if he did not think an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania would accomplish the same results, to which he replied he did not see that it would, and the movement would be too hazarous, ‘and the campaign in thoroughly Union States would require more time and greater preparation than one through Tennessee and Kentucky.’ The account proceeds, ‘I soon discovered that he (Lee) had determined he would make some forward movement, and I finally assented that the Pennsylvania campaign might be brought to a successful issue if he could make it offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics. This point was urged with great persistency,’ &c. These interviews, as reported by General Longstreet himself, are referred to because they reflect at the very outset his mental attitude, and indicate an unwillingness to enter upon the Maryland-Pennsylvania campaign before it began. They also reveal an aggressive attitude on the part of Longstreet towards Lee, which was unsuspected until this announcement. After the battle of Chancellorsville, the two armies lay confronting each other on the banks of the Rappahannock: General Hooker's correspondence at that time shows that notwithstanding his recent disastrous repulse, he was meditating another advance, and this seems to have been General Lee's expectation. Hooker, however, was handicapped by instructions from Washington. The administration seemed unwilling to commit itself to the hazard of another forward move, and when Hooker inquired of headquarters whether it would be within the ‘spirit of his instructions’ to throw his Army South of the river, it met with that well known response from Mr. Lincoln, ‘I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox, jumped half over a fence, and likely to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to go one way, or kick the other.’ Animated by the views contained in the letter to Mr. Seddon, and assured of the return of Longstreet's two divisions, General Lee took the initiative, and on the 3d of June, just a month after the battle of Chancellorsville, the movement began. McLaws' divisions of Longstreet's corps, which had remained with the army, was quietly withdrawn from the front at Fredericksburg, and put on the march to Culpeper Court House, where Hood's
This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
Stuart 's cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign .
Black Eagle Company .
Mr. Slingluffs letter.
Story of battle of five Forks.
War time story of Dahlgren 's raid.
An incident of the battle of Winchester , or Opequon .
Marylanders in the Confederate army .
Jefferson Davis .
The Color Episode of the one hundred and Forty-Ninth regiment , Pennsylvania Volunteers .
Affidavit of Supervisors of Co. C , 149th regiment . Pa. Vols.
Munford 's Marylanders never surrendered to foe. From Richmond, Va. , Times-dispatch, February 6 , 1910 .
Further Recollections of second Cold Harbor .
Suffering in Fredericksburg .
Treachery of W. H. Seward brought fire on Sumter .
Forrest 's men rank with Bravest of brave.
Heth intended to cover his error.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.