Let us turn now to another—to that which records later the three days fighting before
Petersburg.
While
Butler's co-operative move was being foiled,
Grant was urging his sanguinary way from the northward to the vicinity of
Richmond.
He was now approaching the
Chickahominy, upon the banks of which the fate of the
Confederate capital was once more to be submitted to the issue of direct assault.
To reinforce
Lee,
Beauregard was depleted until he had, including ‘the old men and boys’ of
Petersburg, but 5,400 troops with which to hold
Butler off of the
Southern communications of
Richmond and to protect
Petersburg itself.
Butler's force had also been depleted by drafts from
Grant, but he still retained over ten thousand men. He was but seven miles from
Petersburg, and while his forward advance was obstructed, it was open to him by a flank movement across the
Appomattox, where his passage could not be opposed, to throw his force swiftly upon the almost undefended eastern lines of that place.
Beauregard had been
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invited by
Lee to accompany the bulk of his forces, and take command of the right wing of
Lee's army, but he unselfishly preferred to remain with the handful of troops left him at what his military instinct pronounced the tactical point of danger to the defence of
Richmond.
At any time in the campaign of 1864, as afterward in 1865, the abandonment of the
Capital would have promptly followed upon the fall of
Petersburg.
Grant essayed the last desperate effort of his overland campaign in the murderous assault at Cold Harbor.
Sore at his repulse, he lingered upon the northern front of
Richmond for ten days, and then, in determining to transfer the operations of his army to the south side of the
James, assumed the line upon which
Butler's cooperative effort had been directed.
Until he had crossed the
James, it was open to the
Federal general to turn again directly upon
Richmond, in continuance of the idea which had dominated his advance from the
Rapidan.
Lee followed upon his right flank, interposing against such a purpose, but with the coup d'oel which was his own, had on the 14th placed
Hoke's division near
Drewry's Bluff on the eastern side of the river where it was in a position to go to
Beauregard or to act as a reserve in his own operations.
Beauregard, while
Grant was still at Cold Harbor, had, in communication with the War Department on the 7th and again on the 9th, forecasted
Grant's strategy to be the move against which
General Lee was now guarding (or preferably operations on the south side). He had called attention to the defenceless condition of
Petersburg and urgently asked for the return of his troops which had been detached to
Lee.
Grant's movement from Cold Harbor was executed with skill and despatch, and his real purpose was not immediately divined by his adversary.
The movement was commenced on the night of the 12th.
By noon on the 15th
General Smith, with his corps, was before
Petersburg.
At 1:15 P. M. on the 16th
General Lee asked in a telegram of
Beauregard: ‘Have you heard of
Grant's crossing the
James river?’
and on the following day, the 17th, at 4:30 P. M., again telegraphed
General Beauregard: ‘Have no information of
Grant's crossing
James river, but upon your report have ordered troops up to Chaffin's Bluff.’
It was thus the fortune of war for
Beauregard once more to stand in the breach before
Petersburg and save her for the time.
It was the three days fighting that ensued from the 15th to the 18th instant, covering the attempt to carry the place by storm, and preceding the
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regular siege, which was called the battle of
Petersburg, and it is of this that it is proposed to speak.
In response to
Beauregard's urgent calls,
Hoke's division was ordered to him on the 15th, and marched 12 M.
Gracie's Brigade was dispatched later.
These were his own troops which had been sent to
Lee. At
Chester Station,
Hoke found partial transportation by rail, and sent forward first
Hagood's Brigade, then
Colquitt's, while the remainder of his division continued the forced march along the pike.
When
Smith, with his corps, 22,000 strong, had arrived before
Petersburg at noon that day, the three miles of entrenchments threatened, were held by
Wise's Brigade, some detached infantry, the local militia and
Dearing's Cavalry—in all about 2,200 effectives of all arms.
After consuming the afternoon in reconnaissance and preparation,
Smith, at 7 P. M., assailed with a cloud of skirmishers, and carried the lines in his front.
Just after this success,
Hancock's Corps arrived, doubling the
Federal force present; but the enemy, instead of pressing on and seizing the town, which now lay at his mercy, determined to await the morning before making his advance.
Hagood's Brigade reached
Petersburg at dark, and while the men were being gotten off the cars and formed in the street, its commander reported for orders at
Beauregard's headquarters.
Beauregard was on the lines and
Colonel Harris, of his staff, was instructing
Hagood where to take position, when a courier arrived, announcing that the enemy had carried our works from Battery 3 to 7, inclusive, and that our troops were in retreat.
Hagood was then hastily directed to move out upon the
City Point road, uncovered by this success, to check the enemy's advance, and to take a position upon which a new defensive line might be established.
It was a critical moment.
The routed troops were pouring into the town, spreading alarm on every side, and there was no organized body of troops available at the time to check the advance which the enemy was even then supposed to be making, except this brigade and
Tabb's Regiment of
Wise's Brigade, which still held the left of our line.
It would be daylight before
Hoke's Division could all get up, and the main body of
Lee's army was miles away.
In this emergency
Beauregard determined upon the bold expedient of imperilling his communication with
Lee by the withdrawal of the troops along the
Bermuda Hundred lines and their transfer to the south side of the
Appomattox.
Finding these lines abandoned,
Butler next day took possession, and even attempted a further advance,
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but with the arrival of the main body of
Lee's army, he was without much trouble, remanded to his original limits.
It was after dark when
Hagood received his orders, and being unacquainted with the localities, as well as unable to learn much from the confused and contradictory accounts of the volunteer guides who accompanied him when the fork of the
City Point and Prince George roads, just beyond the
New Market race-course, was reached, he halted his column, and leaving it under
Colonel Simonton, rode forward accompanied by two of his staff, to make a personal reconnoissance.
He encountered the enemy's pickets on the latter road at the ford where it crosses
Harrison's Creek, inside of the original line of defences.
The reconnoitering party had nearly ridden in it when they were warned by a wounded Confederate on the roadside.
Turning across the field toward the
City Point road,
Hagood was opportunely met by a courier with a map from
Colonel Harris, who had also the foresight to send a bit of tallow candle and matches.
With the aid of this, and in conjunction with
General Colquitt, who had come up ahead of his brigade,
General Hagood determined upon the line of the creek he was then on, and put his men in position.
Harrison Creek, running northward, emptied into the
Appomattox in rear of Battery 1, and its west fork across the
Southern lines, at Battery 15.
The creek was, therefore, the chord of the arc of our captured and abandoned works, and the line taken for the most part had very good command over the cleared and cultivated valley in its front.
Tabb, holding Batteries 1 and 2, was relieved, and by the time
Hagood was well in position, with his left on the river,
Colquitt's Brigade coming up, prolonged the line.
The remaining brigades of
Hoke arrived during the night, and
Johnson's Division, from
Bermuda Hundred, at 10 A. M. next day. The Confederates now numbered 10,000 men behind their hastily entrenched line, and
Burnside's corps coming up at noon on the 16th, raised the
Federal forces to 66,000.
The morning of the 16th was spent in skirmishing and artillery fire.
In the afternoon
General Hancock, now in command, assailed with all his force.
The contest was kept up into the night, and some advantage was obtained over our right.
