Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

‘ [184] south bank of the river, and if Croxton and Granger were withdrawn, I am satisfied he would push across the river, and operate against our direct line of communication, with no adequate force to successfully oppose him.’ The military instincts of the two were thus entirely opposed. The chief was willing to take great risks in order to attain a cardinal object; the subordinate preferred to risk nothing, but to make all sure. One, indeed, often abandoned less important places for the sake of securing the most important of all; the other was unwilling to abandon or expose any position whatever. One provided against danger by compelling the enemy to defend himself; the other by carefully guarding his own weak points. There are many occasions in war when the offensive is the only practicable defence, and Grant was always on the look-out for these opportunities; Thomas never accepted them till they were thrust upon him, though then he sometimes turned them to superlative account. At this time, however, Grant said no more about abandoning the Decatur railroad. He never overruled a distant subordinate, unless it was indispensable. But four days afterwards, Forrest re-entered Tennessee, in spite of Croxton and Granger.

On the 25th of October, Hood appeared before Decatur in force, for, contrary to Sherman's expectations, he intended to invade Tennessee. Thomas, however, remained confident. He had been notified that A. J. Smith was to reinforce him with ten thousand troops from Missouri, and when he reported to Grant the approach of Hood, he also announced: ‘If Rosecrans's troops can reach Eastport early ’