This text is part of:
[14]
assisted to proclaim the downfall of the republic which they naturally hated and feared.
Grant, however, appreciated the situation as fully as his opponents.
On the 16th of August, he wrote: ‘I have no doubt the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until the Presidential election.
They have many hopes from its effects.
They hope a counter-revolution.
They hope the election of a Peace candidate.’
Accordingly, he renewed his preparations for a vigorous and, if necessary, protracted series of campaigns.
But the enlistment of the Volunteers had been for three years only, and the term of many of the men was now expiring.
It was necessary to provide at once for this emergency.
On the 18th of July, Grant telegraphed to the President, direct: ‘There ought to be an immediate call for, say, three hundred thousand men, to be put in the field in the shortest possible time. . . The enemy have their last man in the field.
Every depletion of their army is an irreparable loss.
Desertions from it now rapid.
With the prospect of large additions to our force their desertions would increase.
The greater number of men we have, the shorter and less sanguinary will be the war.’
These representations were heartily seconded by Halleck, and had their proper effect.
A call for five hundred thousand troops was issued by the President.1
The response, however, was slow, and if volunteering
1 The call was for five hundred thousand men, but from this number were deducted those already raised, under previous calls, in excess of demand; so that in reality only about three hundred thousand were summoned at this time.—See Report of Provost-Marshal General Fry.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.