Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

a change of conviction might have caused him to desist; but as it is he is convinced that he ought to do one thing and nevertheless does another thing.¹ 2. [11]

Again （f） if Self-restraint and Unrestraint can be displayed with reference to anything, what is the meaning of the epithet ‘unrestrained’ without qualification? No one has every form of unrestraint, yet we speak of some men as simply ‘unrestrained.’ 2. [12]

Such, more or less, are the difficulties that arise. Part of the conflicting opinions we have to clear out of the way, but part to leave standing; for to solve a difficulty is to find the answer to a problem.² 3.

We have then to consider, first （i） whether men fail in self-restraint knowing what they do is wrong, or not knowing, and if knowing, knowing in what sense; and next （ii） what are to be set down as the objects with which Self-restraint and Unrestraint are concerned: I mean, are they concerned with pleasure and pain of all sorts, or only with certain special pleasures and pains? and （iii） is Self-restraint the same as Endurance or distinct from it? and so on with （iv） the other questions akin to this subject.3. [2]

A starting-point for our investigation is to ask³ whether the differentia⁴ of the self-restrained man and the unrestrained is constituted by their objects, or by their dispositions: I mean, whether a man is called unrestrained solely because he fails to restrain himself with reference to certain things, or rather because he has a certain disposition, or rather for both reasons combined. A second question is, can Self-restraint and Unrestraint be displayed in regard to everything, or not? When a man is said to be ‘unrestrained’ without further qualification, it does not mean that he is so in relation to everything,