Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 42
Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. and Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D., Ed.

50. A few days before, after the envoys returning from Rome had cut off hope of peace, Perseus held a council. There a contest of opposing views took place for a time. [2] There were those who thought that either a tribute should be paid, if it were imposed, or part of their territory yielded, if this form of fine were inflicted —or, finally, that anything else which must be endured for the sake of peace should not be rejected, nor should the king risk staking himself and his kingdom on a cast with so great a forfeit. [3] If his hold on the kingdom remained quite undisputed, the passage of time might bring, they thought, many means not only of recouping his losses but of making him positively an object of fear to those whom he now feared. [4] However, by far the majority held a bolder opinion. No matter what he should have yielded, they declared, along with it he would immediately have to yield his kingdom. [5] For the Romans were not in want of money or territory, but [p. 445]understood that not only all human affairs, but in¹ particular the greatest of kingdoms and empires, were subject to many vicissitudes. [6] The Romans, said these advisers, knew that they had shattered the power of the Carthaginians and had set upon their necks a very powerful royal neighbour;² Antiochus and his line had been driven beyond the range of Taurus; [7] only the kingdom of Macedonia remained, both near in situation, and such that, when in any way its good fortune began to fail the Roman people, it might seem able to inspire its kings with the spirit of their ancestors. [8] While his strength was intact, Perseus ought to make up his mind whether, after being stripped, by concession after concession, of his resources, and thrust from his kingdom, he would prefer finally to beg of the Romans Samothrace³ or some other island, where as an untitled survivor of his own kingdom he might grow old amid scorn and poverty, or whether, armed in defense of his power and high position, he would either, in a fashion worthy of a [9??] brave man, endure whatever the fortune of war might bring, or as conqueror free the world from Roman domination. It would be no more astounding for the Romans to be driven from Greece than for Hannibal to have been driven from Italy. [10] Nor in truth could they see how it was consistent to resist with the utmost vehemence a brother who was wrongly laying claim to the kingdom, and then, when the kingdom had been securely won, to yield it to aliens. [11] Finally this discussion about peace and war was based on the universally accepted view that nothing is more disgraceful than to have yielded a kingdom without a struggle, nor anything more [p. 447]glorious than to have made trial of fortune to the⁴ utmost in defense of rank and crown.