I have already sketched in this work the chief events of the war west of the
Mississippi, down to the defeat of
Van Dorn and
Price by
Curtis, in the
battle of Elkhorn [see Vol.
I., p. 263], and the withdrawal of the Confederate forces to
Des Arc, whither boats were to be sent by
Beauregard to transport them to
Memphis.
Van Dorn, after issuing orders for the transfer of the army from
Des Arc to
Memphis, to reinforce the army of
Albert Sidney Johnston, in west
Tennessee, went, on March 29th, 1862, to
Corinth, accompanied by
Colonel Dabney H. Maury, in order to confer personally with
Johnston and
Beauregard as to the movement of his command.
He was directed to return forthwith to
Arkansas and bring every man that he could to
Corinth, in all haste, so as to take part in the projected attack upon
Grant, who was then at
Pittsburg Landing.
Until
Van Dorn returned to
Des Arc, on April 5th, it was not generally known that the Trans-Mississippi :army was to be sent across the river, and that
Missouri and
Arkansas were to be abandoned to the enemy.
The governors of both of these States protested earnestly against the movement, and the troops themselves manifested the greatest unwillingness to leave their homes in possession of the enemy, while they should go far away to fight for others.
But
Van Dorn assured them that they were to be brought back to
Arkansas as soon as the impending battle on the
Tennessee had been
[
442]
 |
|
Map: campaign of the Mississippi Valley. |
[
443]
fought, and
Price, though he utterly disapproved of the movement, used his influence with the men to induce them to go willingly.
They all consented to go, and the mounted men were even persuaded to leave their horses behind them.
On the 8th of April, 1862,
Little's Missouri brigade embarked for
Memphis, quickly followed by the remainder of the Army of the West, twenty thousand men. Few of these ever got back to their Western homes, and
Arkansas and
Missouri were abandoned to their fate; moreover,
Van Dorn was too late for the
battle of Shiloh.
The transfer of
Van Dorn's forces to
Corinth resulted before the middle of May not only in the abandonment of
Missouri and
northern Arkansas to the enemy, but in the transfer by
Halleck of more than thrice as many Union troops from the Trans-
Mississippi to the
Tennessee to meet them there.
This policy of depleting the forces west of the
Mississippi, persisted in by the
Confederate authorities, thenceforth down to the
fall of Vicksburg, was one of the gravest of those blunders whereby the downfall of the
Confederacy was precipitated.
Curtis meanwhile moved without opposition from
Elkhorn into
northeastern Arkansas, and on the 3d of May occupied
Batesville, a small town on
White River within ninety miles of
Little Rock.
His effective force, after sending two divisions, under
Generals Asboth and
Jeff. C. Davis, to the
Tennessee, still amounted to 12,422 men
2, Nothing now prevented him from moving against the capital and the
valley of the Arkansas, but the difficulty of subsisting his army so far from its base of supply, which was
St. Louis.
In spite of this difficulty he had begun to advance to
Little Rock, and his outposts were within thirty-five miles of that city (where he was to assume the position of military governor), when the evacuation of
Corinth and the consequent opening of the
Mississippi to
Vicksburg also opened the
White River to the Federal fleet and furnished him, as he hoped, a safe and convenient water communication with his base.
While waiting for the opening of this new line of communication, for which gun-boats and transports were being made ready, he lay inactive at
Batesville.
Van Dorn, on leaving
Arkansas, had assigned
Brigadier-General Roane to the command of that State.
There were no troops there except a few companies of State militia, and these were badly organized and poorly armed; and
Roane, though he had been governor of the .State and was a brave and estimable gentleman, amiable and popular, was wholly unfit for a military command.
Besides these militia companies there were some 5000 or 6000 Indian and mixed (Indian and white) troops in the
Indian Territory under
Brigadier-General Albert Pike, but they could hardly be accounted a force, as they were of no value except on furlough, and had even then to be fed and clothed, and supplied with all sorts of things, and treated with great consideration and gentleness.
Arkansas was thus utterly undefended, and her people, feeling that they
[
444]
had been abandoned by the Confederate Government, were fast becoming despondent or apathetic.
Those living to the north of the
Arkansas among the mountains which rise west of the
White and
Black rivers were fast submitting to the authority of the
Union, and many of them were enlisting in the
Union army.
The slave-holders that lived in the
valley of the Arkansas and on the rich alluvial lands south of that river and along the
Mississippi were in despair.
The governor and State officers were making ready to abandon the capital, and that part of the population which still remained loyal to the
Confederacy was panic-stricken.
In these straits a delegation was sent to
Beauregard, to whose Department the Trans-
Mississippi still belonged, to beg him to appoint
Major-General Hindman to the command, from which
Van Dorn had been taken, and to authorize him to raise an army for the defense of the
State.
Hindman was consequently assigned, on the 26th of May, to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District, comprising the States of
Missouri and
Arkansas and that part of
Louisiana north of the
Red River and the
Indian Territory.
He had commanded a brigade at
Shiloh, was wounded there, and had been promoted for good conduct.
Leaving
Corinth at once
Hindman went to
Memphis, which the
Confederates were preparing to evacuate as soon as
Corinth should be abandoned.
There he collected a few supplies for his army, and “impressed” a million dollars that was in the banks.
Thus equipped, he hastened to
Little Rock, where he assumed command of his district and established headquarters on the 31st of May, 1862.
With great energy and with administrative ability of the highest order, he went to work to create an army and provide supplies for it. He declared martial law, and scattered his provost-marshals all over the
State; enforced the
Conscript Law3 remorselessly; collected thousands of stragglers that were skulking in all directions; arrested deserters and shot scores of them; sent recruiting officers into
north Arkansas and
Missouri; stopped five
Texas regiments that were on their way to
Beauregard; established workshops for making powder, shot, arms, clothing, and other supplies
[
445]
for his forces; and worked in every way so intelligently and earnestly that early in July he had an army of about 20,000 armed men and 46 pieces of artillery.
Not only had
Little Rock and the
valley of the Arkansas been saved to the
Confederacy, but
Curtis's position at
Batesville was fast becoming untenable.
In front he was threatened by
Hindman, who was growing stronger and bolder every day, while behind him the Missourians were organizing in all directions to break his long line of communication with
St. Louis.
The failure of a gun-boat expedition
4 to relieve him from this precarious situation determined him to retreat across the swamps to
Helena.
Hindman resolved to attack him. Sending a considerable force under
Brigadier-General Albert Rust to get between the retreating army and
Helena, and to hold the crossing of the almost impassable
Cache, he himself set off in pursuit.
But
Rust, though a very successful politician, was one of the most incompetent of all “political generals,” and was easily brushed out of the way by
Curtis, who, conquering the greater obstacles which Nature opposed to his march, got safely to
Helena on the 13th of July.
Meanwhile the Confederate Government, yielding to the importunities of
General Price and of the representatives of the States west of the
Mississippi, and alarmed by the progress of the
Union armies in that direction, determined to prosecute more vigorously the war in the
West, and to make some effort to recover
Missouri and that part of
Louisiana which the
Union armies had conquered.
Accordingly, just after
McClellan's “change of base” to the
James,
General J. B. Magruder, who had won distinction in the
Virginia campaign and was believed to be an officer of great ability and force, was assigned to the command of the Trans-
Mississippi, which was now, for the first time, made a separate department.
He was told that
Hindman,
Dick Taylor, and
Price would be ordered to report to him —
Taylor to command the forces in Lousiana,
Hindman the
District of
Arkansas, and
Price the army which was to be sent into
Missouri.
But hardly had this wise plan been, agreed upon before it was set aside.
Magruder, who was already on his way to the
West, was recalled to
Richmond, and subsequently ordered to
Texas;
Price was directed to remain in
Mississippi;
5 and
Major-General Theophilus H. Holmes was assigned to the command of the Trans-
Mississippi.
[
446]
General Holmes reached
Vicksburg on the 30th of July, and on the 12th of August established the headquarters of his department at
Little Rock.
The force which
Hindman turned over to him consisted of about 18,000 infantry “effectives,” some 6000 mounted men, 54 pieces of artillery, and 7000 or 8000 unarmed men in camps of instruction.
Hindman was now ordered by
Holmes to concentrate the greater part of this force near
Fort Smith on the western border of the
State, and to organize there an expedition into
Missouri, which State was at that time in the utmost commotion.
When
Halleck went to the
Tennessee in April, 1862, to assume, command of the armies which he was to lead against
Corinth, he left
Schofield in command of the
Union troops in
Missouri.
This force consisted chiefly of the
State militia which
Schofield had himself organized.
Before the end of the summer this militia had an effective strength of about fifty thousand men. Great as this force was,
Schofield did not find it sufficient to hold the Missourians in subjection and to disperse the roving bands which kept up the fight for their State upon its own soil, and he had to call to his assistance several considerable bodies of Union troops.
With the aid of these he was gradually driving the
Confederate bands out of the
State when he learned, toward the last of August, that
Hindman was
gathering an army for the invasion of
Missouri.
Rumor so magnified the greatness of this invasion that
Schofield fancied that
Hindman was at the head of from 40,000 to 70,000 men. He accordingly called eagerly for help.
The Department of the Missouri was thereupon enlarged by the addition of
Kansas; and on the 24th of September
Curtis was assigned to the command of it.
Curtis ordered
Schofield, who was then at
Springfield, to take command of all the troops in the south-west.
At the same time he ordered
General J. G. Blunt, who was commanding in
Kansas, to reinforce
Schofield with all his available men. This order was promptly obeyed, and
Schofield found himself by the 1st of October at the head of about 11,000 effectives with 16 pieces of artillery.
This force he called the “Army of the Frontier.”
Hindman assumed personal command of the
Confederate troops in
northwestern Arkansas on the 24th of August.
These consisted of between 9000 and 10,000 men, of whom about 3000 were
Indians, under command of
Colonel Douglas H. Cooper.
With this force he moved to the borders of
Missouri, and took position along the line between that State and
Arkansas.
His advance consisted of a brigade of Missouri Cavalry (two thousand strong, perhaps), lying in and around
Newtonia under
Colonel Joseph O. Shelby, one
[
447]
of the very best officers I have ever known.
The men had all just been recruited in
Missouri, and were as fine a body of young fellows as ever fought under any flag.
Hindman had hardly entered
Missouri when, on the 10th of September, he was recalled to
Little Rock by
General Holmes, in order to help organize the troops in that neighborhood for his expedition.
He left
Rains in command, with orders not to provoke an engagement.
Matters remained quiet till the 30th of September, when
General Frederick Salomon with a part of
Blunt's reinforcements approached
Newtonia.
Cooper with 4000 or 5000 Indians and mixed troops had previously joined
Shelby.
Together they attacked
Salomon and drove him back in confusion.
Schofield marched at once to the assistance of
Salomon, and on the 4th of October reached
Newtonia.
Cooper and
Shelby fell back toward
Rains.
Thereupon
Schofield continued to advance, driving the
Confederates before him out of
Missouri and into the mountains of
Arkansas.
Thence
Cooper continued to retreat toward the
Indian Territory, while
Rains made his way to
Huntsville.
Schofield sent
Blunt in pursuit of
Cooper, who was overtaken at Old
Fort Wayne near
Maysville on the 22d of October and completely routed and driven into the
Indian Territory.
Hindman had meanwhile returned to
Fort Smith on the 15th of October.
Learning there of the disasters that had befallen his army, he hastened to the front, relieved
Rains, assumed command himself, and was about to take a strong position near
Fayetteville, whither reenforcements were hastening to him, when
Schofield on the 27th of October again advanced.
Hindman thereupon retreated somewhat precipitately to the banks of the
Arkansas, whence he wrote to
Holmes that with another division he could “move into
Missouri, take
Springfield, and winter on the
Osage at least.”
Schofield, whose effective strength had
been increased by reinforcements to over sixteen thousand men, having accomplished the object of his expedition, now returned toward
Springfield with two divisions of the Army of the Frontier, leaving
Blunt with another division in the vicinity of
Fayetteville to guard the mountain passes.
Believing that hostilities were ended for the winter, and being ill, he turned over the command of the Army of the Frontier to
Blunt on the 20th of November, and went to
St. Louis.
Blunt was a typical
Kansas man of that period.
Born in
Maine, he had practiced medicine in
Ohio, and gone thence to
Kansas when that territory was the battle-field between slavery and freedom.
Deeply inspired by the fierce passions which that savage conflict generated, he was one of the first to enlist
[
448]
for the defense of the
Union and the abolition of slavery.
He was rapidly promoted, and on the 8th of April, 1862, was made brigadier-general and assigned to the command of the Department of Kansas.
He was then 36 years old.
While
Hindman was actively reorganizing his army on the
Arkansas, about fifty miles south of
Fayetteville (where
Blunt was), and getting ready to move again into
Missouri,
Holmes, who was doing all that he could to reinforce him, was ordered by reason of the exigencies of the war on the eastern side of the
Mississippi to abandon the
Missouri expedition.
The disastrous defeat of
Van Dorn at
Corinth in October, 1862, opened the way to
Grant to move overland against
Vicksburg, which stronghold and
Port Hudson were the only places that the
Confederates then held on the
Mississippi.
Leaving
Grand Junction on the 4th of November
Grant advanced toward
Holly Springs,
Van Dorn falling back before him.
McClernand was at the same time concentrating at
Memphis a large force which was to move by the river and cooperate in the attack upon
Vicksburg.
Alarmed by these great preparations the Confederate Government, which had sent
Pemberton, who had been in command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, to supersede
Van Dorn, instructed
Holmes, under date of November 11th, to send ten thousand men to
Vicksburg if possible.
Holmes, on receiving this order, straightway ordered
Hindman to abandon the invasion of
Missouri and return to
Little Rock with his army.
Hindman protested; and to entreaties from
Van Dorn,
Pemberton, and
Joseph E. Johnston (who on the 24th of November had been assigned to the command), and to the reiterated orders of the
President and
Secretary of War requiring him to reinforce
Vicksburg,
Holmes only replied that he could do nothing as “two-thirds of his force was in
north-western Arkansas to meet a heavy advance from
Springfield.”
He nevertheless again ordered
Hindman to bring his army to
Little Rock without further delay.
[
449]
Hindman, however, had made up his mind to attack
Blunt before obeying
Holmes's order.
He had already sent
Marmaduke toward
Cane Hill with a division of cavalry; and skirmishing was taking place almost daily between him and
Blunt, who had some 7000 or 8000 men. At last
Blunt attacked in force on the 28th of November, and drove
Marmaduke back to the vicinity of
Van Buren.
Blunt then took position at
Cane Hill.
Hindman resolved to attack him there with his whole available force.
Leaving
Van Buren on the 3d of December with 9000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 22 pieces of artillery, about 11,500 men in all, he drove in
Blunt's pickets on the evening of the 6th, and was getting ready to attack him the next evening, when he learned that
General F. J. Herron was coming to reenforce
Blunt with about 4000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 30 guns, and was already entering
Fayetteville.
Blunt had learned on the 24th of December that
Hindman was moving his infantry from the south side of the
Arkansas to the north side of that river.
He immediately ordered
Herron, who was encamped with two divisions of the Army of the Frontier near
Springfield; to come instantly to
Cane Hill.
That excellent officer broke camp on the morning of the 3d, and, marching 110 miles in 3 days, reached
Elkhorn on the evening of the 6th of December.
There seemed nothing to prevent
Hindman from first destroying
Herron and then turning upon
Blunt and defeating him; for
Herron and
Blunt were twelve miles apart and the
Confederates lay between them.
Indeed that was what
Hindman determined to do. Masking his movement from
Blunt by so
[
450]
disposing a brigade of cavalry as to deceive him into believing that it was he whom he was about to attack,
Hindman moved at 3 o'clock on the morning of December 7th against
Herron.
His cavalry under
Marmaduke soon encountered
Herron's on the march to
Blunt, and drove them back upon the main body.
Herron brought up his entire force, and
Marmaduke gave way in turn.
Hindman thereupon brought up his infantry, but, instead of attacking, as he ought to have done, took a strong position and awaited
Herron's attack.
This fatal mistake gave the victory to
Blunt.
Herron did attack at noon. The moment that
Blunt heard
Herron's guns he rushed to his assistance, and
Hindman had then to confront the united army, which was not only stronger than his own in numbers, but very much stronger in organization, arms, artillery, and leadership.
Darkness ended the battle.
During the night
Hindman withdrew his army and retreated toward
Van Buren.
Blunt did not pursue.
Hindman's loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 1317;
Blunt's was 1251, of which 918 belonged to
Herron's two divisions, which bore the brunt of the battle, known as “the
battle of Prairie Grove.”
Hindman sheltered his demoralized
army behind the
Arkansas, opposite
Van Buren, and tried to reorganize it. It was still lying there when, on December 28th,
Blunt dashed into
Van Buren at the head of a small mounted force, and hastened the long-projected Confederate retreat to
Little Rock, which place was reached toward the middle of January.
During the long and dreary march thither the troops, who were not clad to withstand the snows and rains of winter, suffered severely.
Sickness increased alarmingly; the men straggled at will; hundreds deserted; and
Hindman's army faded away.
Hindman “was a man of genius and could have commanded a department, or have been a minister of war; but he could not command an army in the field, or plan and execute a battle.”
A disaster almost as great as that which had befallen
Holmes in
western Arkansas befell him in the eastern part of the
State while
Hindman was retreating to
Little Rock.
The Confederates had strongly fortified the Post of
Arkansas, on the north bank of the
Arkansas, 50 miles above the mouth of the river, and 117 miles below
Little Rock.
The fort was primarily intended for the protection of that city and of the
valley of the Arkansas, but it was also useful to the
Confederates in obstructing the navigation of the
Mississippi.
Several unsuccessful attempts to capture it had been made, but now it was about to fall.
[
451]
When
Grant was ready to move overland against
Vicksburg he ordered
Sherman, in the absence of
McClernand,
6 to take all the troops at
Memphis and
Steele's division at
Helena, and to move with
Porter's fleet by the river and cooperate in the attack.
Grant had advanced a part of his own immediate army as far as
Holly Springs, where he established a great depot of supplies, and was about to move forward when
Van Dorn, by a splendid dash upon
Holly Springs,
7 on the 20th of December, and
Forrest, by a brilliant raid into
east Tennessee, so broke
Grant's communications and destroyed his supplies that he was forced to abandon his
[
452]
 |
|
Map: battle of Arkansas Post, Jan. 11, 1863. |
movement;
8 and on the 23d of December he ordered
Sherman to delay his expedition.
But
Sherman was already on the way to
Vicksburg, whence, after making an ineffectual attempt to capture the place [see p. 462], he reimbarked his army and retired to
Milliken's Bend.
McClernand arrived at
Milliken's Bend on the 3d of January, 1863, and the next day assumed command of the expedition.
Having nothing better to do, he determined to capture the Post of
Arkansas, and to occupy the
State.
Accordingly, on the 4th of January, he embarked his army, 32,000 strong, on transports, and set sail for the
Arkansas, accompanied by
Porter's fleet--3 iron-clads and 6 gun-boats.
Reaching the vicinity of the Post on the 9th he disembarked his men the next day. The garrison consisted of about five thousand men under command of
Brigadier-General Thos. J. Churchill.
The iron-clads began the attack on the 10th.
It was renewed the next day by
[
453]
both army and navy, and after a terrific bombardment of nearly four hours
Churchill surrendered.
The Confederate loss was 60 killed, 75 or 80 wounded, and 4791 prisoners; the
Union loss was 1061 killed and wounded. The next day
MeClernand received peremptory orders from
Grant to return forthwith to
Milliken's Bend with his entire command.
By the disasters in the northwestern part of the
State and the capture of the Post of
Arkansas, and through the demoralization consequent upon those events, the fine army which
Hindman had turned over to
Holmes on the 12th of August, 1862, had been reduced within less than five months to about 10,000 effectives, most of which were in camp near
Little Rock.
The ill consequences of
Holmes's incompetence to command a department and of
Hindman's unfitness to command an army, now began to be seriously felt by the
Confederacy.
For not only was
Holmes wholly unable to do anything for the relief of
Vicksburg, but his weakness relieved the
Federal general-in-chief of all apprehension of another invasion of
Missouri, and of all fear for the safety of
Helena.
Halleck consequently ordered 19,000 of the force at
Helena, including those with which
Steele had joined
Sherman in December, to be sent to
Grant, leaving a garrison of only about 5,000 men for the defense of the place.
All this was done before the 19th of January, 1863.
Curtis was also ordered to send all the men that could be spared from
Missouri to the
Mississippi to cooperate in the capture of
Vicksburg.
Schofield, who had resumed command of fthe Army of the Frontier, immediately after the
 |
|
Section of a casemate of Fort Hindman. |
battle of Prairie Grove, began in consequence of this order to withdraw the greater part of his army, which was then 18,000 strong, from
north-western Arkansas and put it on the march through
Missouri to
north-eastern Arkansas, where it was to be joined by
Davidson with six thousand cavalry from
St. Louis.
[
454]
Schofield proposed that ten thousand of these men should be sent to
Grant instead.
This led to the culmination of long-existing differences between
Curtis and
Schofield, the former of whom represented the Radical or Abolition faction of the
Union men of
Missouri, while the latter represented the Conservative faction, at whose head was
Governor Gamble.
Curtis desired to retain the 45,000 “effectives” that were in the
State in order to dragoon the
Southern sympathizers into submission.
Schofield thought that a part of these men could be better employed elsewhere.
Curtis was sustained by the
Government, and on the 1st of April
Schofield was, at his own request, relieved from duty in
Missouri.
Curtis's conduct, however, soon raised such a storm in
Missouri that the
President on the 10th of March ordered
 |
|
Casemate on the eastern curtain of Fort Hindman, showing the effect of shot from the Union guns. |
General E. V. Sumner, from the Army of the Potomac, to relieve him.
Sumner died on the way to
St. Louis, and thereupon the
President, on the 13th of May, ordered
Schofield to relieve
Curtis.
Schofield at once postponed further operations against
Arkansas until after the all-important struggle for
Vicksburg had been decided, and sent nearly twelve thousand of his men thither and to
Tennessee, making more than thirty thousand men that were sent out of
Missouri to reinforce
Grant at
Vicksburg, a force which gave him the victory there and opened all the
Western waters to the
Union fleets and armies.
Even
President Davis at last saw that
General Holmes was unfit for his great command, and on the 7th of February, 1863, ordered LieutenantGeneral
Edmund Kirby Smith to relieve him, and sent
General Price to report to
Smith.
The latter assumed command of the Department of the TransMississippi at
Alexandria, in Louisiana, on the 7th of March, 1863.
Taylor was left in command of
Louisiana, and
Magruder of
Texas.
Holmes was put in command of the
District of
Arkansas.
The change resulted in very little, if any, advantage to the
Confederacy, for
Smith was even feebler than
Holmes, and though attempting to do a great deal more did almost nothing.
General Price reached
Little Rock on the 25th of March and was assigned to the command of
Hindman's division.
The state of affairs in
Arkansas at that time is quite accurately depicted in a letter which the
Confederate Secretary of War addressed to
General Smith on the 18th of March.
He says:
From a variety of sources, many of which I cannot doubt, the most deplorable accounts reach this department of the disorder, confusion, and demoralization everywhere prevalent both with the armies and people of that State.
The commanding general [Holmes] seems, while esteemed for his virtues, to have lost the confidence and attachment of all; and the next in command, General Hindman, who is admitted to have shown energy and ability, has rendered him-
[455]
self by alleged acts of violence and tyranny perfectly odious.
The consequences as depicted are fearful.
The army is stated to have dwindled by desertion, sickness, and death from 40,000 or 50,000 men to some 15,000 or 18,000, who are disaffected and helpless, and are threatened with positive starvation from deficiency of mere necessaries.
The people are represented as in a state of consternation, multitudes suffering for means of subsistence, and yet exposed from gangs of lawless marauders and deserters to being plundered of the little they have.
Such was the outlook in
Arkansas when
Price assumed command of a division at
Little Rock on the 1st of April.
Holmes's entire force in
Arkansas and the
Indian Territory at that time (exclusive of
Walker's division which was soon sent to
Taylor in
Louisiana) aggregated less than 12,500 officers and men. Seven thousand of these constituted
Price's division, which was stationed near
Little Rock.
With them
Price
[
456]
would have done something had he not been repressed by both
Smith and
Holmes.
At last toward the middle of June
Kirby Smith determined to do something for the relief of
Vicksburg, and as the
President had frequently suggested an attack upon
Helena he ordered
Holmes to move from
Little Rock for that place.
He could hardly have done anything more unwise, for
Helena was garrisoned by 5000 men, and was strongly fortified.
It was also protected by gun-boats, and could not have been held 24 hours even if it had been taken.
The Confederates bivouacked within five miles of
Helena on the evening of the 3d of July, and
Holmes then learned for the first time the difficulties which he was to encounter.
Between him and the city rose a succession of precipitous hills over which it was impossible to move artillery, and difficult to manceuvre infantry.
The hills nearest the city were occupied by strong redoubts,--
Graveyard Hill in the center, Fort Righter on the north, and Fort Hindman on the south,--and these redoubts were all connected by a line of bastions.
In the low ground between these hills and
Helena was a strong work,--Fort Curtis,--and in the river lay the gun-boat
Tyler,
Lieutenant Commanding James M. Prichett, whose great guns were to do no little execution.
The Union forces were under the command of
General B. M. Prentiss.
[See organization, p. 460.]
Holmes, nothing daunted, for he was both brave and fearless, ordered the attack to be made at daybreak of the 4th of July.
Price with 3095 men was to take
Graveyard Hill; Pagan with 1770 men to attack Fort Hindman; and
Marmaduke and
L. M. Walker were sent with 2781 men against Fort Righter.
The attack was made as ordered;
Price carried
Graveyard Hill in gallant style and held it, but
Fagan and
Marmaduke were both repulsed, and the fire of the forts, rifle-pits, and gun-boat was then all concentrated against
Price.
By half-past 10 o'clock in the morning
Holmes saw that his attack had failed and withdrew
Price's men from the field.
Holmes's force aggregated 7646 officers and men. His losses were 173 killed, 687 wounded, and 776 missing, 1636 in all.
Prentiss's force aggregated about 5000, but he says that he had only 4129 men in the fight, and that he lost 57 killed, 146 wounded, and 36 missing, 239 in all. All this happened on the day that
Grant's victorious army entered
Vicksburg, and that
Lee began his retreat from
Gettysburg.
Holmes withdrew his army to the
White River, and, being ill, turned over the command of the
District of
Arkansas to
General Price on the 23d of July.
Price at once urged
General Smith to concentrate his scattered forces on the
Arkansas and to do something, but
Smith was then too busy organizing a sort of independent Trans-
Mississippi Confederacy to have time for anything else.
All that
Price could do was to concentrate his own force for the defense of
Little Rock, the approaches to which on the north side of the river he now began to fortify.
The capture of
Vicksburg and
Port Hudson (the former on the 4th and the latter on the 8th of July) opened the way to the
Union armies for active operations in
Arkansas.
Major-General Frederick Steele was accordingly
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457]
sent with a force to
Helena, and instructed to form a junction with
Brigadier-General Davidson, who was moving south from
Missouri, by
Crowley's Ridge, and to “break up
Price and occupy
Little Rock.”
Steele organized his expedition at
Helena on the 5th of August, and moved thence with two divisions
of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and 39 guns to the
White River, where he effected a junction with
Davidson, who had 6000 cavalry, taught as dragoons, and three batteries.
On the 18th of August
Steele moved from
Devall's Bluff upon
Little Rock with 13,000 officers and men and 57 pieces of artillery.
He was reinforced a few days later by
True's brigade, which raised his aggregate to nearly 14,500 “present.”
Of this number 10,500 were “present for duty.”
On the morning of the 10th of September he had come within eight miles of
Little Rock.
Price had “present for duty” 7749 men of all arms.
About 6500 of these occupied the trenches on the north side of the
Arkansas, and about 1250 were disposed on the south side with orders to prevent the enemy from crossing the river.
This was not easy to do, as the river was fordable at many points, and
Davidson did in fact effect a crossing below
Little Rock, about 10 o'clock, without much difficulty.
As soon as
Price learned that his fortified position on the north side of the river had been turned by
Davidson he withdrew his troops across the
Arkansas, and evacuated
Little Rock about 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
Two brigades of
Steele's cavalry, under
Colonel Lewis Merrall, started in pursuit, followed
Marmaduke for a day, and returned to
Little Rock on the 12th.
General Price's total casualties in the series of operations around
Little Rock amounted to 64 killed, wounded, and missing;
General Steele's to 137.
Price continued his retreat undisturbed to
Arkadelphia.
There
Holmes resumed command on the 25th of September.
On the 7th of October
Smith ordered him to fall back to
Camden, whence he could either safely retreat
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458]
to
Shreveport or cooperate with
Taylor, who was concentrating his forces on the
Red River.
General Holmes's “present for duty” then aggregated 8532 officers and men;
General Taylor's 13,649; and
General Kirby Smith's entire force in the Trans-
Mississippi amounted to 41,887, of whom 32,971 were “present for duty.”
Schofield's force in
Missouri and
Arkansas at this time aggregated 47,000 officers and men. Nearly eighteen thousand of these were in
Arkansas under
Steele.
Halleck, who was still general-in-chief, ordered
Steele to hold the line of the
Arkansas, and to wait till
Banks was ready to cooperate with him from
Port Hudson in an attack upon
Shreveport, and in taking possession of the
Red River and its valley.
Holmes, not being pressed by
Steele, settled his infantry quietly at
Camden, while his cavalry indulged in a sort of spasmodic activity, the main object of which was to procure forage for their horses.
A division of infantry — consisting of
Churchill's Arkansas brigade and
Parsons's Missouri brigade, the two having some five thousand effectives — was near
Spring Hill.
On their left flank was
Cabell's brigade
of
Arkansas cavalry; and on their right, toward
Camden, was
Marmaduke with a division of
Missouri cavalry —
Shelby's and
Greene's brigades.
Cabell had about 1200 men for duty;
Marmaduke about 2000.
East of the
Washita were
Dockery's brigade of cavalry and some other mounted men.
Lieutenant-General E. Kirby Smith was kept very busy at
Shreveport organizing bureaus and sub-bureaus; fortifying his capital; issuing orders and countermanding them; and planning campaigns that were never to be fought.
Throughout all his great department hostilities were virtually suspended during the autumn, throughout the winter, and far into the spring.
His soldiers lay idle in their camps, and the people gave themselves up to cottontrading and money-getting.
Neither soldiers nor civilians did anything to sustain, or even to encourage, the armies which were fighting in
Virginia and
Tennessee against overwhelming odds.
It was to no purpose that
Dick Taylor and
General Price begged
Kirby Smith to concentrate the troops that were scattered through
Louisiana,
Arkansas and
Texas, and to move them northward and into
Missouri, where
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459]
they would at least create a diversion in favor of
Lee and of
Johnston, even if they did not regain
Arkansas and
Missouri.
Smith listened, but did nothing.
Yes!--he asked the
President to relieve
General Holmes from service in the Trans-
Mississippi, and toward the middle of March this was done.
General Price was then put in temporary command of what was left of the
District of
Arkansas--that small portion of the
State which lies south of a line drawn east and west through
Camden.
General Price's lines extended from
Monticello in the east to the
Indian Territory in the west, where
General Samuel B. Maxey (who, from March, 1875, till March, 1887, represented
Texas in the United States Senate) had a mixed command of Texans and
Indians, some two thousand strong.
