General Grant on the Wilderness campaign.
Extract from his report as Lieutenant-General, dated July 22d, 1865.
The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of
Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions.
Before night, the whole army was across the
Rapidan (the Fifth and Sixth corps crossing at Germanna Ford, and the Second Corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under
Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance), with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition.
The average distance traveled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained: that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected.
Early on the 5th the advance corps (the Fifth,
Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near
Mine Run.
The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness.
General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was, at the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the
Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to
Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the
Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received.
This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th.
By 6 o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the
Wilderness Tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the
Rappahannock and
Rapidan rivers.
Considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accouterments of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.
The
battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th.
After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion.
But the promptness of
General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon re-formed it and restored order.
On the morning of the 7th reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field.
From this it was evident to my mind that the two days fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in
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the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works.
I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and
Richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank.
On the night of the 7th the march was commenced toward Spotsylvania Court House, the Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road.
But the enemy, having become apprised of our movement and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.
On the 8th
General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance to gain time to fortify the line taken up at
Spotsylvania.
This force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides.
On the morning of the 9th
General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with
Richmond.
The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results.
Among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier
Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Army Corps.
Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command.
Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position.
The Second Corps,
Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of [Edward]
Johnson's division of
Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery.
But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive.
The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reenforcements from
Washington.
Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spotsylvania Court House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement to the
North Anna, to commence at 12 o'clock on the night of the 19th.
Late in the afternoon of the 19th,
Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed with heavy loss.
This delayed the movement to the
North Anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced.
But the enemy, again having the shorter line and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the
North Anna in advance of us, and took position behindit.
The Fifth Corps reached the
North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the Sixth Corps.
The Second and Ninth corps got up about the same time, the Second holding the railroad bridge, and the Ninth lying between that and Jericho Ford.
General Warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter.
On the 25th
General Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from
Spotsylvania, having destroyed the depots at
Beaver Dam and
Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to
Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at
Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around
Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the
Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the
James River, where he communicated with
General Butler.
This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains.
General Butler moved his main force up the
James River, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May,
General Gillmore having joined him with the Tenth Corps.
At the same time he sent a force of 1800 cavalry, by way of
West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of 3000 cavalry, under
General Kautz, from
Suffolk, to operate against the road south of
Petersburg and
Richmond.
On the 5th he occupied, without opposition, both
City Point and
Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise.
On the 6th he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching.
On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting.
On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:
Our operations may be summed up in a few words.
With 1700 cavalry we have advanced up the
Peninsula, forced the
Chickahominy, and have safely brought them to their present position.
These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets toward
Richmond.
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General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from
Suffolk, on the same day with our movement up the
James River, forced the
Black Water, burned the railroad bridge at
Stony Creek, below
Petersburg, cutting into
Beauregard's force at that point.
We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of
Lee's army.
I have ordered up the supplies.
Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by
Kautz.
That portion which reached
Petersburg under
Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.
General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to
Lee from
Beauregard's force.
On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at
Drewry's Bluff, or
Fort Darling, with small loss.
The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of
Richmond and
Petersburg, enabling, as it did,
Beauregard to collect his loose forces in
North and
South Carolina, and bring them to the defense of those places.
On the 16th, the enemy attacked
General Butler in his position in front of
Drewry's Bluff.
He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the
James and
Appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, there-fore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against
Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked.
It required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there.
On the 12th
General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at
Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula stations, destroying them, the railroad track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the
South Side Road, struck it at
Wilson's,
Wellsville, and
Black's and
White's stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to
City Point, which he reached on the 18th.
On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of
General Butler, the enemy, with a land force under
General Hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked
Plymouth, N. C., commanded by
General H. W. Wessells, and our gun-boats there; and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured.
The gun-boat
Smithfield was sunk, and the
Miami disabled.
The army sent to operate against
Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at
Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reenforcements brought from the
South by
Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac.
In addition to this reenforeement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under
Breckinridge from the western part of
Virginia.
The position of
Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy.
I determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they be sent forward, under command of
Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.
On the 24th of May the Ninth Army Corps, commanded by
Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of
Major-General Meade's command.
Finding the enemy's position on the
North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the
North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's position by his right.
Generals Torbert's and
Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under
Sheridan, and the Sixth Corps led the advance; crossed the
Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes's Shop.
On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the
Chickahominy.
Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss.
An attack was immediately ordered by
General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.
On the 31st
General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the
South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.
General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the Sixth Corps and
General Smith's command,
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The Wilderness Tavern.
From a photograph taken in 1884. |
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Brass Coehorns in use at Cold Harbor.
From a War-time sketch. |
which had just arrived, via
White House, from
General Butler's army.
On the first day of June an attack was made at 5 P. M. by the Sixth Corps and the troops under
General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders.
This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the Sixth Corps, and in front of
General Smith.
During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.
That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed.
The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d.
On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's work, in the hope of driving him from his position.
In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light.
It was the only general attack made from the
Rapidan to the
James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses.
I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion.
From the proximity of the enemy to his defenses around
Richmond, it was impossible by any flank movement to interpose between him and the city.
I was still in a condition either to move by his left flank, and invest
Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the
James.
While the former might have been better as a covering for
Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of
Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the
James.
My idea, from the start, had been to beat
Lee's army north of
Richmond, if possible; then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the
James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege
Lee in
Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.
After the
battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them.
Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had designed north of
Richmond.
I therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to
Charlottesville and
Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between
Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynch-burg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the
James River, by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal.
On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under
General Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions to
Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near
Charlottesville, to join his forces to
Sheridan's; and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down in
Sheridan's instructions.
On the 10th of June
General Butler sent a force of infantry under
General Gillmore, and of cavalry under
General Kautz, to capture
Petersburg, if
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possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the
Appomattox.
The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in toward the town, but were forced to retire.
General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to
Bermuda Hundred without attempting one.
Attaching great importance to the possession of
Petersburg I sent back to
Bermuda Hundred and
City Point General Smith's command by water via the
White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.
This was for the express purpose of securing
Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reenforce the place.
The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under
General Wilson, and the Fifth Corps crossed the
Chickahominy at
Long Bridge, and moved out to
White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps.
The advance corps reached
James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th.
During three long years the armies of the
Potomac and
Northern Virginia had been confronting each other.
In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage-ground of either.
The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the
North, finding that they had failed to capture
Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and Southern territory.
Hence,
Antietam,
Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought were by them set down as failures on our part and victories for them.
Their army believed this.
It produced a
morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting.
The battles of the
Wilderness,
Spotsylvania,
North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive.
His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the
Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field.
The details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of
Major-General Meade and the subordinate reports accompanying it.
During the campaign of forty-three days, from the
Rapidan to the
James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels.
Too much credit cannot therefore be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the
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Mansion and grounds on Marye's Hill: this sketch is from a photograph taken during the Wilderness campaign when the mansion and grounds were filled with Union wounded.
The portico faces Fredericksburg, and a few paces in front of it the Hill drops abruptly to the sunken telegraph road and stone wall. |
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General Grant and staff at Bethesda Church, North of Cold Harbor.
From a War-time photograph.
General Grant is sitting with his back to the smaller tree. |
zeal and efficiency displayed by them.
Under the general supervision of the
chief quartermaster,
Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.
The movement in the Kanawha and
Shenandoah valleys, under
General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May.
General Crook, who had the immediate command of the
Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to
General Averell.
They crossed the mountains by separate routes.
Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near Wythe-ville, on the 10th, and, proceeding to
New River and
Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with
Crook at Union on the 15th.
General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at
New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind
Cedar Creek.
Not regarding the operations of
General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and
Major-General Hunter was appointed to supersede him. His instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to
Major-General H. W. Halleck,
chief-of-staff of the army:
near Spotsylvania Court House, Va., May 20th, 1864.
. . . . . . .
The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through
Staunton.
On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for
General Hunter to move in that
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direction; reach
Staunton and
Gordonsville or
Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition.
If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service . . . .
Jericho Ford, Va., May 25th, 1864.
If
Hunter can possibly get to
Charlottesville and
Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country.
The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks.
Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about
Gordonsville join this army.
General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at
Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle 1500 men, three pieces of artillery, and 300 stand of small-arms.
On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with
Crook and
Averell at
Staunton, from which place he moved direct on
Lynchburg, via
Lexington, which place [Lynchburg] he reached and invested on the 16th day of June.
Up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point.
The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great.
To meet this movement under
General Hunter,
General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg a short time before
Hunter.
After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th,
General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.
Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of
Kanawha.
This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defense of the
North.
Had
General Hunter moved by way of
Charlottesville, instead of
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the
James River canal, on the main line of communication between
Lynchburg and the force sent for its defense.
I have never taken exception to the operations of
General Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service.
The promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country.
To return to the Army of the Potomac: The Second Corps commenced crossing the
James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing.
The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.
After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to
Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of
Petersburg.
The instructions to
General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send
General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held.
I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to
Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done; that we could reenforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us.
General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near
Petersburg before daylight next morning, but, for some reason that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown.
Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of
Petersburg from the
Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about 7 P. M. Between the line thus captured and
Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reenforced
Petersburg with a single brigade from any source.
The night was clear — the moon shining brightly — and favorable to further operations.
General Hancock, with two divisions of the Second Corps, reached
General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (
Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops.
But instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into
Petersburg, he requested
General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.
By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force.
An attack was ordered to be made at 6 o'clock that evening by the troops under
Smith and the Second and Ninth corps.
It required until that time for the Ninth Corps to get up and into position.
The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until 6 o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by
General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners.
The Fifth Corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged.
The advantages of position gained by us were very great.
The army then proceeded to envelop
Petersburg toward the South Side Railroad, as far as possible without attacking fortifications.
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