Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

[564] but Sheridan was convinced that Lee would not remain to be attacked, and Grant coincided entirely with Sheridan. The movement of the rebel wagon train to the left, the advance of Lee's infantry in the same direction, and the subsequent effort to cut off Davies, all betrayed the intention of the enemy; and Grant, as usual, determined to forestall the design. Accordingly, after midnight he visited Meade, whom he found in bed and still ailing.

Meade explained his views to Grant, but failed to convince him, and the general-in-chief took a pencil and wrote out instructions for the movement of the entire army, cavalry as well as infantry, reversing the plan of Meade, and directing the whole force to have coffee at four, and to move towards the left flank at daylight. He reminded Meade that the hour was late, and he had no time to lose. The enemy might already be on the march. Meade never failed in soldierly loyalty, and went to work at once to carry out Grant's instructions. Whether he approved of his orders or not, he always obeyed, and that not to the letter only, but with all the energy and skill and ability at his command.

At daylight the army of the Potomac moved towards Amelia court-house, the Fifth corps along the Danville railroad, the Second corps about half a mile west of it, and the Sixth corps on the right or eastern side; the last two without regard to roads and across country. At the same time Sheridan with the cavalry was dispatched in the direction of Deatonsville, about five miles west of the railroad, and Ord was directed to cut the bridge over the Appomattox at Farmville, where, if Grant's surmise was correct, the rebels would attempt to cross.