Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

[205] prestige and morale was greatest of all. His campaign was felt to be a complete failure, and this conviction became so general that all his efforts could not prevent the Federal Government from withdrawing his army (we think wisely) from the James to the Potomac. McClellan fought injudiciously at Cold Harbor. After his defeat he selected skilfully his plan of retreat, but his mode of conducting that retreat has been most severely, and we believe justly, criticised. Good fighting and the advantages afforded by the country enabled him to escape. He chose an admirable position at Malvern Hill, and made there a judicious and successful stand which saved his defeated army from destruction.

On the other hand Lee won a great success. With an army only four-fifths as numerous as his adversaries, and of which he had been in command only a little more than three weeks, he had driven McClellan twenty miles from Richmond, had broken up his depots and communications, and had compelled the splendid army that threatened the Confederate capitol to fly for refuge to the protection of the gunboats in the river. He had, indeed, nearly accomplished the destruction of this army. On the 30th of June his admirable plans failed of their full results, only from the incapacity or want of energy of some of his subordinates. On the next day, at Malvern Hill, more, perhaps, might have been accomplished if he had himself used greater care and watchfulness to ensure concert of action in the attack. As it was, he completely broke up the campaign against Richmond, and having huddled up the Federal army on the banks of the James, left it to a July sun to force the speedy evacuation of the Peninsula and the withdrawal of the enemy to the front of Washington. General Lee was new to his plan and new to the army he was thenceforth to lead, and for this reason this campaign is, in some respects, inferior to those that followed, especially to the great, the almost incomparable one of 1864; but, nevertheless, it will remain an ever-enduring monument of his military audacity and skill.

One of the best chapters in General Webb's book is the last. It is clear, temperate and judicious. One of the worst is that on Malvern Hill, which is disjointed and confused. There are numerous smaller oversights, some of which show haste in preparation or careless proof-reading. Thus Whiting is several times called Whitney (pages 82-134), Mechum's River is called Mechanic's Run (page 122), R. H. Anderson is erroneously put for J. R. Anderson (page 96), Ellison's Mill is called Ellicott's Mill. （Page 126.) Confederate brigades are frequently spoken of as divisions--as Gregg's brigade (page 132),