Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

[128] position became critical. An attempt was made to carry it both from McLaws' and Hood's front. On the part of Mc-Laws it brought on a series of desperate charges which were only partially successful. Hood, on the right of McLaws, who ,was to make the enveloping movement and begin the attack, had a still longer detour to make than McLaws. His Texan's and Alabamians clambering over heavy bowlders and up the precipitate sides of Round Top, gallantly led the assault on the right.

General Hood and Brigadier-General Anderson were both severely wounded and compelled to leave the field soon after the action began. No full and satisfactory report of the occurences on this part of the field have been given. Colonel Oates of the fiftieth Alabama, says that after many struggles with the enemy and forcing his way over almost inaccessible ground, he found the enemy posted in force behind large rocks and at still greater elevation, and after repelling a number of charges, finding the enemy appearing on his right and threatening his rear, he ordered a retreat. General Longstreet's account is largely devoted to the operations of McLaws' division, with which he was present. He complained that McLaws' left was not sufficiently protected by the brigades of Anderson, of the third corps, which he claims were to move in echelon on his flank: That Hood's extending to the right left McLaws only a single line of battle, and finding no co-operation on any side, to have moved his men further forward would have been madness, and McLaws was withdrawn to the Peach Orchard.

Major General Anderson on McLaws' left, in his account of the battle says, ‘It was not until 5:30 o'clock in the evening that McLaws' division, by which the movement of my division was to be regulated, had advanced so far as to call for the movement of my troops. The advance of McLaws' division was immediately followed by the brigades of mine in the manner directed. Never did troops go into action with greater spirit and more determined courage. The ground afforded them but little shelter, and for nearly three-fourths of a mile they were compelled to face a storm of shot and shell and bullets, but there was no hesitation or faltering. They drove the enemy from the first line and possessed themselves of the ridge and much of the artillery with which it was ’