Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

‘ [474] Should he cross either river, and move to attack us in this neighborhood, he will be so far from the main body of Bragg's army, that he cannot be recalled in time to assist it, in case Thomas finds himself in condition to make an attack, after Sherman gets up.’

On the 14th, Grant telegraphed him: ‘Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be ready to move from there, by Tuesday at furthest. If you can hold Longstreet in check, until he gets up, or, by skirmishing and falling back, can avoid serious loss to yourself, and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here, and place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies.¹ Sherman would have been here before this, but for high water in Elk river, driving him some thirty miles up that river, to cross.’ On the same day, he again telegraphed to Burnside: ‘Can you hold the line from Knoxville to Clinton, for seven days? If so, I think the whole Tennessee valley can be secured from present danger.’ And again, at ten o'clock that night: ‘It is of the most vital importance that East Tennessee should be held. Take immediate steps to that end. Evacuate Kingston, if you think best. As I said in a previous dispatch, I think seven days more will enable us to make such movements as to make the whole valley secure, if you hold on that time.’ On the 15th, he said again: ‘I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee, in strong enough terms. Hold on to Knoxville, and that portion of the valley which you will necessarily ’