CHAPTER XX
Without establishing more surely the identity of justice and holiness, Socrates now seeks to prove the identity of temperance
and wisdom, and begins to discuss the relation between temperance and justice.
The proof that temperance and wisdom are the same is briefly
as follows:
ἀφροσύνη is the opposite of
σοφία, and also of
σωφροσύνη: but a thing can have but one opposite: therefore
σοφία and
σωφροσύνη are identical. It is admitted at once that
ἀφροσύνη and
σοφία are opposites: the proof that
ἀφροσύνη is
ἐναντίον σωφροσύνῃ is of some length and (as well as the assertion
that a thing can have but one opposite) assumes the identity of
the contrary and contradictory. The usual sense of
ἀφροσύνη
(intellectual folly) and the meaning natural from its derivation
(as the opposite of
σωφροσύνη) are also—as is natural to one who
holds that vice is ignorance—identified, and the whole argument
is unnecessarily spun out.
1.
ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς. See above on
330C
3.
πότερον δὲ ὅταν. Here begins the proof that
σωφροσύνη is
ἐναντίον ἀφροσύνῃ. (1)
τὸ ὀρθῶς and
ὠφελίμως πράττειν is
σωφρονεῖν,
and
σωφροσύνη is that by which one
σωφρονεῖ; (2)
τὸ μὴ
ὀρθῶς πράττειν is
ἀφρόνως πράττειν and
οὐ σωφρονεῖν: from which
it is inferred that
ἀφρόνως πράττειν is the opposite of
σωφρόνως
πράττειν, or (as is worked out at inordinate length) that
ἀφροσύνη
is the opposite of
σωφροσύνη. In equating
μὴ ὀρθῶς with
ἀφρόνως πράττειν in (2) Socrates again confounds contradictory
and contrary: see on
331A
5.
ἢ τοὐναντίον. So Stallbaum, after Heindorf's
ἢ τοὐναντίον
πράττειν: the MSS. have
ἢ εἰ τοὐναντίον ἔπραττον, which is faulty
both because it in no way corresponds to the answer
σωφρονεῖν and
because
εἰ with the imperfect is here unsuitable. In
ἢ τοὐναντίον
it will be observed that Socrates already allows no middle position
between
σωφρονεῖν and its opposite: see above on l. 3.
17.
φέρε δή. From here to l. 24 Socrates tries to prove that a
thing can have but one
ἐναντίον. This is true only if we confine
ἐναντίον to the meaning of ‘contradictorily opposite’ throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the
ἐναντίον of
καλόν is
μὴ καλόν: as soon as we say that its
ἐναντίον
is
αἰσχρόν we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them
multiform)—since
μὴ καλόν is not
αἰσχρόν but may be anything
in the whole world except
καλόν. This part of the argument is
therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between
contrary and contradictory terms.
24.
ἀναλογισώμεθα: of reckoning up and reflecting as in
Rep.
I.
330E X. 618C.
30-1.
u(po\ swfrosu/nhs—u(po\ a)frosu/nhs. This has not
been admitted in so many words, but with
σωφροσύνῃ and
ἀφροσύνῃ
for
ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης and
ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης:
332B l. II: cf. C, l. 16.
37.
ἔμπροσθεν:
332A
41.
τό does not belong to
ἕν but to the clause
ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον
ἐναντίον εἶναι: cf.
τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο in
331C ἐκεῖνον refers to
ch. XVIII.
46.
οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς—συναρμόττουσιν. ‘In his lenem
agnosco Sophistae irrisionem, qui supra §43’ (
326B ‘
πάντα τὸν
βίον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖσθαι dixisset’,
Heindorf.
49.
πλείω δὲ μή. B reads
πλείοσιν, Τ πλείοσι:
πλείω is a
suggestion of Heindorf's, adopted by most editors. The nominatives
ἓν μόνον in l. 48 and
σοφία and
σωφροσύνη in 50 are
strongly in favour of
πλείω. If
πλείοσιν is retained, it must be
regarded as a blemish in Plato's style.
56.
τἀ λοιπά. If
δικαιοσύνη =
ὁσιότης and
σωφροσύνη =
σοφία it remains to identify either
δικαιοσύνη or
ὁσιότης with
either
σωφροσύνη or
σοφία in order to prove the identity of these
four virtues. Socrates begins to prove that
δικαιοσύνη =
σωφροσύνη.
57.
ὅτι ἀδικεῖ:
ὅτι (cf. below,
333D and
Parm. 155E) is
equivalent to
κατὰ τοῦτο ὅ: cf.
Rep. I. 340D ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν
καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαπτάνοντα ρεπὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ᾽ αὐτὸ
τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει; ὅ τι the relative and
ὅτι the conjunction
shade into one another here. There is much to be said for
Cron's view that the words should be written alike: see on
Apology, Appendix II, p. 123.
59.
πολλοί γέ φασιν. In
Rep. I. 348B ff., Thrasymachus
asserts that
ἀδικία is
εὐβουλία, ἀρετή, καλόν and
ἰσχυρόν: compare
also Polus in
Gorg. 469B ff. Notice that Protagoras'
own opinion
—that
ἀδικία is not compatible with
σωφροσύνη—makes for the
identification of
δικαιοσύνη and
σωφροσύνη.
62.
τὸν τῶν πολλῶν: on account of the
τῶν here, Heindorf
wished to insert
οἱ before
πολλοί in l. 59, but such a view could
hardly be said to be held by the majority: cf.
Rep. I. 348E εἰ γὰρ
λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι ἢ αἰσχπὸν αὐτὸ
ὡμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσρεπ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ
νομιζόμενα λέγοντες κτλ. As Sauppe points out, the article
τῶν
refers only to the above-mentioned
πολλοί. With the situation
cf.
Rep. VII. 527E ff.
σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγει: ἢ
οὐ ρπὸς οὐδετέπους ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ροιεῖ τοὺς λόγους,
φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλω̣ εἴ τίς τι δύναιτο ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι;
63.
εἴτ᾽ οὖν—εἴτε: see on
Apol. 34E.
