From the Wilderness to Cold Harbor.
by E. M. Law, Major-General, C. S. A.
On the 2d of May, 1864, a group of officers stood at the
Confederate signal station on Clark's Mountain, Virginia, south of the
Rapidan, and examined closely through their field-glasses the position of the
Federal army then lying north of the river in
Culpeper county.
The central figure of the group was the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, who had requested his corps and division commanders to meet him there.
Though some demonstrations had been made in the direction of the upper fords,
General Lee expressed the opinion that the
Federal army would cross the river at Germanna or
Ely's. Thirty-six hours later
General Meade's army,
General Grant, now commander-in-chief, being with it, commenced its march to the crossings indicated by
General Lee.
The Army of the Potomac, which had now commenced its march toward
Richmond, was more powerful in numbers than at any previous period of the war. It consisted of three corps: the Second (
Hancock's), the Fifth (
Warren's), and the Sixth (
Sedgwick's); but the Ninth (
Burnside's) acted with
Meade throughout the campaign.
Meade's army was thoroughly equipped, and provided with every appliance of modern warfare.
On the other hand, the Army of Northern Virginia had gained little in numbers during the winter just passed, and had never been so scantily supplied with food and clothing.
The equipment as to arms was well enough for men who knew how to use them, but commissary and quartermasters' supplies were lamentably deficient.
A new pair of shoes or an overcoat was a luxury, and full rations would have astonished the stomachs of
Lee's ragged Confederates.
But they took their privations cheerfully, and complaints were seldom heard.
I recall an instance of one hardy fellow whose trousers were literally “worn to a frazzle” and would no longer adhere to his legs even by dint of the most
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persistent patching.
Unable to buy, beg, or borrow another pair, he wore instead a pair of thin cotton drawers.
By nursing these carefully he managed to get through the winter.
Before the campaign opened in the spring a small lot of clothing was received, and he was the first man of his regiment to be supplied.
I have often heard expressions of surprise that these ragged, barefooted, half-starved men would fight at all. But the very fact that they remained with their colors through such privations and hardships was sufficient to prove that they would be dangerous foes to encounter upon the line of battle.
The
morale of the army at this time was excellent, and it moved forward confidently to the grim death-grapple in the wilderness of
Spotsylvania with its old enemy, the Army of the Potomac.
General Lee's headquarters were two miles north-east of
Orange Court House; of his three corps,
Longstreet's was at
Gordonsville,
Ewell's was on and near the
Rapidan, above
Mine Run, and
Hill's on his left, higher up the stream.
When the
Federal army was known to be in motion,
General Lee prepared to move upon its flank with his whole force as soon as his opponent should clear the river and begin the march southward.
The route selected by
General Grant led entirely around the right of
Lee's position on the river above.
Grant's passage of the
Rapidan was unopposed, and he struck boldly out on the direct road to
Richmond.
Two roads lead from
Orange Court House down the
Rapidan toward
Fredericksburg.
They follow the general direction of the river, and are almost parallel to each other, the “Old turnpike” nearest the river, and the “Plank road” a short distance
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Union troops crossing the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, May 4, 1864.
from a sketch made at the time. |
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south of it. The route of the
Federal army lay directly across these two roads, along the western borders of the famous
Wilderness.
About noon on the 4th of May,
Ewell's corps was put in motion on and toward the
Orange turnpike, while
A. P. Hill, with two divisions, moved parallel with him on the Orange Plank road.
The two divisions of
Longstreet's corps encamped near
Gordonsville were ordered to move rapidly across the country and follow
Hill on the
Plank road.
Ewell's corps was the first to find itself in the presence of the enemy.
As it advanced along the turnpike on the morning of the 5th, the
Federal column was seen crossing it from the direction of Germanna Ford.
Ewell promptly formed line of battle across the turnpike, and communicated his position to
General Lee, who was on the
Plank road with
Hill.
Ewell was instructed to regulate his movements by the head of
Hill's column, whose progress he could tell by the firing in its front, and not to bring on a general engagement until
Longstreet should come up. The position of
Ewell's troops, so near the flank of the
Federal line of march, was anything but favorable to a preservation of the peace, and a collision soon occurred which opened the campaign in earnest.
General Warren, whose corps was passing when
Ewell came up, halted, and turning to the right made a vigorous attack upon
Edward Johnson's division, posted across the turnpike.
J. M. Jones's brigade, which held the road, was driven back in confusion.
1 Steuart's brigade was pushed forward to take its place.
Rodes's division was thrown in on
Johnson's right, south of the road, and the line, thus reestablished, moved forward, reversed the tide of battle, and rolled back the
Federal attack.
The fighting was severe and bloody while it lasted.
At some points the lines were in such close proximity in the thick woods which covered the battle-field that when the
Federal troops gave way several hundred of them, unable to retreat without exposure to almost certain death, surrendered themselves as prisoners.
Ewell's entire corps was now up-
Johnson's division holding the turnpike,
Rodes's division on the right of it, and
Early's in reserve.
So far
Ewell had been engaged only with
Warren's corps, but
Sedgwick's soon came up from the river and joined
Warren on his right.
Early's division was sent to meet it. The battle extended in that direction, with steady and determined attacks upon
Early's front, until nightfall.
The Confederates still clung to their hold on the
Federal flank against every effort to dislodge them.
When
Warren's corps encountered the head of
Ewell's column on the 5th of May,
General Meade is reported to have said: “They have left a division to fool us here, while they concentrate and prepare a position on the
North Anna.”
If the stubborn resistance to
Warren's attack did not at once
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convince him of his mistake, the firing that announced the approach of
Hill's corps along the
Plank road, very soon afterward, must have opened his eyes to the bold strategy of the
Confederate commander.
General Lee had deliberately chosen this as his battle-ground.
He knew this tangled wilderness well, and appreciated fully the advantages such a field afforded for concealing his great inferiority of force and for neutralizing the superior strength of his antagonist.
General Grant's bold movement across the lower fords into the
Wilderness, in the execution of his plan to swing past the Confederate army and place himself between it and
Richmond, offered the expected opportunity of striking a blow upon his flank while his troops were stretched out on the line of march.
The wish for such an opportunity was doubtless in a measure “father to the thought” expressed by
General Lee three days before, at the signal station on Clark's Mountain.
Soon after
Ewell became engaged on the
Old turnpike,
A. P. Hill's advance struck the
Federal outposts on the
Plank road at
Parker's store, on the outskirts of the
Wilderness.
These were driven in and followed up to their line of battle, which was so posted as to cover the junction of the
Plank road with the
Stevensburg and Brock roads, on which the
Federal army was moving toward
Spotsylvania.
The fight began between
Getty's division of the Sixth Corps and
Heth's division, which was leading
A. P. Hill's column.
Hancock's corps, which was already on the march for
Spotsylvania.
by way of
Chancellorsville, was at once recalled, and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon was ordered to drive
Hill “out of the
Wilderness.”
Cadmus Wilcox's division went to
Heth's support, and
Poague's battalion of artillery took position in a little clearing on the north side of the
Plank road, in rear of the Confederate infantry.
But there was little use for artillery on such a field.
After the battle was fairly joined in the thickets in front, its fire might do as much damage to friend as to foe; so it was silent.
It was a desperate struggle between the infantry of the two armies, on a field whose physical aspects were as grim and forbidding as the struggle itself.
It was a battle of brigades and regiments rather than of corps and divisions.
Officers could not see the whole length of their commands, and could tell whether the troops on their right and left were driving or being driven only by the sound of the firing.
It was a fight at close quarters too, for as night came on, in those tangled thickets of stunted pine, sweet-gum, scrub-oak, and cedar, the approach of the opposing lines could be discerned only by the noise of their passage through the underbrush or the flashing of their guns.
The usually silent
Wilderness had suddenly become alive
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Confederate line waiting orders in the Wilderness. |
with the angry flashing and heavy roar of the musketry, mingled with the yells of the combatants as they swayed to and fro in the gloomy thickets.
Among the killed were
General Alexander Hays, of
Hancock's corps, and
General J. M. Jones, of
Ewell's.
When the battle closed at 8 o'clock,
General Lee sent an order to
Longstreet to make a night march, so as to arrive upon the field at daylight the next morning.
The latter moved at 1 A. M. of the 6th, but it was already daylight when he reached the
Plank road at
Parker's store, three miles in rear of
Hill's battle-field.
2 During the night the movements of troops and preparations for battle could be heard on the
Federal line, in front of
Heth's and
Wilcox's divisions, which had so far sustained themselves against every attack by six divisions under
General Hancock.
But
Heth's and
Wilcox's men were thoroughly worn out. Their lines were ragged and irregular, with wide intervals, and in some places fronting in different directions.
In the expectation that they would be relieved during the night, no effort was made to rearrange and strengthen them to meet the storm that was brewing.
As soon as it was light enough to see what little could be seen in that dark forest,
Hancock's troops swept forward to the attack.
The blow fell with greatest force upon
Wilcox's troops south of the Orange Plank road.
They made what front they could and renewed the fight, until, the attacking column overlapping the right wing, it gave way, and the whole line “rolled up” from the right and retired in disorder along the
Plank road as far as the position of
Poague's artillery, which now opened upon the attacking force.
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The Federals pressed their advantage and were soon abreast of the artillery on the opposite side, their bullets flying across the road among the guns where
General Lee himself stood.
For a while matters looked very serious for the
Confederates.
General Lee, after sending a messenger to hasten the march of
Longstreet's troops and another to prepare the trains for a movement to the rear, was assisting in rallying the disordered troops and directing the fire of the artillery, when the head of
Longstreet's corps appeared in double column, swinging down the Orange Plank road at a trot.
In perfect order, ranks well closed, and no stragglers, those splendid troops came on, regardless of the confusion on every side, pushing their steady way onward like “a river in the sea” of confused and troubled human waves around them.
Kershaw's division took the right of the road, and, coming into line under a heavy fire, moved obliquely to the right (south) to meet the
Federal left, which had “swung round” in that direction.
The Federals were checked in their sweeping advance and thrown back upon their front line of breastworks, where they made a stubborn stand.
But
Kershaw, urged on by
Longstreet, charged with his whole command, swept his front, and captured the works.
Nearly at the same moment
Field's division took the left of the road, with
Gregg's brigade in front,
Benning's behind it,
Law's next, and
Jenkins's following.
As the
Texans in the front line swept past the batteries where
General Lee was standing, they gave a rousing cheer for “Marse Robert,” who spurred his horse forward and followed them in the charge.
When the men became aware that he was “going in” with them, they called loudly to him to go back.
“We won't go on unless you go back,” was the general cry. One of the men dropped to the rear, and taking the bridle turned the general's horse around, while
General Gregg came up and urged him to do as the
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Capture of a part of the burning Union breastworks on the Brock road on the afternoon of May 6.
from a sketch made at the time. |
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men wished.
At that moment a member of his staff (
Colonel Venable) directed his attention to
General Longstreet, whom he had been looking for, and who was sitting on his horse near the Orange Plank road.
With evident disappointment
General Lee turned off and joined
General Longstreet.
The ground over which
Field's troops were advancing was open for a short distance, and fringed on its farther edge with scattered pines, beyond which began the
Wilderness.
The Federals [
Webb's brigade of
Hancock's corps] were advancing through the pines with apparently resistless force, when
Gregg's eight hundred Texans, regardless of numbers, flanks, or supports, dashed directly upon them.
There was a terrific crash, mingled with wild yells, which settled down into a steady roar of musketry.
In less than ten minutes one-half of that devoted eight hundred were lying upon the field dead or wounded; but they had delivered a staggering blow and broken the force of the
Federal advance.
Benning's and
Law's brigades came promptly to their support, and the whole swept forward together.
The tide was flowing the other way. It ebbed and flowed many times that day, strewing the
Wilderness with human wrecks.
Law's brigade captured a line of log breastworks in its front, but had held them only a few moments when their former owners [
Webb's brigade] came back to claim them.
The Federals were driven back to a second line several hundred yards beyond, which was also taken.
This advanced position was attacked in front and on the right from across the Orange Plank road, and
Law's Alabamians “advanced backward” without standing on the order of their going, until they reached the first line of logs, now in their rear.
As their friends in blue still insisted on claiming their property and were advancing to take it, they were met by a counter-charge and again driven beyond the second line.
This was held against a determined attack, in which the
Federal General Wadsworth was shot from his horse as he rode up close to the right of the line on the
Plank road.
The position again becoming untenable by reason of the movements of. Federal troops on their right,
Law's men retired a second time to the works they had first captured.
And so, for more than two hours, the storm of battle swept to and fro, in some places passing several times over the same ground, and settling down at length almost where it had begun the day before.
About 10 o'clock it was ascertained that the
Federal left flank rested only a short distance south of the Orange Plank road, which offered a favorable opportunity for a turning movement in that quarter.
General Longstreet at once moved
Mahone's,
Wofford's,
Anderson's, and
Davis's brigades, the whole under
General Mahone, around this end of the
Federal line.
Forming at right angles to it, they attacked in flank and rear, while a general advance
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was made in front.
So far the fight had been one of anvil and hammer.
But this first display of tactics at once changed the face of the field.
The Federal left wing was rolled up in confusion toward the
Plank road and then back upon the
Brock road.
This partial victory had been a comparatively easy one.
The signs of demoralization and even panic among the troops of
Hancock's left wing, who had been hurled back by
Mahone's flank attack, were too plain to be mistaken by the
Confederates, who believed that
Chancellorsville was about to be repeated.
General Longstreet rode forward and prepared to press his advantage.
Jenkins's fresh brigade was moved forward on the
Plank road to renew the attack, supported by
Kershaw's division, while the flanking column was to come into position on its right.
The latter were now in line south of the road and almost parallel to it.
Longstreet and
Kershaw rode with
General Jenkins at the head of his brigade as it pressed forward, when suddenly the quiet that had reigned for some moments was broken by a few scattering shots on the north of the road, which were answered by a volley from
Mahone's line on the south side.
The firing in their front, and the appearance of troops on the road whom they failed to recognize as friends through the intervening timber, had drawn a single volley, which lost to them all the fruits of the splendid work they had just done.
General Jenkins was killed and
Longstreet seriously wounded by our own men. The troops who were following them faced quickly toward the firing and were about to return it; but when
General Kershaw called out, “They are friends!”
every musket was lowered, and the men dropped upon the ground to avoid the fire.
The head of the attack had fallen, and for a time the movements of the
Confederates were paralyzed.
Lee came forward and directed the dispositions for a new attack, but the change of commanders after the fall of
Longstreet, and the resumption of the thread of operations, occasioned a delay of several hours, and then the tide had turned, and we received only hard knocks instead of victory.
When at 4 o'clock an attack was made upon the
Federal line along the
Brock road, it was found strongly fortified and stubbornly defended.
The log breastworks had taken fire during the battle, and at one point separated the combatants by a wall of fire and smoke which neither could pass.
Part of
Field's division captured the works in their front, but were forced to relinquish them for want of support.
Meanwhile
Burnside's corps, which had reenforced
Hancock during the day, made a vigorous attack on the north of the Orange Plank road.
Law's (
Alabama) and
Perry's (
Florida) brigades were being forced back, when,
Heth's division coming to their assistance, they assumed the offensive, driving
Burnside's troops beyond the extensive line of breastworks constructed previous to their advance.
The battles fought by
Ewell on the
Old turnpike and by
A. P. Hill on the
Plank road, on the 5th of May, were entirely distinct, no connected line existing between them.
Connection was established with
Ewell's right by
Wilcox's division, after it had been relieved by
Longstreet's troops on the morning of the 6th.
While the battle was in progress on the Orange Plank road, on the 6th, an unsuccessful attempt was made to turn
Ewell's left next the river,
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Breastworks of Hancock's Corps on the Brock road-morning of May 7.
from a sketch made at the time. |
and heavy assaults were made upon the line of
Early's division.
So persistent were these attacks on the front of
Pegram's brigade, that other troops were brought up to its support, but the men rejected the offer of assistance.
Late in the day
General Ewell ordered a movement against the
Federal right wing, similar to that by which
Longstreet had “doubled up”
Hancock's left in the morning.
Two brigades, under
General John B. Gordon, moved out of their works at sunset, and lapping the right of
Sedgwick's corps [the Sixth] made a sudden and determined attack upon it.
3 Taken by surprise, the
Federals were driven from a large portion of their works with the loss of six hundred prisoners,--among them
Generals Seymour and
Shaler. Night closed the contest, and with it the
battle of the Wilderness.
When
Lee's army appeared on the flank of the
Federal line of march on the 5th of May,
General Grant had at once faced his adversary and endeavored to push him out of the way.
Grant's strongest efforts had been directed to forcing back the
Confederate advance on the Orange Plank road, which, if successful, would have enabled him to complete his plan of “swinging past” that army and placing himself between it and
Richmond.
On the other hand,
Lee's principal effort had been to strike the head of
Grant's
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column a crushing blow where it crossed the
Plank road, in order to force it from its route and throw it in confusion back into the
Wilderness.
Both attempts had failed.
What advantages had been gained by the two days fighting remained with the
Confederates.
They held a position nearer the
Federal line of march than when the battle began, and had inflicted losses incomparably heavier than they had themselves sustained.
Both sides were now strongly intrenched, and neither could well afford to attack.
And so the 7th of May was spent in skirmishing, each waiting to see what the other would do. That night the race for
Spotsylvania began.
General Lee had been informed by “
Jeb” Stuart of the movement of the
Federal trains southward during the afternoon.
After dark the noise of moving columns along the
Brock road could be heard, and it was at once responded to by a similar movement on the part of
Lee. The armies moved in parallel columns separated only by a short interval.
Longstreet's corps (now commanded by R,
H. Anderson) marched all night and arrived at
Spotsylvania at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, where the ball was already in motion.
Stuart had thrown his cavalry across the
Brock road to check the
Federal advance, and as the
Federal cavalry had failed to dislodge him,
Warren's corps had been pushed forward to clear the way.
Kershaw's,
Humphreys's, and
Law's brigades were at once sent to
Stuart's assistance.
The head of
Warren's column was forced back and immediately commenced intrenching.
Spotsylvania Court House was found occupied by Federal cavalry and artillery,! which retired without a fight.
The Confederates had won the race.
The troops on both sides were now rapidly arriving.
Sedgwick's corps.
joined
Warren's, and in the afternoon was thrown heavily against
Anderson's. right wing, which, assisted by the timely arrival of
Ewell's corps, repulsed the attack with great slaughter.
Hill's corps (now under command of
General Early) did not arrive until the next morning, May 9th.
General Lee's. line now covered Spotsylvania Court House, with its left (
Longstreet's corps) resting on the
Po River, a small stream which flows on the south-west;;
Ewell's corps.
in the center, north of the
Court House, and
Hill's on the right, crossing the
Fredericksburg road.
These positions were generally maintained during the battles that followed, though brigades and divisions were often detached from their proper commands and sent to other parts of the field to meet pressing emergencies.
No engagement of importance took place on the 9th, which was spent in intrenching the lines and preparing places of refuge from the impending storm.
But the 10th was “a field-day.”
Early in the morning it was found that
Hancock's corps had crossed the
Po above the point where the
Confederate left rested, had reached the
Shady Grove road, and was threatening our rear, as well as the trains which were in that direction on the Old Court House road leading to Louisa Court House.
General Early was ordered from the right with
Mahone's and
Heth's divisions, and, moving rapidly to the threatened quarter, attacked
Hancock's rear division as it was about to recross the
Po — driving it, with severe loss, through the burning woods in its rear, back across the river.
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Meanwhile
General Grant was not idle elsewhere.
He had commenced his efforts to break through the lines confronting him. The first assault was made upon
Field's division of
Longstreet's corps and met with a complete and bloody repulse.
Again at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the blue columns pressed forward to the attack, and were sent back torn and bleeding, leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded.
Anticipating a renewal of the assaults, many of our men went out in front of their breastworks, and, gathering up the muskets and cartridge-boxes of the dead and wounded, brought them in and distributed them along the line.
If they did not have repeating-rifles, they had a very good substitute-several loaded ones to each man. They had no reserves, and knew that if they could not sufficiently reduce the number of their assailants to equalize matters somewhat before they reached the works, these might become untenable against such heavy and determined attacks.
A lull of several hours succeeded the failure of the second attack, but it was only a breathing spell preparatory to the culminating effort of the day. Near sunset our skirmishers were driven in and the heavy, dark lines of attack came into view, one after another, first in quick time, then in a trot, and then with a rush toward the works.
The front lines dissolved before the pitiless storm that met them, but those in the rear pressed forward, and over their dead and dying comrades reached that portion of the works held by the
Texas brigade.
These gallant fellows, now reduced to a mere handful by their losses in the
Wilderness, stood manfully to their work.
Their line was bent backward by the pressure, but they continued the fight in rear of the works with bayonets and clubbed muskets.
Fortunately for them,
Anderson's brigade had cleared its own front, and a portion of it turned upon the flank of their assailants, who were driven out, leaving many dead and wounded inside the works.
While this attack was in progress on
Field's line, another, quite as determined, was made farther to the right, in front of
Rodes's division of
Ewell's corps.
Doles's brigade was broken and swept out of its works with the loss of three hundred prisoners. But as the attacking force poured through the gap thus made, Daniel's brigade on one side and
Steuart's on the other drew back from their lines and fell upon its flanks, while
Battle's and
Johnston's brigades were hurried up from the left and thrown across its front.
Assailed on three sides at once, the
Federals were forced back to the works, and over them, whereupon they broke in disorderly retreat to their own lines.
The next day was rainy and disagreeable, and no serious fighting took place.
There were movements, however, along the
Federal lines during the day that indicated a withdrawal from the front of
Longstreet's corps.
Late in the afternoon, under the impression that
General Grant had actually begun another flanking movement,
General Lee ordered that all the artillery on the left and center that was “difficult of access” should be withdrawn from the lines, and that everything should be in readiness to move during the night if necessary.
Under this order,
General Long,
Ewell's chief of artillery, removed all but two batteries from the line of
General Edward
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Johnson's division, for the reason given, that they were “difficult of access.”
Johnson's division held an elevated point somewhat advanced from the general line, and known as “the salient” [or “Bloody angle” ; see map], the breastworks there making a considerable angle, with its point toward the enemy.
This point had been held because it was a good position for artillery, and if occupied by the enemy would command portions of our line.
Such projections on a defensive line are always dangerous if held by infantry alone, as an attack upon the point of the angle can only be met by a diverging fire; or if attacked on either face, the troops holding the other face, unless protected by traverses or by works in rear (as were some of the
Confederates), are more exposed than those on the side attacked.
But with sufficient artillery, so posted as to sweep the sides of the angle, such a position may be very strong.
To provide against contingencies, a second line had been laid off and partly constructed a short distance in rear, so as to cut off this salient.
After the artillery had been withdrawn on the night of the 11th,
General Johnson discovered that the enemy was concentrating in his front, and, convinced that he would be attacked in the morning, requested the immediate return of the artillery that had been taken away.
The men in the trenches were kept on the alert all night and were ready for the attack, when at dawn on the morning of the 12th a dense column emerged from the pines half a mile in the front of the salient and rushed to the attack.
They came on, to use
General Johnson's words, “in great disorder, with a narrow front, but extending back as far as I could see.”
Page's battalion of artillery, which had been ordered back to the trenches at 4 o'clock in the morning, was
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just arriving and was not in position to fire upon the attacking column, which offered so fair a mark for artillery.
The guns came only in time to be captured.
The infantry in the salient fought as long as fighting was of any use; but deprived of the assistance of the artillery, which constituted the chief strength of the position, they could do little to check the onward rush of the
Federal column, which soon overran the salient, capturing
General Johnson himself, 20 pieces of artillery, and 2800 men-almost his entire division.
The whole thing happened so quickly that the extent of the disaster could not be realized at once.
Hancock's troops, who made the assault, had recovered their formation, and, extending their lines across the works on both sides of the salient had resumed their
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|
Spotsylvania Court House. |
advance, when
Lane's brigade.
of
Hill's corps, which was immediately on the right of the captured works, rapidly drew back to the unfinished line in rear, and poured a galling fire upon
Hancock's left wing, which checked its advance and threw it back with severe loss.
General Gordon, whose division (
Early's) was in reserve and under orders
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Spotsylvania Tavern, near the Court House.
Both from War-time Photographs. |
to support any part of the line about the salient, hastened to throw it in front of the advancing Federal column.
As the division was about to charge,
General Lee rode up and joined.
General Gordon, evidently intending to go forward with him.
Gordon remonstrated, and the men, seeing his intention, cried out, “
General Lee to the rear!”
which was taken up all along the line.
One of the men respectfully but firmly took hold of the general's bridle and led his horse to the rear, and the charge went on. The two moving lines met in the rear of the captured works, and after a fierce struggle in the woods the
Federals were forced back to the base of the salient.
But
Gordon's division did not cover their whole front.
On the left of the salient, where
Rodes's division had connected with
Johnson's, the attack was still pressed with great determination.
General Rodes drew out
Ramseur's brigade from the left of his line (a portion of
Kershaw's division taking its place), and sent it to relieve the pressure on his right and restore the line between himself and
Gordon.
Ramseur swept the trenches the whole length of his brigade, but did not fill the gap, and his right was exposed to a terrible fire from the works still held by the enemy.
Three brigades from
Hill's corps were ordered up.
Perrin's, which was the first to
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arrive, rushed forward through a fearful fire and recovered a part of the line on
Gordon's left.
General Perrin fell dead from his horse just as he reached the works.
General Daniel had been killed, and
Ramseur painfully wounded, though remaining in the trenches with his men.
Rodes's right being still hard pressed,
Harris's (
Mississippi) and
McGowan's (
South Carolina) brigades were ordered forward and rushed through the blinding storm into the works on
Ramseur's right.
The Federals still held the greater part of the salient, and though the
Confederates were unable to drive them out, the
Federals could get no farther.
Hancock's corps, which had made the attack, had been reenforced by
Russell's and
Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps and one-half of
Warren's corps, as the battle progressed.
Artillery had been brought up on both sides, the
Confederates using every piece that could be made available upon the salient.
Before 10 o'clock
General Lee had put in every man that could be spared for the restoration of his broken center.
It then became a matter of endurance with the men themselves.
All day long and until far into the night the battle raged with unceasing fury, in the space covered by the salient and the adjacent works.
Every attempt to advance on either side was met and repelled from the other.
The hostile battle-flags waved over different portions of the same works, while the men fought like fiends for their possession.
[See “Hand-to-hand fighting at
Spotsylvania,” to follow.]
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Views of Confederate intrenchments at Spotsylvania.
From War-time Photographs. |
During the day diversions were made on both sides, to relieve the pressure in the center.
An attack upon
Anderson's (
Longstreet's) corps by
Wright's
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Sixth Corps (
Sedgwick having been killed on the 9th) was severely repulsed, while, on the other side of the salient,
General Early, who was moving with a part of
Hill's corps to strike the flank of the
Federal force engaged there, met and defeated
Burnside's corps, which was advancing at the same time to attack
Early's works.
while the battle was raging at the salient, a portion of
Gordon's division was busily engaged in constructing in rear of the old line of intrenchments a new and shorter one, to which
Ewell's corps retired before daylight on the 13th.
Never was respite more welcome than the five days of comparative rest that followed the terrible battle of the 12th to our wearied men, who had been marching and fighting almost without intermission since the 4th of May.
Their comfort was materially enhanced, too, by the supply of coffee, sugar, and other luxuries to which they had long been strangers, obtained from the haversacks of the
Federal dead.
It was astonishing into what close places a hungry Confederate would go to get something to eat. Men would some-times go out under a severe fire, in the hope of finding a full haversack.
It may seem a small matter to the readers of war history; but to the
makers of it who were in the trenches, or on the march, or engaged in battle night and day for weeks without intermission, the supply of the one article of coffee, furnished by the Army of the Potomac to the Army of Northern Virginia, was
not a small matter, but did as much as any other material agency to sustain the spirits and bodily energies of the men, in a campaign that taxed both to their utmost limit.
Old haversacks gave place to better ones, and tin cups now dangled from the accouterments of the
Confederates, who at every rest on the march or interval of quiet on the lines could be seen gathered around small fires, preparing the coveted beverage.
In the interval from the 12th to the 18th our army was gradually moving east to meet corresponding movements on the other side.
Longstreet's corps was shifted from the left to the extreme right, beyond the
Fredericksburg road.
Ewell's corps still held the works in rear of the famous salient, when on the morning of the 18th a last effort was made to force the lines of
Spotsylvania at the only point where previous efforts had met with even partial success.
This was destined to a more signal failure than any of the others.
Under the fire of thirty pieces of artillery, which swept all the approaches to
Ewell's line, the attacking force
4 was broken and driven back in disorder before it came well within reach of the muskets of the infantry.
After the failure of this attack, the “sidling” movement, as the men expressed it, again began, and on the afternoon of the 19th
Ewell's corps was thrown round the
Federal left wing to ascertain the extent of this movement.
After a severe engagement, which lasted until night,
Ewell withdrew, having lost about nine hundred men in the action.
This seemed a heavy price to pay for information that might have been otherwise obtained, but the enemy had suffered more severely, and
General Grant was delayed in his turning movement for twenty-four hours. He however got the start in the race for the
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North Anna;
Hancock's corps, leading off on the night of the 20th, was followed rapidly by the remainder of his army.
On the morning of the 21st
Ewell's corps moved from the left to the right of our line, and later on the same day it was pushed southward on the
Telegraph road, closely followed by
Longstreet's corps.
5 A. P. Hill brought up the rear that night, after a sharp “brush” with the Sixth Corps, which was in the act of retiring from its lines.
Lee had the inside track this time, as the
Telegraph road on which he moved was the direct route, while
Grant had to swing round on the arc of a circle of which this was the chord.
About noon on the 22d the head of our column reached the
North Anna, and that night
Lee's army lay on the south side of the river.
We had won the second heat and secured a good night's rest besides, when the
Federal army appeared on the other side in the forenoon of the 23d.
Warren's corps crossed the river that afternoon without opposition at Jericho Ford, four miles above the
Chesterfield bridge on the
Telegraph road; but as it moved out from the river it met
Cadmus Wilcox's division of
Hill's corps, and a severe but indecisive engagement ensued, the confronting lines intrenching as usual.
Meanwhile a small earth-work, that had been built the year before, covering the approaches to the bridge on the
Telegraph road and now held by a small detachment from
Kershaw's division, was attacked and carried by troops in of
Hancock's corps, the
Confederates at retiring across the river with the loss of a few prisoners.
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Confederate trenches at Chesterfield bridge on the North Anna, half a mile above the Railroad bridge.
[see map, next Page.] from a War-time photograph. |
It did not seem to be
General Lee's purpose to offer any serious resistance to
Grant's passage of the river at the points selected.
His lines had been retired from it at both these points, but touched it at Ox Ford, a point intermediate between them.
Hancock's corps, having secured the
Chesterfield bridge, crossed over on the morning of the 24th, and, extending down the river, moved out until it came upon
Longstreet's and
Ewell's corps in position and ready for battle.
The Sixth Corps (
General Wright) crossed at
Jericho Mill and joined
Warren.
The two wings of
Grant's army were safely across the river, but there was no connection between them.
Lee had only thrown back his flanks and let them in on either side, while he held the river between; and when
General Grant attempted to throw his center, under
Burnside, across between the ford and the bridge, it was very severely handled and failed to get a foothold on the south side.
A detachment from
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Warren's corps was sent down on the south side to help
Burnside across,
6 but was attacked by
Mahone's division, and driven back with heavy loss, narrowly escaping capture.
General Grant found himself in what may be called a military dilemma.
He had cut his army in two by running it upon the point of a wedge.
He could not break the point, which rested upon the river, and the attempt to force it out of place by striking on its sides must of necessity be made without much concert of action between the two wings of his army, neither of which could reenforce the other without crossing the river twice; while his opponent could readily transfer his troops, as needed, from one wing to the other, across the narrow space between them.
The next two days were consumed by
General Grant in fruitless attempts to find a vulnerable point in our lines.
The skirmishers were very active, often forcing their way close up to our works.
The line of my brigade crossed the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad.
It was an exposed point, and the men stationed there, after building their log breastwork, leant their
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muskets against it and moved out on one side, to avoid the constant fire that was directed upon it. As I was passing that point on one occasion, the men called to me, “Stoop!”
At the same moment I received a more forcible admonition from the whiz of a minie-ball close to my head.
Turning quickly, I caught a glimpse of something blue disappearing behind a pile of earth that had been thrown out from the railroad cut some distance in front.
Taking one of the muskets leaning against the works I waited for the reappearance of my friend in blue, who had taken such an unfair advantage of me. He soon appeared, rising cautiously behind his earth-work, and we both fired at the same moment, neither shot taking effect.
This time my friend didn't “hedge,” but commenced reloading rapidly, thinking., I suppose, that I would have to do the same.
But he was mistaken; for, taking up another musket, I fired at once, with a result at which both of us were equally surprised, he probably at my being able to load so quickly, and I at hitting the mark.
He was found there, wounded, when my skirmishers were pushed forward.
On the morning of May 27th
General Grant's army had disappeared from our front.
During the night it had “folded its tents like the Arab and as quietly stolen away,” on its fourth turning movement since the opening of the campaign.
The Army of the Potomac was already on its march for the
Pamunkey River at
Hanovertown, where the leading corps crossed on the morning of the 27th.
Lee moved at once to head off his adversary, whose column was now eight miles nearer
Richmond than he was. In the
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Jericho Mills — Union Engineer Corps at work.
From a War-time photograph. |
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afternoon of the 28th, after one of the severest cavalry engagements of the war, in which
Hampton and
Fitz Lee opposed the advance of
Sheridan at Hawes's Shop, the infantry of both armies came up and again confronted each other along the
Totopotomoy.
Here the
Confederate position was found too strong to be attacked in front with any prospect of success, and again the “sidling” movements began — this time toward Cold Harbor.
Sheridan's cavalry had taken possession of Cold Harbor on the 31st, and had been promptly followed up by two corps of infantry.
7 Longstreet's and a part of
Hill's corps, with
Hoke's and
Breckinridge's divisions,
8 were thrown across their front.
The fighting began on the Cold Harbor line, late in the afternoon of the 1st of June, by a heavy attack upon the divisions of
Hoke and
Kershaw.
Clingman's brigade on
Hoke's left gave way, and
Wofford's on
Kershaw's right, being turned, was also forced back; but the further progress of the attack was checked and the line partly restored before night.
By the morning of the 2d of June the opposing lines had settled down close to each other, and everything promised a repetition of the scenes at
Spotsylvania.
Three corps of
Grant's army (
General W. F. Smith's Eighteenth Corps having arrived from
Drewry's Bluff) now confronted the
Confederate right wing at Cold Harbor, while the other two looked after
Early's (
Ewell's) corps near Bethesda Church.
In the afternoon of June 2d,
General Early, perceiving a movement that indicated a withdrawal of the
Federal force in his front, attacked
Burnside's corps while it was in motion, striking also the flank of
Warren's corps, and capturing several hundred prisoners. This was accomplished with small loss, and had the effect of preventing the cooperation of these two corps in the attack at Cold Harbor the next day.
Early in the morning of the 2d I was ordered to move with my own and
Anderson's brigades, of
Field's division, “to reenforce the line on the right,” exercising my own discretion as to the point where assistance was most needed.
After putting the troops in motion I rode along the line, making a personal inspection as I went.
Pickett's division, the first on our right, held a strong position along the skirt of a wood, with open fields in front, and needed no strengthening.
The left of
Kershaw's division, which was the next in order, was equally strong; but on calling at
General Kershaw's quarters I was informed of the particulars of the attack upon his own and
Hoke's divisions the evening before, and requested by him to place my troops as a support to his right wing, which had been thrown back by the attack.
On examining the line I found it bent sharply back at almost a right angle, the point of which rested upon a body of heavy woods.
The works were in open ground and were ill-adapted to resist an attack.
The right face of the angle ran along a slope, with a small marshy stream behind and higher ground in front.
The works had evidently been built just where the troops found.
themselves at the close of the fight the previous evening.
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The Pennsyivania Reserves resisting a Confederate attack near the Bethesda Church, June 2.
from a sketch made at the time. |
Convinced that under such assaults as we had sustained at
Spotsylvania our line would be broken at that point, I proposed to cut off the angle by building a new line across its base, which would throw the marshy ground in our front and give us a clear sweep across it with our fire from the slope on the other side.
This would not only strengthen but shorten the line considerably, and I proposed to
General Kershaw to build and occupy it with my two brigades that night.
Meanwhile the enemy was evidently concentrating in the woods in front, and every indication pointed to an early attack.
Nothing could be done upon the contemplated line during the day, and we waited anxiously the coming of night.
The day passed without an attack.
I was as well satisfied that it would come at dawn the next morning as if I had seen
General Meade's order directing it. That no mistake should be made in the location of the works, I procured a hatchet, and accompanied by two members of my staff, each with an armful of stakes, went out after dark, located the line, and drove every stake upon it. The troops were formed on it at once, and before morning the works were finished.
Artillery was placed at both ends of the new line, abreast of the infantry.
General Kershaw then withdrew that portion of his division which occupied the salient, the men having leveled the works as far as possible before leaving them.
Our troops were under arms and waiting, when with the misty light of early morning the scattering fire of our pickets, who now occupied the abandoned works in the angle, announced the beginning of the attack.
As the assaulting column swept over the old works a loud cheer was given, and it rushed on into the marshy ground in the angle.
Its front covered little more than the line of my own brigade of less than a thousand men; but line followed line until the space inclosed by the old salient became a mass of writhing humanity, upon which our artillery and musketry played with cruel effect.
I had taken position on the slope in rear of the line and was carefully noting the firing of the men, which soon became so heavy that I feared they
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would exhaust the cartridges in their boxes before the attack ceased.
Sending an order for a supply of ammunition to be brought into the lines, I went down to the trenches to regulate the firing.
On my way I met a man, belonging to the 15th Alabama regiment of my brigade, running to the rear through the storm of bullets that swept the hill.
He had left his hat behind in his retreat, was crying like a big baby, and was the bloodiest man I ever saw. “Oh, General,” he blubbered out, “I am dead!
I am killed!
Look at this!”
showing his wound.
He was a broad, fat-faced fellow, and a minie-ball had passed through his cheek and the fleshy part of his neck, letting a large amount of blood.
Finding it was only a flesh-wound, I told him to go on; he was not hurt.
He
looked at me doubtfully for a second as if questioning my veracity or my surgical knowledge, I don't know which; then, as if satisfied with my diagnosis, he broke into a broad laugh, and, the tears still running down his cheeks, trotted off, the happiest man I saw that day.
On reaching the trenches, I found the men in fine spirits, laughing and talking as they fired.
There, too, I could see more plainly the terrible havoc made in the ranks of the assaulting column.
I had seen the dreadful carnage in front of Marye's Hill at
Fredericksburg, and on the “old railroad cut” which
Jackson's men held at the
Second Manassas; but I had seen nothing to exceed this.
It was not war; it was murder.
When the fight ended, more than a thousand men lay in front of our works either killed or too badly wounded to leave the field.
9 Among them were some who were not hurt, but remained among the dead and wounded rather than take the chances of going back under that merciless fire.
Most of these came in and surrendered during the day, but were fired on in some instances by their own men (who still held a position close in our front) to prevent them from doing so. The loss in my command was fifteen or twenty, most of them wounded about the head and shoulders, myself among the number.
Our artillery was handled superbly during the action.
Major Hamilton,
chief of artillery of
Kershaw's division, not only cooperated with energy in strengthening our line on the night of June 2d, but directed the fire of his guns with great skill during the attack on the 3d, reaching not only the front of the attacking force, but its flanks also, as well as those of the supporting troops.
While we were busy with the Eighteenth Corps on the center of the general line, the sounds of battle could be heard both on the right and left, and we
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knew from long use what that meant.
It was a general advance of
Grant's whole army.
Early's corps below Bethesda Church was attacked without success.
On our right, where the line extended toward the
Chickahominy, it was broken at one point, but at once restored by
Finegan's (
Florida) brigade, with heavy loss to
Hancock's troops who were attacking there.
The result of the action in the center, which has been described, presents a fair picture of the result along the entire line — a grand advance, a desperate struggle, a bloody and crushing repulse.
Before 8 o'clock A. M. on the 3d of June the
battle of Cold Harbor was over, and with it
Grant's “overland campaign” against
Richmond.
When
General Grant was appointed to the command of the
Union armies and established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, we of the Army of Northern Virginia knew very little about his character and capacity as a commander.
Even “old army” officers, who were supposed to know all about any one who had ever been in the army before the war, seemed to know as little as anybody else.
The opinion was pretty freely expressed, however, that his Western laurels would wither in the climate of
Virginia.
His name was associated with
Shiloh, where it was believed that he had been outgeneraled and badly beaten by
Albert Sidney Johnston, and saved by
Buell.
The capture of
Vicksburg and the
battle of Chattanooga, which gave him a brilliant reputation at the
North, we re believed by the
Confederates to be due more to the weakness of the forces opposed to him and the bad generalship of their commanders than to any great ability on his part.
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Extreme right of the Confederate line, Cold Harbor.
From a War-time photograph. |
That he was bold and aggressive, we all knew, but we believed that it was the boldness and aggressiveness that arise from the consciousness of strength, as he had generally managed to fight his battles with the advantage of largely superior numbers.
That this policy of force would be pursued when he took command in
Virginia, we had no doubt; but we were not prepared for the unparalleled stubbornness and tenacity with which he persisted in his attacks under the fearful losses which his army sustained at the
Wilderness and at
Spotsylvania.
General Grant's method of conducting the campaign was frequently discussed among the
Confederates, and the universal verdict was that he was no strategist and that he relied almost entirely upon the brute force of numbers for success.
Such a policy is not characteristic of a high order of generalship, and seldom wins unless the odds are overwhelmingly
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on the side of the assailant.
It failed in this instance, as shown by the result at Cold Harbor, which necessitated an entire change in the plan of campaign.
What a part at least of his own men thought about
General Grant's methods was shown by the fact that many of the prisoners taken during the campaign complained bitterly of the “useless butchery” to which they were subjected, some going so far as to prophesy the destruction of their army.
“He fights!”
was the pithy reply of
President Lincoln to a deputation of influential politicians who urged his removal from the command of the army.
These two words embody perfectly the
Confederate idea of
General Grant at that time.
If, as the medieval chroniclers tell us, Charles cartel (the Hammer) gained that title by a seven days continuous battle with the Saracens at
Tours,
General Grant certainly entitled himself to a like distinction by his thirty days campaign from the
Wilderness to Cold Harbor.
General Lee held so completely the admiration and confidence of his men that his conduct of a campaign was rarely criticised.
Few points present themselves in his campaign from the
Wilderness to Cold Harbor upon which criticism can lay hold, when all the circumstances are considered.
His plan of striking the flank of
Grant's army as it passed through the
Wilderness is above criticism.
Fault can be found only with its execution.
The two divisions of
Longstreet at
Gordonsville, and
Anderson's division of
Hill's corps left on the
Upper Rapidan, were too widely separated from the rest of the army, and, as the event proved, should have been in supporting distance of
A. P. Hill on the Orange Plank road on the afternoon of the 5th of May.
That
Lee did not strike
Grant a damaging blow when he had him at such disadvantage on the
North Anna may seem strange to those who had witnessed his bold aggressiveness at the
Wilderness and on other fields.
He was ill and confined to his tent at the time; but, as showing his purpose had he been able to keep the saddle, he was heard to say, as he lay prostrated by sickness, “We must strike them a blow; we must never let them pass us again.”
10 Whatever
General Lee did, his men thought it the best that could be done under the circumstances.
Their feeling toward him is well illustrated by the remark of a “ragged rebel” who took off his hat to the general as he was passing and received a like courteous salute in return: “God bless Marse Robert!
I wish he was emperor of this country and I was his carriage-driver.”
The results of the “overland campaign” against
Richmond, in 1864, cannot be gauged simply by the fact that
Grant's army found itself within a few miles of the
Confederate capital when it ended.
It might have gotten there in a much shorter time and without any fighting at all. Indeed, one Federal army under
General Butler was already there, threatening
Richmond, which was considered by the
Confederates much more secure after the arrival of the armies of
Lee and
Grant than it had been before.
Nor can these results be measured only by the losses of the opposing armies on the battle-field, except as they affected the
morale of armies themselves; for their losses were about proportional to their relative strength.
So far as the
Confederates were concerned, it would be idle to deny that they (as well as
General Lee
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himself) were disappointed at the result of their efforts in the
Wilderness on the 5th and 6th of May, and that
General Grant's constant “hammering” with his largely superior force had, to a certain extent, a depressing effect upon both officers and men. “It's no use killing these fellows; a half-dozen take the place of every one we kill,” was a common remark in our army.
We knew that our resources of men were exhausted, and that the vastly greater resources of the
Federal Government, if brought fully to bear, even in this costly kind of warfare, must wear us out in the end. The question with us (and one often asked at the time) was, “How long will the people of the
North, and the army itself, stand it?”
We heard much about the demoralization of
Grant's army, and of the mutterings of discontent at home with the conduct of the campaign, and we verily believed that their patience would soon come to an end.
So far as the fighting qualities of our men were concerned, they were little if at all impaired by the terrible strain that had been put upon them.
Had
General Lee so ordered, they would have attacked the
Federal army, after the
battle of Cold Harbor, with the same courage, though perhaps more quiet, that they had displayed on entering the campaign thirty days before.
The Army of Northern Virginia was so well seasoned and tempered that, like the famous Toledo blade, it could be bent back and doubled upon itself, and then spring again into perfect shape.
It may justly be said of both armies that in this terrible thirty days struggle their courage and endurance was superb.
Both met “foemen worthy of their steel,” and battles were fought such as could only have occurred between men of kindred race, and nowhere else than in
America.
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A Rabbit in a Confederate camp. |
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Second day of the battle of the Wilderness, May 6, 1864--view toward Parker's Store, from the Lacy House, the headquarters of Grant, Meade, and Warren.
From a sketch made at the time. |
