In July, 1863, the
Confederacy was cut in two by the capture of
Vicksburg and
Port Hudson, including the
Confederate garrison, composing the army of
General Pemberton, which had been used to keep the
Mississippi river closed to navigation, and to preserve communication between the States of the
Confederacy on the east and west of the great river.
At the close of the
Vicksburg campaign, the river and its tributaries were almost in full and complete control of the
Federal government, being protected so thoroughly from
Cairo to New Orleans by the fleet of
Admiral Porter, composed of heavy and light gunboats, that it was difficult for even an individual to get across.
It was essentially free from annoyances, even of field batteries and riflemen on either bank.
About the time of the surrender of
Vicksburg and
Port Hudson,
General Joseph E. Johnston, who had succeeded in collecting a Confederate army of 30,000 men near
Jackson, Miss. (the present effective force being about 28,000 men), had moved towards
Vicksburg to attempt its relief.
He had arrived in the vicinity of
Mechanicsburg, when, on July 4, he heard of the surrender of the city.
He immediately retreated to the city of
Jackson, arriving there July 7, and placed his army in the intrenchments surrounding the city from the river on the north to the river on the south.
General Sherman followed with an army of about 50,000 men, arriving before
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the city on the 9th of July.
The two armies faced each other in the attitude of besieged and besieging, from the 9th to the night of the 16th day of July, when
General Johnston, seeing his danger, crossed over
Pearl river and marched towards
Meridian,
General Sherman pursuing beyond
Brandon, Miss.
It appears that it was
General Sherman's intention at that time to crush the Confederate army, or drive it out of the
State of Mississippi, and destroy the railroads.
There was then a great drought and the heat was so intense that he decided to postpone further pursuit, and return to
Vicksburg, intending at some future time to penetrate the
State and drive out any Confederate forces that might be found.
During these operations the Confederate army lost 600 men in killed, wounded and missing.
The Federal army lost 1,122.
The occupation of
Jackson by
Grant's army in May, 1863, began the cruel side of the war in the wanton destruction of private as well as public property, which destruction was emphasized especially by
General Sherman in all his campaigns to the close of the war. He reported July 18, 1863:
“We have made fine progress to-day in the work of desolation;
Jackson will no longer be a point of danger.
The land is desolated for thirty miles around.”
The destruction of private property ever marked the progress of
General Sherman's armies.
Raymond,
Jackson and
Brandon had already felt the shock, and monumental chimneys for the most part marked their former locations.
In the meantime
General Sherman had carried most of his army to
east Tennessee to assist
General Grant in his operations against the Confederate army under
General Bragg.
He returned to
Memphis January 10, 1864, and began at once to prepare an army to go into
Mississippi from
Vicksburg as far as
Meridian, or
Demopolis, Ala. His first step was to order that the Memphis and Charleston Railroad be abandoned.
He had a large force guarding the
Mississippi river, one division at
Natchez,
McPherson's 17th Army Corps at
Vicksburg,
Hurlbut's 16th Army Corps at
Memphis, and about 10,000 cavalry in
West Tennessee, including
General W. Sooy Smith's command from
middle Tennessee (about 40,000 effectives). With this large force and the great
Mississippi gunboat and ironclad fleets operating with these troops, a diversion was to be made on
Mobile Ala., by
General Banks and
Admiral Farragut.
An expedition was also to ascend the
Yazoo river from
Snyder's Mill, consisting of five gunboats and five transports with several regiments of infantry.
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As stated,
Generals Pemberton's and
Gardner's Confederate forces had been captured, and there remained in observation of this large force in
Mississippi two small divisons of
Confederate States infantry—Loring at
Canton, and French at
Jackson—about 9,000 men, with several batteries.
General Stephen D. Lee, with four brigades of cavalry,
Stark's,
Adams' and
Ross', composing
Jackson's Divison, and
General S. W. Ferguson's Brigade, which had been drawn from
northeast Mississippi, covering the country from opposite
Yazoo City to
Natchez, Miss. (over 300 miles), and numbering about 3,500 effectives.
General Forrest was south of the
Tallahatchie river in
northwest Mississippi, picketing towards
Memphis and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, his force numbering about 3,500 men. The entire Confederate force in
Mississippi did not exceed 16,000 men.
This was the condition of affairs in January, 1864.
The concentration of troops at
Vicksburg and the marshaling of 10,000 cavalry in
west Tennessee was duly observed and reported to
General Polk, commanding in
Mississippi.
Spies reported the force as consisting of an army of four divisions of infantry with the usual complement of artillery and a brigade of cavalry, making an army of over 26,000 men, to move from
Vicksburg early in February.
Another column of 7,000 cavalry, under
General W. Sooy Smith, was to move from
west Tennessee direct to
Meridian to meet the army under
General Sherman from
Vicksburg near that point, and then the combined forces to go either to
Selma or
Mobile, as might be indicated.
General Sherman was to hold
Lee's Confederate cavalry and any infantry in his front, and
General W. Sooy Smith was to engage
Forrest with his cavalry force, which outnumbered
Forrest by double as many men.
To meet the enemy,
General Lee concentrated his cavalry in front of
Vicksburg, along the
Big Black river and near the
Yazoo river.
On January 28th, the
Yazoo river expedition began to move.
Federal cavalry advancing on the
Yazoo City road from Snyder's Bluff on the
Yazoo.
This force was met by
Ross' Texas Brigade and driven back.
On February 3rd, Federal infantry began crossing the
Big Black river at the railroad crossing and six miles above, at Messenger's ferry, distant from
Vicksburg twelve or fifteen miles, and rapidly drove in the cavalry pickets on the two roads leading to
Clinton.
Early on the morning of February 4th, there was severe skirmishing on both roads, the enemy deploying their force in the open country and steadily driving back the brigades of
Adams and
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Stark in their front, their troops being in full view.
The day's operations, in causing the enemy to develop their forces from actual observation, from prisoners, scouts and other sources, in flank and rear of their columns, fixed the force as consisting of two corps of infantry and artillery (16th and 17th), commanded respectively by
Generals Hurlbut and
McPherson, and a brigade of cavalry under
Colonel Winslow.
The entire force was about 26,000 effectives, with a comparatively small wagon-train for such an army.
The
Yazoo river expedition started about the same time, and it was intended to divide and hold a part of
Lee's Confederate cavalry, so that no concentration could be made against
General W. Sooy Smith's column; who was ordered to start about the time
General Sherman started from
Vicksburg.
The two expeditions displayed the two great resources
General Sherman had to bring against the small force of Confederates in
Mississippi.
An incident near the old battlefield of
Baker's creek is worthy of being recorded.
The enemy's infantry deployed was moving forward gradually, pressing back
Adams' Brigade, dismounting and fighting them in a swamp.
While thus engaged the
Federal brigade of cavalry came charging down on their rear and flank, and on their lead horses.
The moment was critical, as
Adams was almost too hotly engaged to withdraw on short notice.
The two escort companies of
General S. D. Lee and
W. H. Jackson alone were mounted and near at hand, numbering about ninety men all told.
Major W. H. Bridges, of
Texas, was temporarily connected with the command, an officer for just such an emergency.
He was ordered to lead the two companies against the
Federal brigade and hold them in check.
It was a choice command, fearlessly led, and it did the work assigned it, but with the loss of the noble leader and many of his followers.
The dash saved
Adams' Brigade, which was retired mounted, and moved over
Baker's creek.
At the same time
Griffith's Arkansas regiment was thrown into the woods near the bridge, thus permitting the two escort companies to sweep over the bridge, when gradually pressed back by the superior numbers of the
Federal cavalry following, and just as the Federal infantry had got through the swamp and were moving towards the bridge.
The Federal advance was checked by artillery across
Baker's creek, which also enabled the
Arkansas regiment to get over the bridge.
On February 5th the Confederate cavalry was gradually pressed back to
Jackson, where it arrived about dark, passing out on the road towards
Canton, to enable
General Loring's infantry division
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to cross
Pearl river from
Canton, moving towards
Morton, on the Jackson and Meridian railroad; a regiment was also sent across
Pearl river to cover the front of the enemy, if they tried to cross
Pearl river at
Jackson.
This regiment was also to destroy the pontoon bridge over
Pearl river.
General French, with two small brigades at
Jackson, and
General Loring at
Canton, had been advised to cross
Pearl river, owing to the large forces of the
Federal army, and their rapid advance.
As soon as it was ascertained that
General Sherman was crossing
Pearl river at
Jackson,
General Loring, who had marched towards
Pearl river from
Canton, crossed and united his division with
General French's near
Morton, on the Jackson and Meridian Railroad.
Ferguson's Brigade covered
Loring's command on the
Clinton and
Canton road.
General Lee also crossed with two brigades of
Jackson's Division (
Adams' and
Stark's) and with
Ferguson's Brigade, which was sent to get in front of the enemy and cover the retreat of
General Loring's two divisions.
Jackson, with
Adams' and
Stark's Brigades, was ordered to operate on the flank and rear of the enemy on his march at Brandon and Pelahatchie stations.
General Ross, who was operating on the
Yazoo river, was ordered to abandon his operations there and march to join his division under
General W. H. Jackson.
As soon as
General Polk was fully advised of the large force under
General Sherman, and of the column which was to move from the north, he decided that his force was too small to give battle.
He had drawn a part of the
Mobile garrison to
Meridian as a re-enforcement, but considering
Mobile as the most important place in his department, and fearing that
Sherman would move towards
Mobile instead of
Meridian to meet
Admiral Farragut and
General Banks, he ordered
General Lee on February 9 to move all his cavary from the rear and the north of
Sherman's line of march to the south, to protect the Mobile and Ohio railroad, so that he could return the troops he got from
Mobile, and could also be able to reenforce that point, if necessary, with additional troops.
He could not understand why
Sherman had
Meridian as his objective point.
General Polk at the same time ordered
General Ferguson's Brigade from the front of
General Sherman's advance to the south, in order also to protect the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.
General Lee, on arriving at
Newton Station, on the 11th of February, met
General Ferguson.
He at once saw that
General Sherman was going to
Meridian and not to
Mobile, and caused
General Ferguson to retrace his steps and again get in front of
General Sherman.
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In the meantime
General Sherman, after crossing
Big Black river on two different roads, advanced rapidly to
Jackson, arriving there on the morning of February 6th.
He crossed
Pearl river on the 6th and 7th of February, and pressed out towards
Brandon on the road to
Meridian, arriving at
Brandon on February 7th, at
Morton February 7th, and at
Meridian February 14th at 3 P. M., the Confederate infantry and cavalry gradually falling back before him.
General Lee made a dash at some wagons near
Decatur.
The enemy was found moving with every precaution, their trains perfectly and judiciously arranged with each brigade, no foraging parties out, and their large infantry force ready to punish any ill-advised attempt on their column.
Colonel R. C. Wood's Mississippi Regiment disabled about twenty wagons, but could not bring them off, as the infantry advanced on him from the front and the rear of the column.
This was found to be the case wherever an attempt was made by the cavalry to impede the march.
On the 13th
General Polk ordered
General Lee to again get to the north of
General Sherman's line of march, as he proposed to evacuate
Meridian and march with his infantry towards
Demopolis, Ala. The enemy arrived at
Meridian at 3 P. M., February 14th, the Confederate cavalry retiring towards
Marion station.
On this date (February 14th)
General Polk issued an order placing
Major-General Stephen D. Lee in command of all the cavalry west of
Alabama.
That officer at once put himself in rapid communication with
General Forrest, who was then concentrating his command near
Starkville, Miss., to check the large cavalry force which had left Collerville, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and was rapidly moving southward in the direction of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and towards the great prairie region.
For some reason this cavalry force of 7,000 men had delayed a week in starting to join
General Sherman.
From February 15th to 20th,
General Sherman, while at
Meridian, was engaged in destroying the railroad in every direction, north, south, east and west, for this purpose placing two divisions of infantry on each road.
The road was destroyed for twelve miles in each direction, making a destruction of about fifty miles of railroad.
Attempts to stop the work were made by the cavalry, but the enemies' force was too large for it. In addition to destroying the railroads, they destroyed the city of
Meridian, burning most of the houses, depots, hotels, boarding houses, and those near them.
On February 20th,
General Sherman began his return march to
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Vicksburg.
One of his corps took the road on which he came through
Decatur to
Hillsboro, the other marching from
Lauderdale Station, on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, by Union to
Hillsboro, the latter corps feeling northward, hoping to hear of or find
General W. Sooy Smith's command; which
Sherman had ordered to join him at
Meridian about the 10th of February.
The cavalry brigade (with
General Sherman) was also detached as far north as
Louisville and
Philadelphia, and circled west and south through
Kosciusko to
Canton.
The two corps met at
Hillsboro and moved across
Pearl river to
Canton, marching on two separate roads.
They remained at
Canton several days, devastating and destroying the town and country for miles, and then returned to
Vicksburg.
In the meantime, February 17th,
General Lee, under orders from
General Polk, left only a few regiments to watch the army of
General Sherman at
Meridian and moved with all of his disposable force northward to unite with
General Forrest in an attempt to crush the column under
General Smith, estimated by
General Forrest at 7,000 men.
Lee put his four cavalry brigades (
Ross had joined him the day before in the vicinity of
Marion Station), in motion on the morning of February 18th, and reached the
Line creek north of
Starkville, and nine miles southwest of
West Point, on the morning of February 22d.
It was found that the enemy had begun a hasty retreat early on the morning of February 21st.
General Forrest, as soon as he knew the probable destination of this column, concentrated his command in the vicinity of
Starkville, and on the 20th had a part of his force at
West Point, one brigade being in front of the town.
He had up to this time offered no opposition to the advance of the
Federal cavalry.
He intended avoiding a battle until the arrival of
General Lee's force, which was rapidly approaching, and he offered slight opposition at
West Point, retreating across Sookartonichie creek, three miles from
West Point.
General Forrest knew that
General Smith's force of 7,000 well equipped cavalry would outnumber his command when united with
General Lee's, and he believed also that there would be trouble in avoiding a battle before the junction of the two commands.
General Sooy Smith began his march with the cavalry (7,000) and an infantry brigade on February 10th, a week later than
General Sherman had expected him to start.
Under cover of the advance of his infantry, he moved eastward with his cavalry to New Albany, then towards
Pontotoc, and to within a few miles of
Houston, where
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he moved due east to
Okolona; he then moved south down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to
Prairie station (fifteen miles north of
West Point), where he concentrated his command.
On February 20th, he moved his entire command to the vicinity of
West Point.
Here he encountered the first Confederate brigade drawn up in line of battle a mile out of the city.
After a slight skirmish the brigade retired before him through the city, and on the road towards
Starkville over Sookatonichie creek,.
General Smith, on arriving at
West Point (February 20th), heard of the approach of
General Stephen D. Lee's cavalry from the direction of
Meriden, and had it confirmed from prisoners and deserters taken on the evening of the same date, when
Forrest was retiring, and being followed across the Sookatonichie, to await the arrival of
General Lee's command.
General Smith, although he had fought no battle, and had met with no opposition to amount to anything on his march from
Collierville to
West Point, suddenly determined to retreat, and issued orders for his command to begin the return march early on the morning of the 21st of February.
He says in his official report: ‘Exaggerated reports of
Forrest's strength reached me constantly, and it was reported that
Lee was about to reinforce him with a portion or the whole of his command.’
To cover his retreat, he moved one of his brigades towards Sockatonichie creek and attacked a part of
General Forrest's command on February 21st.
The fight lasted about two hours, when
Forrest, with his usual perception and vigor, began to believe a change of operation had occurred in his front, and with a regiment and escort he began a headlong charge, breaking through and driving the enemy before him. He found that
Smith was rapidly retreating northward.
He at once had all his command rushed to the front in pursuit, overtaking the enemy near
Okolona, where he began crowding him, and gradually driving him from position to position, capturing six pieces of artillery; this pursuit was kept up to near
Pontotoc, on February 22d and 23d, where it was abandoned except by a small force.
General Forrest had about exhausted his ammunition, and could follow the enemy no farther.
The retreat was very rapid, the itinerary and reports showing that in the first day's retrograde movement (February 21st), a part of the command marched thirty-seven miles and had to remount with captured horses, abandoning many of their exhausted stock.
It is difficult to understand his headlong retreat, except that the enemy was fearful of being cut off by the cavalry getting in their rear.
It is difficult now to speculate as to the results had
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Smith not retreated.
It was a great disappointment to
Generals Lee and
Forrest.
Their united forces numbered a little less than 7,000 effectives, while
Smith had that number.
With a soldier's pride the
Confederate commanders looked forward to the greatest cavalry battle of the war, where 14,000 cavalry were to meet in deadly conflict on one field.
It was arranged that as soon as
General Lee arrived,
Forrest was to take his entire force to the rear of
Smith and cut off his retreat, while
Lee was to battle in front, and in front and rear the battle was to be fought to a final issue.
It was a great disappointment when it was found that the
Federal general not only declined battle, but made one of the most headlong, hasty retreats during the war, before an inferior force in pursuit, not numbering over 2,500 men.
General Stephen D. Lee, as soon as he learned from dispatches from
General Forrest of the rapid and headlong retreat of
General W. S. Smith and his cavalry back towards
Memphis, put his cavalry command again in motion to overtake
General Sherman's command on its way to
Vicksburg.
General W. H. Jackson overtook the enemy in the vicinity of
Sharon, Madison county.
He found the enemy desolating and destroying the country in every direction.
He soon drove in all foraging parties and confined their movements to one or two roads and a limited area.
General Sherman's army recrossed
Big Black river, March 6th, on its way to
Vicksburg.
The official reports show that in the three columns,
Sherman's,
Smith's and the
Yazoo river expedition, the
Federals lost in killed, wounded and missing, 912 men, and that
General Forrest lost 144 men, and
General Stephen D. Lee 279 men, or only 423 men in all. These reports also show that
Gen. Lee's cavalry was in the saddle actively engaged from February 1st to March 4th, and that the command marched from 600 to 800 miles during that time.
It is difficult to understand the military object of
Sherman's campaign.
He says it was ‘to strike the roads inland, so as to paralyze the
Rebel forces, that we could take from the defense of of the
Mississippi river the equivalent of a corps of 20,000 men to be used in the next
Georgia campaign, at the same time I wanted to destroy
General Forrest, etc.’
He did destroy over fifty miles of railroads, but he did not destroy
Forrest, although his column of 7,000 men was the best equipped veteran cavalry that ever went into the field, and outnumbered
Forrest's freshly raised men two to one.
The railroads in twenty-six working days were thoroughly repaired and in as good running order as they were before
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his campaign, and this work was done by
Major George Whitfield and
Major Pritchard, of the
Confederate Quartermaster Department.
The campaign, however, did demonstrate how few troops the
Confederacy had, and that it was a mere shell, all the fighting men being in the armies at the front, and only helpless women and children and negroes occupied the interior; that the few troops in
Mississippi had to fall back until the armies at the front could be awakened to meet any new army not in front of the main armies; that
General Sherman could easily, at almost a moment's notice, take 30,000 men from the garrisons on the
Mississippi river and move into
Mississippi.
General Sherman was outgeneraled by
General Polk, and the expedition was devoid of military interest, but was most remarkable as bringing out clearly the harsh and cruel warfare waged against the
Confederacy.
General Sherman, in his official report, says he ‘made a swath of desolation fifty miles broad across the
State of Mississippi, which the present generation will not forget.’
In his orders to
General W. S. Smith, he tells him ‘to take horses, mules and cattle, and to destroy mills, barns, sheds, stables, etc.,’ and to tell the people ‘it was their time to be hurt.’
He literally carried out his plan to ‘make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war as well as the organized armies.’
The reports of the
Confederate commanders show that with the above-given license the enemy regarded nothing in the way of property, public or private, as worthy to be spared.
General Stephen D. Lee, in his official report says:
‘On the line of march the enemy took or destroyed everything, carried off every animal, 8,000 negroes, burnt every vacant house, destroyed furniture, destruction was fearful.’
The track of the
Federal column was marked by wanton destruction of private property, cotton, corn, horses, provisions, furniture and all that could be destroyed.
The people were left in absolute want.
A Federal correspondent who accompanied
Sherman, estimated the damage at $50,000,000, and three-fourths of this was private property,
Meridian,
Canton and other towns being almost totally destroyed.
It is painful now, when we are again a reunited and prosperous people, and the worst memories of the war have been relegated to the past, to recall this sad recollection, but the truth of history demands that the facts be given as they really were.
