In the beginning of the spring of 1864 the enemy made an expedition, which may be regarded as the beginning of operations in the last campaign.
This was the attempt made by
.
As my command was called into service on this occasion, I begin my narrative of active operations of my division by inserting the official report which was sent in by me at that time.
Before doing this, however, the following letter, which throws some light on the movements, is given:
headquarters, March 6th, 1864.
General,—In advance of the report that I shall make, I write to suggest some considerations which have occurred to me. In the first place, my observations convinced me that the enemy
could have taken
Richmond, and in all probability would have done so, but for the fact that
Colonel Johnson intercepted a dispatch from
Dahlgren to
Kilpatrick, asking what hour the latter had fixed for an attack on the city, so that both attacks might be simultaneous.
Kilpatrick had said on his retreat that with
Butler's force he could and would take the city.
I regard the force to defend
Richmond inadequate as at present located; and if a determined and concentrated attack is made, grave apprehensions of the result are to be entertained.
But if
Kilpatrick will not risk another attack, there are but two modes of egress from his present position, not, of course, including that by water.
He may, under cover of a feint from the
Peninsula, endeavor to pass by Hanover Courthouse, across Little Page Ferry, and thence to the
Rappahannock; or he may cross into
Gloucester, go to
Urbanna, cross the river there and escape by the
Northern Neck.
A judicious disposition of a proper force of infantry can defeat either attempt to escape.
The Mattadaquin and the
Totopotomoy creeks, with very little work, would make most excellent defensive lines, where an enemy can be checked by a small force; and both of these creeks head near the railroad.
A force distributed along the line of
