederate banners for two years. But the magnificent army that defeated McClellan in 1862 was gradually lessened by bullet and disease, and when the surrender came it was a mere skeleton in numbers. Attrition did the work.

After the battle of the First Manassas General Jackson advanced, getting together all the available men of the South to invade the North. He argued that the North had unlimited resources, while those of the South were limited. He declared that in acting upon the defensive it was sometimes necessary to become the aggressor in order to be successful. He maintained that the North would wear down the South if the duration of the war developed upon endurance of numbers.

Subsequent events proved Jackson's theory to be correct. The 2,800,000 soldiers enlisted in the North simply wore out the 550,000 Southern soldiers. New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio alone enlisted for the cause of the Union 750,000 men, which is more than the combined South enlisted in defense of its cause.