Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

‘ [61] despatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee river about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to be met, and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee river. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north, he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I should prefer that; but I must trust to your judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements therefore will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.’¹

Sherman, with his usual ardor, had not waited for Grant's reply, but on the 11th, he sent the following despatch, dated the same hour with Grant's—eleven A. M. ‘Hood moved his army from Palmetto station, across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa river, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Ackworth, and I was ’