Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

History can only be written from the examination of time, whence the grand movements can be seen unobscured by the dust of action which blinds the immediate contestants. But when history shall know the enormous results achieved by Confederate arms, with almost infinitesimal means, the highest meed will be awarded the genius which used such weapons with such wonderful effect.

When General Johnston evacuated Harper's Ferry his command consisted of hardly 7,000 men of all arms. They were deficient in material, in transportation, in clothes, in ammunition, in every thing. The Maryland battalion had one wagon, which more than sufficed for its baggage and cooking utensils.

Thanks to .Mrs. Johnson's energy and the liberality of North Carolina and Governor Ellis, it had excellent arms. The clothing and equipments procured by her did not arrive until we were at Winchester. Many of the men were indecent for the want of clothes, wanting coats, shirts, hats, pants, and shoes.

On the march, Swisher, a gallant boy from Boonsboroa, fell out of ranks, and said to Captain Johnson, “Captain, it is impossible for me to keep up, my feet are so sore;” “Well,” said the Captain, “I will not order you to do so, but no man of my company has yet fallen out.” “Then I wont,” said he, and taking his place, barefoot for miles, his steps were literally marked by blood over the sharp stones of the Martinsburg pike. At Bunker Hill, on the 17th June, when Patterson was reported advancing, ammunition was served out, which the men carried in their pockets or haversacks. They had no cartridge boxes. The bold front then showed by General Johnston, with his raw levies, forced Patterson back over the Potomac, with a force certainly three or four times as numerous, and infinitely better equipped. A month after, by that masterly flank march, the Federal General was left at Charlestown, while Johnston swept down on McDowell's right flank, crushing it in, and saving the battle of Manassas. Then he only had nine thousand men up, and with the forces of General Beauregard they routed certainly three times their number. Whatever may be the judgment of history as to the inaction after that battle, and the failure to occupy Washington city, there can be no doubt but that the operations, subsequent to that period in which the city could have been taken, were controlled by the highest appreciation of the rules of the art of war.

In July and August, 1861, the Confederates could have occupied