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On the 18th of July, Grant announced to Halleck the fall of Jackson and the completion of the Vicksburg campaign.
In the same dispatch, he said: ‘It seems to me, now, that Mobile should be captured, the expedition starting from Lake Ponchartrain.’
But Halleck had other plans, and, on the 22d, he replied: ‘efore attempting Mobile, I think it will be best to clean up a little.
Johnston should be disposed of, also Price and Marmaduke, so as to hold line of Arkansas river.
This will enable us to withdraw troops from Missouri.
Vicksburg and Port Hudson should be repaired, so as to be tenable by small garrisons; also, assist Banks in clearing out western Louisiana.
When these things are accomplished, there will be a large available force to operate either on Mobile or Texas.
Navy is not ready for cooperation; should Sumter fall, then iron-clads can be sent to assist at Mobile.’
This strategy was in accordance with Halleck's habit of scattering his forces and energies upon conparatively unimportant objects, leaving the great and decisive aims to be accomplished last.
He seemed unable to appreciate the fact, that if the main objects of the war were gained, the lesser ones were sure to follow; or even the purely military maxim, that strategic points of the highest consequence should be first secured.
Had Grant's suggestion been acted on, and a campaign against Mobile promptly authorized, before the rebels had time to recover from the stunning
New York Appleton 1885.
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