Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 9.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

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[457] unaccountable delay in the transmission of the fact of Morgan's evacuation. General Stevenson should have followed more closely; but that officer abandoned the pursuit at Manchester, and turning abruptly to the left, marched to Lancaster, deeming, probably, that the cooperation of his division with Gen. Bragg's forces was of more consequence than the tiresome pursuit of a flying column, which, if it escaped capture, could not be recruited in time to assist Buell in the stirring events about to transpire in Kentucky.

From Mount Sterling, Heth was sent back to Georgetown, Marshall to Owingsville, to prevent Morgan from taking that route to Cincinnati, and General Smith returned to Lexington.

In the meantime Colonel Duke, with a portion of Morgan's cavalry, had attacked the enemy in the town of Augusta, on the Ohio river, and captured his entire force. In this bloody combat Duke lost several of his best officers, shot, it was said, from the houses after the town had surrendered. It was with difficulty that the justly infuriated soldiers could be restrained from executing summary vengeance.

After the surrender of Mumfordsville General Bragg advanced towards Cave City and offered Buell battle. But the latter would not leave his intrenched position at Bowling Green, and finding it impossible to procure subsistence in that desolated region, Bragg retired to Bardstown. Buell then left Bowling Green, and, actuated by a desperate impulse, marched in a direct line for Louisville, passing immediately in front of Bragg, exposing his entire flank. This movement was accomplished without molestation. It is hardly possible that General Bragg could have been taken by surprise, and yet it is not a little singular that he should willingly refrain from striking an enemy in a disadvantageous position whom but a few days previously he had been eager to engage on equal terms. His incomprehensible failure to attack may be explained on the supposition that Buell's army was much stronger than he had estimated, or that it had been heavily reinforced — opinions in either case which it is now quite certain were incorrect.

Thus the two Federal armies extricated themselves from positions of the greatest peril, and displayed in retreating an amount of audacity, which they had never shown in any attack. Morgan's escape was considered unfortunate, but Buell's was universally regarded as a great if not irretrievable disaster. Now that the prime object of the campaign was lost, the greatest vigor of action and dexterity of conduct were required of General Bragg--vigor and dexterity which, it is due to truth to say, did not characterize the subsequent operations in Kentucky. But perhaps the most lamentable consequence of this failure