[1246a]
[1]
in order that they
may not appear from selfish considerations actually to choose the joy
of their friend's grief and furthermore to find it a relief not to
bear their misfortunes alone. And as both well-being and companionship are
desirable, it is clear that companionship combined with even a lesser
good is in a way more desirable than separation with a greater good.
But as it is not clear how much value companionship has, at this point
men differ, and some think it is friendly to share everything in
company, and say, for instance, that it is pleasanter to dine with
company though having the same food; others wish to share only in
well-being, because, they say, if one supposes extreme cases, people
experiencing great adversity in company or great prosperity separately
are on a par. And it is
much the same as this in regard to misfortunes also; sometimes we wish
our friends to be absent, and do not want to give them pain when their
presence is not going to do any good, but at other times for them to
be present is most pleasant. And the reason of this contrariety is
very easily explained; it comes about because of the things stated
before,1 and
because to behold a friend in pain or in a bad state is a thing we
absolutely shun, as we shun it in our own case, but to see a friend is
as pleasant as anything can be, for the reason stated,2 and indeed to see him ill if
one is ill oneself; so
that whichever of these is more pleasant, it sways the balance of
wishing him to be present or not.
[20]
And it fits in that the former occurs in the case of
inferior people, and for the same reason; they are most eager for
their friends not to prosper and not to be absent if they themselves
have to suffer adversity. Hence sometimes suicides kill those whom
they love with themselves, as they think that they feel their own
misfortune more if their loved ones are to survive3; just as, if a man in trouble had the memory
that he had once been prosperous, he would be more conscious of his
trouble than if he thought that he had always done badly.
1 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1245b 26-1246a 2.
2 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1245a 26-b 9.
3 In the Greek this clause is left to be understood.
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