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τῆς ὁμολογίας, ‘the desired (or expected) agreement.’
ἐδιδάσκετο, viz. c. 46, § 2. ἐδεδίδακτο might seem more apposite, and the translators say ‘had been taught.’ But Tissaphernes is still under the influence of Alcibiades, and though A. wishes him to favour the Athenian side rather than the Lacedaemonian, yet he recommends him to wear out the Greeks upon each other (c. 46). The imperfect is therefore sound, ‘according to the lesson he was learning from him.’ εἶδος Cf. ii. 41, ἐπὶ πλεῖστα εἴδη; vi. 77, ὁρῶντες αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους. There was perhaps originally a metaphor from metamorphoses such as those of the gods, Proteus, etc.
τὸ αὐτὸ, sc. μὴ ξυμβῆναι. αὐτὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ δέος, ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλκιβιάδης . . . ἐβούλετο an easily intelligible laxity of expression. αύτὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ δέος, ὁ δ᾽ Ἀλκιβιάδης διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι κ.τ.λ would be the sequence suggested by αὐτὸς μὲν . . ., though even this of course would be a loose extension of the appositive construction (σχῆμα καθ᾽ ὅλον καὶ μέρος). There is, in fact, a confusion of two ways of speaking, viz. (1) δοκοῦσί μοι ὅ τε Τισς. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκ. τὸ αὐτὸ βουληθῆναι, ὁ μὲν Τ. διὰ τὸ δέος, ὁ δὲ Ἀ. διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι κ.τ.λ., and (2) δοκεῖ δέ μοι ὁ Τισς. τὸ αὐτὸ βουληθῆναι, αὐτὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ δέος (αὐτὸ βουλόμενος), τοῦ δ᾽ Ἀλκ. . . . βουλομένου. . . . καὶ ὣς v. c. 51, § 2. ξυμβησείοντα The MS. reading ξυμβασείοντα is erroneously formed. διαβασείω is the reading in Dio C. 40, 32, but διαβησείω in Agathias, 39 D. Inf. c. 79, § 3, ναυμαχησείοντες (cf. πολεμησείω). This class of desiderative verbs is regularly formed on the sigmatic future stem (δρασείω, απαλλαξείω) The only defence of ξυμβασείω would be that correct forms in ας (γελασείω, ἐλασείω) may have prompted incorrect analogous forms, and especially where nouns like ξύμβασις, διάβασις previously existed. ἐβούλετο κ.τ.λ. ἐβούλετο δοκεῖν belongs to all that follows, but with the subject of δοκεῖν divided: i.e. ἐβούλετο δοκεῖν (αὐτὸς) μὴ ἀδύνατος εἶναι πεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἱκανὰ διδόναι τῷ Τισς. κ.τ.λ ‘he wanted it to seem, not that he was powerless . . ., but that the Athenians, etc.’
ὤστε τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων . . . αἴτιον γενέσθαι, ‘so that the Athenian side (or position) became responsible’ (sc. for the failure of the negotiations). Cf. iii. 59, τὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς; vii. 61, τὸ τῆς τύχης. Without τὸ we must render less well ‘so that it (the failure) became the fault of the Athenians.’ νήσους τε . . . καὶ ἄλλα What these other demands were we do not know. ἄλλα seems somewhat bald, but is relieved by the following οἷς οὐκ ἐναντιουμένων κ.τ.λ., ‘he demanded that all Ionia should be given up, and then the adjacent islands, as well as making other demands which the Athenians did not oppose, etc.’ The variant καὶ τἆλλα would apparently mean ‘and everything else (which appertained to Ionia and its adjacent islands)’: cf. c. 37, § 5, ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ ἢ ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει, with the same vagueness. See crit. note. τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν The ἑαυτῶν of some inferior MSS. is allowable for σφῶν on the ground of emphasis. But ἑαυτῶν would imply a ridiculous demand. On the other hand it might seem a small request to make that the Persians should be allowed to use any fleet they wished along their own shore. Yet in reality the concession would be great. For the Persian king to keep as large a fleet as he chose sailing where he chose off the coast of Ionia in the Aegean, was to endanger every outlying part of the Athenian empire. Unfortunately the evidence with regard to existing agreements between Persia and Athens is contradictory and obscure. Historians are at variance as to the existence of the so-called ‘Peace of Callias’ (wrongly called ‘of Cimon’) of B.C. 445. Thucydides says nothing of the convention, but, as Grote points out (Hist. pt. ii. c. xlv.), it is clear from Thucydides himself that since the supposed date of the ‘Peace of Callias’ such a state of things had existed between Athens and Persia as would correspond to the supposed terms of the treaty. That there was an embassy of Callias to Susa is seen from Hdt. vii. 151. It is its results which are uncertain One cannot, however, suppose that all the statements of the Attic orators relating to the ‘Peace of Callias’ are based upon either imposture or mere mistake. Dem. De F. Leg. 428 has Καλλίαν τὸν Ἱππονίκου ταύτην τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλουμένην εἰρήνην πρεσβεύσαντα, ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἡμέρας πεζῇ μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν βασιλέα, ἐντὸς δὲ Χελιδονίων καὶ Κυανέων πλοίῳ μακρῷ μὴ πλεῖν κ.τ.λ. Plutarch, Cim. 487 [13. 5], refers the convention to Cimon, but quotes Callisthenes (circ. B.C. 350) as saying that there was really no such agreement, but that merely de facto the king did keep his fleet within these limits. For the present passage we may point out (what seems to have been forgotten) that the reality of the existence of such a treaty is not here involved. It will be quite enough to suppose that in their negotiations, if not in any convention, with Persia the Athenians claimed that the king should not use a fleet on the Ionian coast. If Callias had demanded this, Tissaphernes would now seek to settle the matter before concluding an alliance. We cannot reject the consensus of ancient statement that this restriction upon the Persian navy was at least a condition insisted upon by Athens. We should not try to emend Thucydides from our preconceptions as to the ‘Peace of Callias,’ but rather correct our preconceptions of the ‘Peace of Callias’ from the hint of Thucydides. There is, however, no statement in any writer that the king was not allowed to build a fleet. Hence ναῦς ποεῖσθαι καὶ παραπλεῖν is correctly taken as =ναῦς ποησάμενον παραπλεῖν. Cf. c. 15, § 1, τὰ χίλια τάλαντα ἔλυσαν τὰς ζημίας καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν.
οὐκέτι τι ἀλλ᾽ ἄπορα νομίσαντες, i.e. οὐκέτι τι (ἄλλο) ἀλλ᾽ ἄπορα νομίσαντες, ‘no longer thinking anything (else) but that the matter (τὰ πράγματα) was an impracticable one.’ ἄλλο is not indispensable in this idiom, cf. Soph. O. T. 1331, ἔπαισεν οὔτις (sc. ἄλλος) ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ, though it is commonly expressed. A different way of expressing the same sense would be οὐκέτι τι ἄλλ᾽ ἢ ἄπορα νομίσαντες (where ἄλλο is not to be confounded with ἀλλὰ). An alternative rendering οὐκέτι τι (πράσσουσιν), ἀλλ᾽ ἄπορα νομίσαντες . . . κομίζονται would be difficult to support by a parallel.
Commentary on Thucydides Book 8. T.G. Tucker. London. MacMillan & Company. 1892.
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