Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 42
Evan T. Sage, Ph.D. and Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D., Ed.

57. Then about the same time both the consul¹ and the king held a council to consider how to open the campaign. [2] The spirits of the king's men had risen when the devastated area of Pheraean territory had been yielded to their side by the enemy; and so they advised going thence at once against the enemy's camp and giving him no further time for delay. [3] The Romans also were aware that their delay was being roundly criticized among their allies, who were especially incensed that aid had not been given the Pheraeans. [4] While they were conferring as to what to do —for Eumenes and Attalus were present in the council —an alarmed messenger reported that the enemy was at hand with a large column. [5] The council was dismissed and the signal for arming immediately given. Meanwhile it was decided to send out from the king's auxiliary troops a hundred² cavalry and an equal number of javelin-throwers on foot. [6] At about the fourth hour of the day Perseus ordered the ranks of the infantry to halt at a distance of a little over a mile from the Roman camp; he himself led the way with the cavalry and light-armed force; Cotys too and the leaders of the other auxiliaries went on with him. [7] They were less than half a mile from the camp when enemy cavalry came in sight; there were two squadrons made up mostly of Gauls³ —Cassignatus was the commander —and of light-armed troops about one hundred and fifty Mysians and Cretans. [8] The king halted, not being sure how large the enemy forces were. Then he sent from the column two troops of Thracians and two of Macedonians with two cohorts each of Cretans and Thracians. [9] Since they [p. 469]were equally matched as to numbers and from⁴ neither the one side nor the other were reinforcements sent up, the battle ended in a draw. Of Eumenes' men about thirty were killed, among whom Cassignatus, leader of the Gauls, fell. [10] And for the time being Perseus led back his forces to Sycurium; on the next day at about the same hour to the same place the king brought up his troops, followed by wagons with water; for the journey of twelve miles was all waterless and exceedingly dusty; it was clear that they would have fought under the handicap of thirst if the battle had begun at the first sight of the foe. [11] When the Romans kept quiet, even withdrawing their outposts within the rampart, the king's men also returned to camp. This they did during several days, hoping that the Roman cavalry would attack the rear of their departing column; [12] then after a fight had begun, when they had lured them too far from camp, they could easily, wheresoever they might be, turn the tide of battle by their superior power in cavalry and light troops.