Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

[245] when they differed in judgment at a momentous crisis, than to hope, and to state the hope, that the man who persisted in disobeying might prove to have been right all the time.

Thomas replied at 11.30 P. M.,¹ the same night: ‘Your despatch of 7.30 P. M.. is just received. I can only say in further extenuation why I have not attacked Hood, that I could not concentrate my troops and get their transportation in order in shorter time than it has been done; and am satisfied I have made every effort that was possible to complete the task.’ Still he did not attack.

At 9.30 P. Mr. he telegraphed to Halleck: ‘There is no perceptible change in the appearance of the enemy's line to-day. Have heard from Cumberland, between Harpeth and Clarksville. There are no indications of any preparation on the part of the enemy to cross. The storm continues.’

On the 10th, no despatches passed between Thomas and either Grant or the government; but on that day the general-in-chief directed Halleck: ‘I think it probably will be better to bring Winslow's cavalry to Thomas, until Hood is driven out. So much seems to be awaiting the raising of a cavalry force, that everything should be done to supply this want.’ Hearing nothing whatever from Thomas, at four P. M., on the 11th, Grant telegraphed him once more: ‘If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio river, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there be no further ’