This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus
That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves.
1 See ii. 11. 1, and iii. 14. 8.
4 'That Epictetus does not quite correctly compare the notion of what is wholesome to the human body with the preconceived notion (anticipata notione) of moral good and bad, will be apparent to those who have carefully inquired into the various origin and principles of oar notions.' Schweigh. Also see his note on ἀνάτεινον.
5 The topic of the desires and aversions. Sec. iii. c. 2.
6 Compare i. c. 27, 10.
7 This is the meaning of what Medea says in the Medea of Euripides Epictetus does not give the words of the poet.
8 Compare iv. 7. 20.
10 See i. 7. 1.
11 The Pseudomenos was a treatise by Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. vii. Chrysippus). “The Pseudomenos was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks truth: if he speaks truth, he lies. The philosophers composed many books on this difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself in studying to answer it.” Mrs. Carter.
Alterius sermone meros audiret honores—
Discedo Alcaeus puncto lllius? ille meo quis?
Quis nisi Callimachus?
13 Compare i. 19. 4.
15 As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, 11; and Antipater, ii. 19, 2.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.