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In pursuance of orders my command [formerly
Hardee's] crossed
Duck River on the morning of the 29th of November, 1864, the division of
Major-General [P. R.]
Cleburne in advance, followed by that of
Major-General [W. B.]
Bate, the division of
Major-General [J. C.]
Brown in the rear.
The march was made as rapidly as the condition of the roads would allow, and without occurrence of note, until about 3 o'clock P. i., when I arrived at
Rutherford's Creek, two and one-half miles from
Spring Hill.
At this point
General Hood gave me verbal orders as follows: That I should get
Cleburne across the creek and send him forward toward
Spring Hill, with instructions to communicate with
General Forrest, who was near the village, ascertain from him the position of the enemy, and attack immediately; that I should remain at the creek, assist
General Bate in crossing his division, and then go forward and put
Bate's command in to support
Cleburne; and that he would push
Brown forward to join me. [See p. 432.]
As soon as the division of
General Bate had crossed the creek, I rode forward, and at a point on the road about one and a half miles from
Spring Hill I saw the left of
Cleburne's command just disappearing over a hill to the left of the road.
Halting here, I waited a few minutes for the arrival of
Bate, and formed his command with his right upon the position of
Cleburne's left, and ordered him forward to the support of
Cleburne.
Shortly after
Bate's division had disappeared over the same range of hills, I heard firing toward
Cleburne's right, and just then
General Brown's division had come up. I thereupon ordered
Brown to proceed to the right, turn the range of hills over which
Cleburne and
Bate had crossed, and to form line of battle and attack to the right of
Cleburne.
The division of
General Brown was in motion to execute this order, when I received a message from
Cleburne that his right brigade had been struck in the flank by the enemy and had suffered severely, and that he had been compelled to fall back and reform with a change of front.
It so happened that the direction of
Cleburne's advance was such as had exposed his right flank to the enemy's line.
When his command was formed on the road by which he had marched from
Rutherford's Creek, neither the village of
Spring Hill nor the turnpike could be seen.
Instead of advancing directly upon
Spring Hill his forward movement was a little south of west and almost parallel with the turnpike toward
Columbia, instead of north-west upon the enemy's lines south and east of the village.
General Cleburne was killed in the assault upon
Franklin the next day, and I had no opportunity to learn from him how it was that the error of direction occurred.
Mean-while,
General Bate, whom I had placed in position on the left of
Cleburne's line of march, continued to move forward in the same direction until he had reached the farm of
N. F. Cheairs, one and a half miles south of
Spring Hill.
After
Brown had reached the position indicated to him and had formed a line of battle, he sent to inform me that it would be certain disaster for him to attack, as the enemy's line extended beyond his right several hundred yards. I sent word to him to throw back his right brigade and make the attack.
I had already sent couriers after
General Bate to bring him back and direct him to join
Cleburne's left.
Going to the right of my line, I found
Generals Brown and
Cleburne, and the latter reported that he had reformed his division.
I then gave orders to
Brown and
Cleburne that, as soon as they could connect their lines, they should attack the enemy, who were then in sight; informing them at the same time that
General Hood had just told me that
Stewart's column was close at hand, and that
General Stewart had been ordered to go to my right and place his command across the pike.
I further — more said to them that I would go myself and see that
General Bate was placed in position to connect with them, and immediately rode to the left of my line for that purpose.
During all this time I had met and talked with
General Hood repeatedly, our field headquarters being not over one hundred yards apart.
After
Cleburne's repulse I had been along my line, and had seen that
Brown's right was outflanked several hundred yards. I had urged
General Hood to hurry up
Stewart and place him on my right, and had received from him the assurance that this would be done; and this assurance, as before stated, I had communicated to
Cleburne and
Brown.
When I returned from my left, where I had been to get
Bate in position, and was on the way to the right of my line, it was dark; but I intended to move forward with
Cleburne and
Brown and make the attack, knowing that
Bate would be in position to support them.
Stewart's column had already passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed he would be in position on my right.
On reaching the road where
General Hood's field headquarters had been established I found a courier with a message from
General Hood requesting me to come to him at
Captain Thompson's house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to
Rutherford's Creek.
I found
General Stewart with
General Hood.
The
commanding general there informed me that he had concluded to wait until the morning, and then directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at day-light.
I was never more astonished than when
General Hood informed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack till daylight.
The road was still open — orders to remain quiet until morning — and nothing to prevent the enemy from marching to
Franklin.
About 11 o'clock that night
General Hood sent
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439]
Major-General [Edward]
Johnson, whose division had marched in rear of
Stewart's corps, to report to me. I directed
Major Bostick, of my staff, to place
Johnson on my extreme left.
About midnight
Major Bostick returned and reported that he had been near to the turnpike, and could hear straggling troops passing northward.
While he was talking about this to
Colonel Porter, my chief-of-staff, a courier from headquarters brought a note from
Major [A. P.]
Mason [
Assistant-Adjutant General], to the effect that
General Hood had just learned that stragglers were passing along the road in front of my left, and “the
commanding general says you had better order your picket line to fire on them.”
Upon reading the note I ordered
Major Bostick to return to
General Johnson, whose command was on my left and nearest the pike, and say to him that he must take a brigade, or, if necessary, his whole division, and go on to the pike and cut off anything that might be passing.
Major Bostick afterward informed me that
General Johnson commenced complaining bitterly at having been “loaned out,” and asked why
General Cheatham did not order one of his own divisions to go in ; but at length ordered his horse and rode with
Major Bostick close up to the turnpike, where they found everything quiet and no one passing.
General Johnson came with
Major Bostick to my quarters, and informed me of what they had done.
It was now about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 30th.
This suggestion that I had better order my pickets to fire upon stragglers passing in front of my left was the only order, if that can be called an order, that I received from
General Hood after leaving him at his quarters early in the night, when he had informed me of his determination to wait until daylight to attack the enemy.
What reason
General Stewart gave for not reaching the turnpike I do not know.
As I have already stated,
General Hood said to me repeatedly, when I met him between 4 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, “
Stewart will be here in a few minutes.”
Stewart's column did not come up until about dark.
General Stewart says he was at
Rutherford's Creek before
General Brown's division crossed that stream.
He also says that
General Hood there ordered him to form line of battle on the south side of the creek, and that he was not allowed to move thence until dusk.
If
General Stewart had followed
Brown he would have been in position on my right, across the turnpike, before dark.
That he would have executed an order to make such disposition of his command, no one who knows that officer will doubt; and he would have done it in the darkness of midnight as surely and as certainly as in the day.
