Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

[462] was repulsed at half-past 10; and simultaneously a heavy attack of the enemy drove Ayres's whole command back upon Crawford. The rebels followed fast, and all efforts to hold the men in the woods were unavailing; so that both Ayres and Crawford were forced back in confusion upon Griffin. That commander formed his men along a branch of Gravelly run, and Ayres and Crawford retired behind him. Warren promptly notified Humphreys, on his right, of the disaster, and Humphreys sent Miles's division at once to his support. The rebel advance was checked; but the Fifth corps had been driven in a mile.

As soon as the news was brought to Grant, he said to Meade: ‘If the enemy has been checked in Warren's front, what is to prevent him from pitching in with his whole corps and attacking, before giving him time to entrench or return in good order to his old entrenchments? I do not understand why Warren permitted his corps to be fought in detail. When Ayres was pushed forward, he should have sent other troops to their support.’

The affair was over by noon, and arrangements were at once made to resume the battle. Griffin was ordered to advance, supported by an attack by Humphreys, who was to withdraw from his right all the force he could spare, and assault on the left with Miles. But when these dispositions were reported to Grant, he replied: ‘Humphreys should not push to the front without a fair chance and full determination to go through.’ He wanted no more failures. In consequence of this dispatch, Meade determined not to attack in front, but to put all the available troops of the Second corps under Miles,