‘ [36] which he abandoned, and compelled him to advance in order of battle to compel us to desist. * * I sent a dispatch to General Lee concerning Hooker's movements and moved back to Buckland to deceive the enemy.’ From this it appears that at the very outset of his enterprise, General Stuart encountered such a ‘hindrance’ as General Lee anticipated might occur if he tried to pass through Hooker's army, but he did not then abandon his own plans and adopt General Lee's suggestion to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown; for as Mosby says (page 177):
He made a wide detour through Fairfax and crossed the Potomac the night of the 27th at Seneca, and went into bivouac on the Maryland shore. On the same night Pleasanton's cavalry corps, the rear-guard of the army, crossed ten or twelve miles above on the pontoon at Edwards' Ferry, and marched on to Frederick.If Stuart had crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on the 25th, as suggested by General Lee, he would have been in position on General Ewell's right on the 26th of June, on which date the two columns of the Second Corps left Chambersburg, going towards the Susquehanna and General Lee arrived at that place. (See page 15). If he had crossed at Seneca on the 25th, as he expected to do before Hooker's army moved, he might still have had time ‘to move over to Fredericktown,’ as indicated by General Lee; but when he had crossed the Potomac on the 27th, it was too late to go to Fredericktown, and Ewell's movement had so far progressed that it was too late for Stuart to join him en route to the Susquehanna. The only thing that was then left for him to do was to go on to Dover, where he had reason to believe he would find Ewell's corps. Unfortunately he was again too late, for before he got to Dover, looking for the column that General Lee said would probably move by Emmittsburg, both columns of Ewell's corps had been withdrawn and General Lee was concentrating his army for the battle of Gettysburg. It is a pleasure to concur with Col. Mosby, when he says, on page 59:
