Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

‘ [253] Black and Yazoo rivers. We must beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the trains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train.’

By these dispositions, Grant's whole command would converge at Bolton, marching by different roads. The troops were admirably located for such a move. The heavy rains, however, had impeded the march, and pioneers had sometimes to drain the roads before artillery or wagons could pass. These rapid movements taxed the strength of the troops, but no one murmured. Officers and men seemed inspired to extraordinary efforts, and finding that every time they met the enemy they outnumbered and beat him, began to understand that life was saved and success secured by the rapidity which cost them only temporary fatigue. ‘Better weary our legs in marching, than lose them altogether in battle,’ said the soldiers, and moved on cheerfully.

When Grant's orders reached McClernand, that commander had Hovey's division on the Clinton road, four miles in rear of McPherson, and facing Jackson; another division (Carr's) was within six miles of Sherman, near Mississippi Springs, and a third, under Osterhaus, was at Raymond. Smith s division was back near Auburn, with Blair, guarding the only train of supplies that Grant received from Grand Gulf during this campaign. McClernand faced about his troops promptly, and moved, on the 15th, at an early hour. By nine and a half o'clock, a detachment of cavalry in Osterhaus's command had seized Bolton, driving out the enemy's pickets, and