‘  and the prevention of the invasion of Pennsylvania beyond the Susquehanna, and it was no longer his intention to assume the offensive, unless the enemy's movements or position, made such an operation certain of success, and further, that should the enemy attack, it was his intention, after holding them in check a sufficient time, to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle along the direction of Pipe Creek. That for this purpose General Reynolds, in command of the left, would withdraw the forces at present at Gettysburg. The time for falling back, it was added, would be developed by circumstances.’ It is apparent from these orders, that General Meade did not design to bring on a battle at Gettysburg, and that he attached no strategic importance to the place. He was evidently in no hurry to seize it, for like every one else, he was in ignorance of its strength as a defensive position. The letter from General Meade to Reynolds, advising him to withdraw, never reached the latter. It required several hours for a courier from headquarters at Taneytown to reach Reynolds, and he moved from Emmittsburg early on the morning of the 1st, to accompany Wadsworth's division on the way to Gettysburg. So late as 12:30 of the 1st of July, and after the battle was begun, the contemplated withdrawal was still in the mind of General Meade, as will be seen by a letter, written at that time by Butterfield, chief of staff to Hancock, directing that ‘in view of the advance of Generals A. P. Hill and Ewell, on Gettysburg, and the possible failure of General Reynolds to receive the order to withdraw his command by the route through Taneytown, thus leaving the centre of our position open, that you proceed with your troops on the direct road to Gettysburg from Taneytown. When you find that General Reynolds is covering that road instead of withdrawing by Emmittsburg (which it is feared he may do), you will withdraw to Frizzelburg, as directed in circular of directions for the positions issued this morning.’ So far then as General Meade was concerned, the battle of Gettysburg was a pure accident. Let us see how it was on the other side. In his official report of July 31st, already referred to, General Lee states ‘that ’
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Table of Contents:
Stuart 's cavalry in the Gettysburg campaign .
Black Eagle Company .
Mr. Slingluffs letter.
Story of battle of five Forks.
War time story of Dahlgren 's raid.
An incident of the battle of Winchester , or Opequon .
Marylanders in the Confederate army .
Jefferson Davis .
The Color Episode of the one hundred and Forty-Ninth regiment , Pennsylvania Volunteers .
Affidavit of Supervisors of Co. C , 149th regiment . Pa. Vols.
Munford 's Marylanders never surrendered to foe. From Richmond, Va. , Times-dispatch, February 6 , 1910 .
Further Recollections of second Cold Harbor .
Suffering in Fredericksburg .
Treachery of W. H. Seward brought fire on Sumter .
Forrest 's men rank with Bravest of brave.
Heth intended to cover his error.
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