Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

‘ [267] Military Division of the Mississippi on Atlanta, from the commencement of the campaign till its close, and which is now in addition aided by Forrest's cavalry. Although my progress may appear slow, I feel assured Hood's army can be driven from Tennessee, and eventually driven to the wall by the force under my command. But too much must not be expected of troops which have to be reorganized, especially when they have the task of destroying a force, in a winter's campaign, which was able to make an obstinate resistance to twice its numbers, in spring and summer. In conclusion, I can safely state that this army is willing to submit to any sacrifice to oust Hood's army, or to strike any other blow which may contribute to the destruction of the rebellion.’

The defence was eloquent, but on one or two points hardly fair. Sherman left Thomas much more than two corps, as has been repeatedly shown; and Thomas had been, since the 3rd of October, in command of all the district north of the Tennessee. His Headquarters were established at the greatest depot west of the Alleghanies, where thousands of quartermasters' employes were at his disposal to provide transportation, and every facility was afforded for supplying and equipping his troops. Few armies during the war were better furnished than that which fought so successfully at Nashville. It was to ensure this readiness that Thomas had so persistently retreated and delayed; and during the few days before the battle, he had himself repeatedly assured the general-in-chief that he was entirely ready for offensive operations, and waited only for favorable weather. The completeness of his success demonstrates