Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

‘ [83] line of this valley, and the investing army supplied. . . With Crook's force the Valley can be held.’ To this Grant replied on the 3rd of October; ‘You can take up such position in the Valley as you think can and ought to be held, and send all the force not required for this immediately here.’. This, it has been seen, was always his policy. He disliked to overrule the judgment of a distant subordinate; if he distrusted a general, he preferred to remove him; but in Sheridan he now placed almost implicit confidence.

He still, however, omitted no precaution which, as general-in-chief, it was his duty to employ, and carefully considered the supplies and communications of his lieutenant in the Valley. On the 27th of September, he said to Halleck: ‘I think the railroad towards Sheridan should be put in order as far as protection can be furnished for it. . . I would like Sheridan to decide which road should be opened;’ and on the same day he ordered: ‘Now that Sheridan has pushed so far up the Valley, General Augur should send, if it is possible, a force of cavalry and infantry out by Culpeper, with scouts, as far as they can go, to watch if any troops move north on the east side of the Blue Ridge, to get in upon Sheridan's rear.’

At the same time, he was watching the effect which events in the Valley might have on the devices and movements of Lee. On the 1st of October, he said to Butler: ‘The strong works about Chapin's Farm should be held or levelled. Sheridan, for want of supplies, if there should be no other reason, will be forced to fall back. The enemy may take advantage of such an occurrence to bring the remnants ’