Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

1 The rebels reported a loss of sixty-three killed, one hundred and thirty-four wounded, and ten missing.

2 It has been supposed and stated by some, that Sherman's reverse was the consequence of a failure on Grant's part to move south from Grenada, and appear in the rear of Vicksburg at the time of the assault. I have already explained what was the nature and extent of the cooperation planned by Grant. He meant, if he could, to hold Pemberton at Grenada, and thus allow Sherman to enter Vicksburg without any material opposition: but the strength of the works was not fully appreciated when this arrangement was made; they were so strong that had Grant been able to keep Pemberton's entire force in his own front, there would have been no different result to Sherman's endeavor. Sherman himself declared that his failure was owing to ‘the strength of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial;’ and he never could have anticipated a tactical cooperation from Grant, for Grant had neither promised nor suggested it. The letters from Grant to Halleck, and Grant's orders to Sherman, both given in full above (in the text or in notes), are proof of this assertion. Sherman himself declared in his report of the operations: ‘I supposed their’ (the rebel) ‘organized forces to amount to about fifteen thousand, which could be reinforced at the rate of about five thousand a day, provided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemberton's forces at Grenada.’ Again, in the same report: ‘Not one word could I hear from General Grant, who was supposed to be pushing south.’ ‘I proposed. . . to attack the enemy's right, which, if successful, would give us the substantial possession of the Yazoo river, and place us in communication with General Grant.’ ‘Of course I was sadly disappointed, as it was the only remaining chance of our securing a lodgment on the ridge between the Yazoo and the Black rivers, from which to operate against Vicksburg and the railroad east, as also to secure the navigation of the Yazoo river.’ ‘The rumor of General Grant having fallen back behind the Tallahatchie, became confirmed by my receiving no intelligence from him.’ ‘The effort was necessary to a successful accomplishment of my orders, and the combinations were the best possible under the circumstances. I assume all the responsibility, and attach blame to no one.’

In his orders to division commanders before the attack, dated December 23d, Sherman said: ‘Parts of this general plan are to cooperate with the naval squadron in the reduction of Vicksburg, to secure possession of the land lying between the Yazoo and the Black, and to act in concert with General Grant against Pemberton's forces, supposed to have Jackson, Mississippi, as a point of concentration.’ In the same paper: ‘It may be necessary (looking to Grant's approach), before attacking Vicksburg, to reduce the battery at Haine's bluff first, so as to enable some of the lighter gunboats and transports to ascend the Ya-zoo, and communicate with General Grant.’ Again: ‘Grant's left and centre were at the last accounts approaching the Yallabusha, near Grenada, and the railroad to his rear, by which he drew his supplies, was reported to be seriously damaged. This may disconcert him somewhat, but only makes more important our line of operations. At the Yallabusha, General Grant may encounter the army of General Pemberton, the same which refused him battle on the line of the Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified; but as he’ (Pemberton) ‘will not have time to fortify the Yallabusha, he will hardly fortify there, and in that event General Grant will immediately advance down the high ridge lying between the Big Black and Yazoo, and will expect to meet us on the Yazoo, and receive from us the supplies which he needs, and which he knows we carry along.’ Finally: ‘I purpose to land our whole force on the Mississippi side, and then to reach the point where the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad crosses the Big Black, after which to attack Vicksburg by land, whilst the gunboats assail it by water.’

Of course those who think or have said that General Grant was to meet Sherman at Vicksburg, or to cooperate with him in the assault, never can have seen these papers. It is evident that Sherman understood exactly what his chief meant to do, and explained those intentions to his own subordinates. It is plain that he felt the greatest anxiety to open up the Yazoo river, so that Grant might descend, and in order to open the Yazoo, he made the assault; it is plain, not only, that he did not expect Grant to be at Vicksburg, but that he had heard and believed strong rumors of the disaster which had occurred to Grant's line of communication; that, knowing the probability of this disaster having occurred, he was, like a good soldier and loyal subordinate, still more anxious to assault, in order to relieve his commander from what might be imminent stress; that he knew Grant's objective to be Pemberton, and declared that Pemberton's point of concentration was Jackson, fifty miles from Vicksburg; that after the unsuccessful assault he still made no ungenerous attempt to lay the blame on any shoulders but his own, but assumed it all, if any blame there was in making a skilful and courageous though unsuccessful effort to take a place of unusual strength by storm. Sherman deserves all praise for his determination to attempt the assault, when he knew, not only, that Grant never intended to support him in its tactical execution, but that he was prob ably unable to render even the strategical support to the movement which had originally been planned.