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was attempted at the beginning of the session in December, 1870, and threatened in debate on December 21, some weeks before the memorandum of Jan. 17, 1871, about Canada was written.
Mr. Davis assumes to give the terms of Mr. Sumner's memorandum of Jan. 17, 1871.
Taking it as given, Mr. Sumner appears to have thought the proximity to us of the British possessions a cause of irritation and disturbance, by furnishing a basis of operations for Fenianism; and in order to make the settlement complete, and prevent all controversy in the future, he proposed the peaceful and voluntary withdrawal of the British flag from this continent.
This proposition was neither dishonorable nor unstatesmanlike, and it is in harmony with the best opinions of our time.
The single sentence of the memorandum already given alone invites criticism: but by those words, written not in a formal paper, and signed only with initials, he meant merely to say, as the event showed, that the cession of British America should be our first request in order to reach, as a final consummation, perpetual peace between the two nations.
That this was his thought is shown by other expressions in the memorandum, as where, cordially accepting Sir John Rose's idea that all causes of irritation should be removed, he added: ‘Nothing could be better than this initial idea; it should be the starting-point.’
That he laid no greater stress on this part of his memorandum appears clearly enough from a letter he wrote the day after to George Bemis, in which, mentioning the fact of his memorandum, he refers to the clause in it concerning the depredations of the different cruisers, but without any reference to the clause concerning Canada.
But as demonstrating that he held no impracticable, no obstructive position about Canada this fact alone is sufficient, that he supported in the Senate the Treaty of Washington; and while he criticised some omissions, and moved certain amendments, and spoke at length upon its various provisions, he made no complaint that it did not provide for the cession of Canada, and indeed made no reference to the matter whatever.
This was not the first occasion on which Mr. Sumner had shown his desire for the acquisition of British America, as he had already supported that of Russian America.
Always, however, he insisted that it should be made by peaceful annexation, by the voluntary act of England, and with the cordial assent of the colonists.
This view appears in his speech at the Republican State convention at Worcester, Sept. 22, 1869, where here called the aspirations of our fathers for the union of all Englishmen in America, and their invitation to Canada to join our new nation at its birth; suggested that reciprocity of trade was prophetic of political unity, and pictured our country as hereafter destined to cover the continent ‘from the frozen sea to the tepid waters of the Mexican Gulf;’ but referring to the whispers of territorial compensation for our claims against England with territory as the consideration, he rejected such a solution altogether, except with the full concurrence of Canada herself, declaring with emphasis, ‘Territory may be conveyed, but not a people.’
Is there anything in this aspiration unworthy, visionary, or impracticable?
Rather is there not something in it lofty and inspiring?
Everywhere races of common origin and speech are gravitating to oneness and solidarity.
Such is the lesson of history, and such also is the spectacle of our era. This generation has seen Italy rise from a geographical expression
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