[
1036b]
[1]
for the bronze would be none the less
no part of the form, but it is difficult to separate it in
thought.For
example, the form of "man" is always manifested in flesh and bones and
elements of this kind; then are these actually parts of the form and
formula, or are they not so, but matter, though since the form is not
induced in other materials, we cannot separate it?Now since this seems to be possible,
but it is not clear
when, some thinkers
1 are
doubtful even in the case of the circle and the triangle, considering
that it is not proper to define them by lines and continuous space,
but that all these are to the circle or triangle as flesh or bone is
to man, and bronze or stone to the statue; and they reduce everything
to numbers, and say that the formula of "line" is the formula of
2.And of the
exponents of the Forms, some make 2 the Ideal line, and some the form
of the line
2;
for they say that in some cases the form and that of which it is the
form, e.g. 2 and the form of 2, are the same; but in the case of
"line" this is no longer so.It follows, then, that there is one form of
many things whose form is clearly different (a consequence which
confronted the Pythagoreans too
3), and that
it is possible to make one supreme Form of everything, and not to
regard the rest as forms.
[20]
In
this way, however, all things would be one.
Now we
have stated that the question of definitions involves some difficulty,
and have shown why this is so. Hence to reduce everything in this way
and to dispose of the matter is going too far; for some things are
presumably a particular form in particular matter, or particular
things in a particular state.And the analogy in the case of the living
thing which the younger
Socrates
4 used to state is not a good one; for it
leads one away from the truth, and makes one suppose that it is
possible for a man to exist without his parts, as a circle does
without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for the animal is
sensible and cannot be defined without motion, and hence not unless
its parts are in some definite condition;for it is not the hand in
any
condition that is a part of a man, but only when it can perform its
function, and so has life in it. Without life in it it is not a
part.
And with respect to
mathematical objects, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of
the formulae of the whole; e.g., why are the formulae of the
semicircles not parts of the formula of the circle? for they are not
sensible.Probably
this makes no difference; because there will be matter even of some
things which are not sensible.