Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 9.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

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[456] labor, and in which he justly placed great pride and confidence. The two armies acted in concert, in pursuance of a prearranged plan, but that of General Smith had not been subject to the orders of General Bragg. To whom, if any one man, is due the credit of planning the campaign into Kentucky it might be difficult to determine, and it is of little consequence to inquire. But when in Kentucky it became necessary for the two armies to be united, General Bragg, of course, assumed command of the whole. Hitherto, whatever either General had accomplished belonged exclusively to his own reputation; hereafter, in assuming the entire command the entire responsibilities devolve upon General Bragg. I do not propose to tire my readers, if ever there should be any, with military or moral dogmas or platitudes, but it is well to remember that, while a commander may be mislead by the advice of subordinate officers, it has never been deemed sufficient excuse for failure, rarely even for palliation, that he received and acted upon false information or the mistaken views of counsellors. To him belongs all the glory of success, and upon him rests equally all the obloquy of defeat. When, moreover, after a campaign is concluded, no charges are preferred, no prominent officers relieved of command, it is fair to infer that there has been no treachery, no gross negligence nor disobedience of orders, no flagrant breach of duty.

General Smith had withdrawn his forces from their position in front of Covington, with the view to cooperate with General Bragg, when, on the 24th of September, he received information that the Federal General, Morgan, had evacuated Cumberland Gap on the 17th instant, and was seeking an outlet by Manchester and West Liberty to the Little Sandy.

Brigadier-General Morgan was at once dispatched to Irvine, with a regiment of cavalry, with orders to get in the enemy's front, and destroying supplies and felling timber along his line of march, retard his progress as much as possible. At the same time General Heth was ordered to Mount Sterling, whither General Smith proceeded the next day. There he learned that Morgan had made his escape, having passed West Liberty. From the declarations of many citizens about Lexington, who professed to know the country well, General Smith was led to believe that Morgan would find the route he attempted impracticable, even for infantry, but he succeeded in getting his artillery safely off. This perilous march, with armies equal to his own in numbers and superior in condition in front and rear, reflects great credit upon the Federal commander. It cannot be denied that the failure to effect his capture rests solely with General Smith. It was owing chiefly to the