CHAPTER XXXVI
Although pleasures are sometimes called evil and pains good,
it is in such cases their consequences which are intended to be
so called: at the time itself all pain is evil, and all pleasure good.
The argument proceeds by these stages: First, the meaning of
ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν is explained (
353C: next, it is shown that
pleasures are called evil when they bring pain in their train or
loss of pleasure, not because they are pleasant themselves
(
353C354A, and that pains are called good because they
bring pleasure in their train or escape from pain, not because
they are painful themselves (
354A354C; therefore pleasure in
itself is good, and pain evil (
354CE). The rest of the chapter
forms an introduction to the chapter which follows.
3.
ἐλέγομεν is more humble than
λέγομεν—the idea is ‘used
to call’ till you said it was wrong.
4.
ἀκούετε δή: Socrates bespeaks ‘Attention!’ like a herald.
ἀκούετε λεῴ (e.g.
Ar. Peace, 551) was the usual way of beginning
a proclamation at Athens. Cf.
Apol. 20D, 32A,
Theaet. 201D.
5.
ἄλλο τι. This, the shorter form of this particle of interrogation, is probably not a deliberate abbreviation for
ἄλλο τι ἤ.
Thus
ἄλλο τι τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστιν = ‘this is true—anything else?’
i.e. isn't it?, the words being thrown in parenthetically like
nicht wahr and
n'est ce pas.
6.
ἐν τοῖσδε—οί̂ον: τοῖσδε would lead us to expect an
enumeration of the cases: as it is, only examples are given. The
effect of the Greek may be brought out by ‘in the following
cases—that often for example, etc.’ With this punctuation it is
needless to write (as Kroschel does)
τοιοῖσδε for
τοῖσδε.
8.
γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν: cf.
Meno, 77C ἦ γὰρ
δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ὅμως ἐριθυμεῖν
αὐτῶν; μάλιστα.
14.
κἂν εἴ: see note on
328Aabove.
16.
ὅμως δ᾽ ἂν κακὰ ἦν. So the MSS.: most recent editors
(except Kral) read
εἴη. The imperfect is used because the answer
‘No’ is expected and desired: would they be evil just because
they give us pleasure? Certainly not. See Goodwin,
M.T. p. 190,
§ 503. Schleiermacher wrongly rejected
δέ after
ὅμως: the
‘apodotic
δέ’ is frequent after
ὅμως, ὡσαύτως, οὕτω and the like.
16.
ὅ τι μαθόντα ποιεῖ κτλ. So the MSS. A variety of
emendations have been proposed for
μαθόντα, such as
ἁμαρτόντα
(Schleiermacher, followed by Heindorf),
ἀμαθαίνοντα (Orelli),
παρόντα (Hermann),
παθόντα (Sauppe and others), while
Kroschel doubts the entire passage
ἦν—ὁπῃοῦν, saying ‘Totus
autem locus ita comparatus est ut de eius emendatione desperandum esse videatur’. It would be natural to regard this
particular passage as corrupt if this were an isolated example of
the idiom in question; but—not to mention other authors—it
occurs also in the following passages of Plato:
Apol. 36B τί
ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτῖσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν
ἦγον; Euthyd. 283E
εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον—ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἄν, σοὶ
εἰς κεφαλήν, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐμοῦ—καταψεύδει κτλ.;
ibid. 299A
πολὺ
μέντοι—δικαιότεπον ἂν τὸν ὑμέτεπον ρατέπα τύρτοιμι, ὅ τι μαθὼν
σοφοὺς υἱεῖς οὕτως ἔφυσεν. In each of these cases the MSS.
reading
μαθών (not
παθών) should be retained. In the direct
speech
τί μαθών is used in an impatient question:
τί μαθὼν τοῦτο
ἐποίησας is ‘what ever made you think of doing this?’ (e.g.
Ar.
Clouds, 1506,
Wasps, 251,
Ach. 826): cf. the idiom
τί ληρεῖς
ἔχων; in which
τί depends on
ἔχων (see Kühner,
Gr. Gr. II, 624).
τί μαθών becomes in the indirect
ὅ τι μαθών, but in every case in
which this phrase occurs in Plato
ὅ τι μαθών means not ‘why’
but ‘because’. The transition in meaning is sometimes explained
as parallel to the use of
οἶος, ὅσος, ὡς etc. for
ὅτι τοιοῦτος, ὅτι
τοσοῦτος, ὅτι οὕτως, so that
ὅ τι μαθών =
ὅτι τοῦτο μαθών; but
a simpler explanation is perhaps possible (see my edition of the
Apol. Appendix II, p. 123).
ὅ τι μαθών is an impatient
ὅ τι just
as
τί μαθών is an impatient
τί; but as
ὅτι and
ὅ τι are in reality
the same word (see on
333B, and
ὅτι means ‘because’,
ὅ τι
μαθών comes also to mean ‘because’ (impatiently), the original
interrogative force being lost. Similarly, in sentences like
ληρεῖς
ἔχων, the interrogation is dropped, and the participle alone
survives, conveying the same sense of blame or impatience as
in
τί ληρεῖς ἔχων; which is probably the form of sentence in
which this idiom originated. Here
μαθόντα is of course the nom.
plur.; if (as we suppose) the original force of the participle is
no longer felt in this idiom, there is nothing harsh in finding it
in agreement with a neuter subject.
29.
οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἂν—ἐροίμεθα. There is no sufficient
reason for changing
ἄν to
αὖ or for omitting
ἄν:
ἄν points forward to the apodosis in l. 35
φαῖεν ἄν and is just as idiomatic as
ἄν in
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, e.g. in
311Babove.
31.
οί̂ον τά τε γυμνάσια κτλ. Rep. II. 357C τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾷς
τι—εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατπεύεσθαι καὶ
ἰάτπευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χπηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰπ ἐρίρονα φαῖμεν
ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν,
τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν.
32.
τὰς στρατείας. Ar.
Eth. Nic. X. 7. 1177
b. 9
οὐδεὶς γὰρ
αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον:
δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους
ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γιγνοιντο.
33.
καύσεών τε—λιμοκτονιῶν.
Gorg. 521E πολλὰ ὑμᾶς
καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἁνήρ (sc.
ὁ ἰατρός）—
τέμνων τε καὶ κάων,
καὶ ἰσχναίνων καὶ ρνίγων—ρικπότατα ρώματα διδοὺς καὶ ρεινῆν καὶ
διψῆν ἀναγκάζων. λιμοκτονία (‘Hungerkur’, says Stallbaum) is
part of the
μικρὰ δίαιτα of
Rep. III. 406D.
40.
ἄλλων ἀρχαί: ‘dominions over others’—not
ἄλλων
πόλεων: cf.
Gorg. 452D αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις, ἄμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ.
Heindorf's conjecture
ἄλλαι (i.e. ‘besides’) is not necessary, in
view of
Gorg. 514A (quoted by Sauppe)
ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ
λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχήν τινων ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντινοῦν.
43.
τέλος. The philosophical sense of this word—as an end
of action—is beginning to appear in Plato: cf.
Gorg. 499E ἆρα
καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθὸν κτλ.;
44.
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἡδονάς is Stephanus' emendation for
ἀλλ᾽ ἡδονάς.
47.
ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν: the copula is attracted to the predicate, as
regularly: cf. below,
359Dτὸ ἥττω εἶϝαι ἑαυτοῦ ηὑρέθη ἀμαθία οὖσα.
64.
εἴ με ἀνέροισθε: without the
φαίην ἄν which we should
expect. Socrates apostrophises the
ἄνθρωποι as if they stood
before him; the
φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε of l. 66 is part of what Socrates
says to the
ἄνθρωποι.
68.
ἐν τούτῳ: see on
310Dabove.
πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις means
all the proofs that pleasure is good and pain evil.
69.
ἀναθέσθαι suggests (as often) draughts-playing: a comparison which is worked up into a simile by Plato in
Rep. VI.
487B-C.
71.
ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι. B and T have
ἤ before
ἄλλο τι by a
natural mistake: it is corrected in T by a later hand.
77.
ἄνθρωπος: so the MSS., but
ὁ ἄνθρωπος in line 80.
Kroschel refers to the variation in
321Dἄνθρωπον—τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
—ἀνθρώπω̣—ἄνθρωπος. Cf. below
355E
79.
καὶ αὖθις αὖ λέγετε. We should of course expect
λέγητε, but the second part of a logically subordinate clause in
Greek tends to become an independent clause: see on
313A
