[
1072b]
[1]
and that which is first in a class is
always best or analogous to the best.
That the final cause may apply to immovable things is shown by the
distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is not only "the good
for something," but also "the good which is
the end of some action." In the latter sense it
applies to immovable things, although in the former it does not; and
it causes motion as being an object of love, whereas all other things
cause motion because they are themselves in motion.Now if a thing is moved, it can be
otherwise than it is. Therefore if the actuality of "the heaven" is
primary locomotion, then in so far as "the heaven" is moved, in this
respect at least it is possible for it to be otherwise; i.e. in
respect of place, even if not of substantiality. But since there is
something—X—which moves while being itself
unmoved, existing actually, X cannot be otherwise in any
respect.For the
primary kind of change is locomotion,
1 and of locomotion circular
locomotion
2; and this is the motion which X induces. Thus X is necessarily
existent; and qua necessary it is good, and is
in this sense a first principle.
3 For the necessary has all
these meanings: that which is by constraint because it is contrary to
impulse; and that without which excellence is impossible; and that
which cannot be otherwise, but is absolutely necessary.
4Such, then, is the first principle upon which
depend the sensible universe and the world of nature.And its life is like the best
which we temporarily enjoy. It must be in that state always (which for
us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure.
5(And for this reason waking, sensation and
thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant
because of them.) Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which
is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that which
is in the highest sense best.
6
[20]
And thought thinks itself through
participation in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of
thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and
the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of
the object of thought, i.e. essence, is thought. And it actually
functions when it possesses this object.
7 Hence it is actuality
rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of
rational thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most
pleasant and best.If,
then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which
we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is greater, this is
still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs
to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that
actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and
eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most
good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to
God; for that is what God is.
Those who suppose, as do the
Pythagoreans and Speusippus,
8 that
perfect beauty and goodness do
not exist
in the beginning (on the ground that whereas the first beginnings of
plants and animals are causes, it is in the products of these that
beauty and perfection are found) are mistaken in their
views.For seed
comes from prior creatures which are perfect, and that which is first
is not the seed but the perfect creature.