[1015a]
[1]
Of nothing that exists is there nature,
but only mixture and separation of what has been mixed; nature is but
a name given to these by men.1Hence as regards those things
which exist or are produced by nature, although that from which they
naturally are produced or exist is already present, we say that they
have not their nature yet unless they have their form and
shape.That which
comprises both of these exists by nature; e.g. animals and their
parts. And nature is both the primary matter (and this in two senses:
either primary in relation to the thing, or primary in general; e.g.,
in bronze articles the primary matter in relation to those articles is
bronze, but in general it is perhaps water—that is if all
things which can be melted are water) and the form or essence, i.e.
the end of the process, of generation. Indeed from this sense of
"nature," by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is
called "nature," because the nature of anything is a kind of
essence.From what has been said, then, the primary and
proper sense of "nature" is the essence of those things which contain
in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called
"nature" because it is capable of receiving the nature, and the
processes of generation and growth are called "nature" because they
are motions derived from it. And nature in this sense is the source of
motion in natural objects, which is somehow inherent in them, either
potentially or actually.
[20]
"Necessary" means: (a) That without which, as
a concomitant condition, life is impossible; e.g. respiration and food
are necessary for an animal, because it cannot exist without them. (b)
The conditions without which good cannot be or come to be, or without
which one cannot get rid or keep free of evil—e.g., drinking
medicine is necessary to escape from ill-health, and sailing to
Aegina is necessary to
recover one's money.(c)
The compulsory and compulsion; i.e. that which hinders and prevents,
in opposition to impulse and purpose. For the compulsory is called
necessary, and hence the necessary is disagreeable; as indeed
Evenus2 says: "For every necessary
thing is by nature grievous."3And compulsion is a kind of
necessity, as Sophocles says: "Compulsion makes me do this of
necessity."4And necessity
is held, rightly, to be something inexorable; for it is opposed to
motion which is in accordance with purpose and calculation. (d) Again,
what cannot be otherwise we say is necessarily so.It is from this sense of "necessary"
that all others are somehow derived; for the term "compulsory" is used
of something which it is necessary for one to do or suffer
1 Empedocles Fr. 8 (Diels).
2 Of Poros; sophist and poet, contemporary with Socrates.
3 Evenus Fr. 8 (Hiller).
4 Soph. El. 256 (the quotation is slightly inaccurate).
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