Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 20.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

Many new causes of dissatisfaction on both sides occurred in this short campaign. The hostility of the two men is said to have been aggravated by a personal quarrel maintained between their wives, growing out of social grievances about this time, though there is no record of such. There was, of course, a lack of mutual confidence, fatal to success. Davis complained that the general was silent and reserved as to his plans, overruled Johnston's wish to abandon the lower peninsula at once, and pretends to doubt if he even intended or hoped to hold Richmond. This, however, is evidently an afterthought. On his part, Johnston tells us that he constantly urged upon the military authorities the absolute necessity of concentrating to overwhelm McClellan and no notice was taken of his views. As soon as he was compelled to leave the command he states that Davis at once hastened to adopt his suggestions and collect a large army. This looks like truth.

Their dispute gives an inside view of Confederate affairs which will be invaluable to the future historian. Davis, for obvious reasons, clearly understates the Confederate forces engaged in the seven days campaign. Johnston is emphatic in the assertion that the army was reinforced by fully 53,000 men, naming the detachments that were brought forward before Lee ventured to attack McClellan. This would give an aggregate of 109,000. In her book Mrs. Davis states Lee's effective force at 80,762. The Confederate official records on this head are incomplete and unsatisfactory, but there is ample warrant for stating Lee's army at not less than 95,000 men, including Magruder's forces, left to defend Richmond.