Early in the afternoon General R. E. Lee
, was placed in command by President Davis
, and during the evening and night he ordered the Confederate army back to its late positions in front of Richmond
The battle of Seven Pines
, though costing each army about 6,000 men, resulted in little.
The plan of the Confederate
leader was admirable, but the execution of it was defective.
Too much time was wasted in waiting for Huger
; but a more serious fault was the delay in sending forward Smith
's division on Longstreet
Next morning the battle might have been renewed with the whole Confederate force at hand with good promise of success.
As it was, the Confederates
had hit Keyes
damaging blows, but it had been done at heavy cost, and the only result of value to them was the increased caution and slowness of McClellan
The new Confederate Commander
at once began preparations for a renewal of the struggle.
Troops that could be spared from the South
were ordered to Richmond
was directed to be prepared to move to the same place from the Valley
at the critical moment. (General Webb
is in error in attributing this movement to Jackson
himself, as he does on page 122. Jackson
had been constantly instructed to keep such a movement in view, as may be seen from General Lee
's letter to him of May 16.) The victories of Cross Keys
and Port Republic
, on June 8 and June 9, made the withdrawal of McDowell
's corps from McClellan
permanent, and left Jackson
free to join Lee
. Meantime the latter was busy in preparation.
On June 11 Stuart
was sent with the Confederate cavalry to reconnoiter McClellan
's right and rear.
This gallant cavalryman extended his reconnoissance into a raid completely around the Federal
army, cutting its communications and destroying supplies as he went.
This expedition, one of the most brilliant and successful feats of arms that had been accomplished up to that time in the war, gave Lee
the information on which he planned his attack on McClellan
thinks it worthy of only a passing allusion.
now ordered Jackson
to join the main army, using a ruse de guerre
to prevent the large Federal forces in Northern Virginia
from following him. Considerable bodies of troops were sent up to Jackson
as if to reinforce him for another advance towards Washington
Care was taken that tidings of this movement should reach the enemy.
On June 16 Jackson
was ordered to move down with the greatest expedition and secrecy, and so admirable was the execution of this plan, that when Jackson
, twelve miles north of Richmond
on June 25th, neither McClellan
nor the government at Washington
had any knowledge of his whereabouts (page 124), and it