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1068b]
[1]
E.g.,
if simple becoming was once coming to be, that which comes to be
something was also once coming to be. Therefore that which simply
comes to be was not yet, but there was already something coming to be
coming to be something.But this too was at one time coming to be, and therefore it was not
at that time coming to be something. But in infinite series there is
no first term, and therefore in this series the first term cannot
exist, nor can any subsequent term. Therefore nothing can be either
generated or moved or changed.
Further,
the same thing which admits of motion admits also of the contrary
motion and of rest, and that which admits of generation admits also of
destruction.Therefore that which comes to be, when it has come to be coming to
be, is then in course of perishing
1; for it does not
perish as soon as it is coming to be coming to be, nor afterwards,
because that which is perishing must
exist .
2Further, there must be some matter underlying that which is coming
to be or changing. What then will it be? What is it that becomes
motion or generation in the same way as it is body or soul that
undergoes change? And moreover what is that which is the terminus of
the motion? For that which we are considering must be a motion or
generation
of A
from B
into
C.How then can
these conditions be fulfilled? There can be no learning of learning,
and therefore there can be no generation of generation.
Since there is no motion of substance or of
the relative or of activity and passivity, it remains that there is
motion in respect of quality, quantity and place; for each of these
admits of contrariety. By "quality" I mean not that which is in the
substance (for indeed even the differentia is a quality),
[20]
but the passive quality in
virtue of which a thing is said to be acted upon or to be immune from
being acted upon.
3 The immovable is either that which is wholly incapable of being
moved, or that which is scarcely moved in the course of a long time or
is slow in starting, or that which would naturally be moved but cannot
be moved at the time when and from the place whence and in the way in
which it would naturally be moved. This last is the only kind of
immovable thing which I recognize as being at rest; for rest is
contrary to motion, and so must be a privation of that which admits of
motion.
Things are "together in place" which
are in the primary sense
4 in one place, and "separate" which are in
different places. "Contrary in place" is that which is at a maximum
distance in a straight line.
5 Things are said to be "in contact" whose extremes are
together in place. An "intermediate" is that at which a changing thing
which changes continuously in accordance with its nature naturally
arrives before it arrives at the extreme into which it is changing.
Since all change takes place between opposites, and these are either
contraries or contradictories, and contradictories have no middle
term, clearly it is to the sphere of contraries that the intermediate
belongs.
6 "Successive" is that which comes after the beginning (the order
being determined by position or form or in some other way) and has
nothing of the same class between itself and that which it succeeds;
e.g. lines in the case of a line, and units in that of a unit, and a
house in the case of a house (but there is nothing to prevent
something else from coming between). For that which is successive is a
thing which is successive and posterior to some other thing.